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Rioting and the Mob in New Hampshire 1680-1775 
Nancy Elizabeth Scott 
Rioting and the mob in New Hampshire, 1680-1775, had 
a small but interesting and important part in the history 
of the province.  From New Hampshire's first official gov- 
ernment to the year of independence, the province developed 
as both an isolated frontier region and a New England port 
of call.  Its growth coincided with the general colonial 
trend toward a fluid, self-sufficient society.  Within 
seventy years of New Hampshire's provincial beginnings, 
that growth rendered the standards of the British imperial 
system ill-suited to a maturing colonial outlook. 
The inadequacy of the established royal government to 
satisfy local interests was demonstrated by the mob and 
by the rioting which occurred during New Hampshire's de- 
velopment.  The failure of British laws to coalesce with 
the colonial social and economic framework caused dis- 
affection at the grassroots level.  Successful rioting 
demonstrated the incompatability of imperialism and special 
interests in New Hampshire.  It also proved the inability 
of royal officials to enforce imperial laws without the 
support of the local community. 
Rioting as an expression of protest indicated the 
values and priorities of the average citizen.  As a means 
of self defense, rioting was legitimate, since it accom- 
plished practical and necessary political ends which a 
feeble royal government could not handle through normal 
channels. 
iv 
Prior to 1765, opposition to royal government and its 
officials was sporadic.  No one particular issue consistent- 
ly aroused the public; no one class or type of person was 
consistently involved in mob violence.  Local personal ana 
special interests normally governed the attitude of the com- 
munity toward pressure from the royal established govern- 
ment. 
However, after 1765, increasing dissatisfaction with 
imperial ties and distrust of the British ministry drew 
broader issues into civil discontent.  The introduction of 
"ideals" into rioting strengthened and perpetuated up- 
heaval as the mob, with long-term goals, become less easily 
satisfied.  In the context of New Hampshire's society as 
a whole, purposeful mob violence painfully pointed out a 
consistent demarcation between the American and British 
philosophies of economics and government. 
v 
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INTRODUCTION 
The historian examining the significance of riotous 
behavior will find it more than just a study of mob psychol- 
ogy or anti-authoritarianism.   Rioting was and is supported 
by societal conditions internal and external to the group. 
In this sense, the value of the study rests not with the 
"who" and the "why" of the mob, but with what it has re- 
vealed about the society in which it thrived. 
The study of mob behavior has shed light on the com- 
plex transitions of pre-revolutionary New Hampshire.  With- 
in the history of the colony, there has emerged a picture 
of a changing society, a society decidedly different in 
1776 from its English ancestry of the previous century. 
Yet, while it is clear that change has occurred, it has 
often been difficult to pinpoint how or when a trend began. 
Colonial society moved along many lines, with varying 
political, economic and social tensions creating both sub- 
tle and dramatic transitions.  To properly understand these 
tensions and the effect they had on a particular society, 
the historian requires effective guidelines to measure 
change and a reliable and consistent perspective.  Viewing 
the history of a society through the actions of its mobs 
and its reactions to them is one  such perspective.  In 
-1- 
the case of colonial New Hampshire, it is a very interest- 
ing and useful one. 
English common law defined rioting as a "tumultuous 
disturbance of the peace" by three or more persons who vio- 
lently carried out an act of a private nature.  The law 
recognized several variations on this definition depending 
on the intention of the mob, the type of violence employed 
and the nature of the grievance.  However, the use of the 
term "riot" in colonial New Hampshire followed its wide- 
spread application.  From a practical standpoint a riot was 
any public disturbance carried out by a group of men with 
a definite purpose behind their assembly and violent be- 
havior.  The mob was composed of men mutually determined to 
resolve a defined grievance in spite of the methods and 
1 
consequences. 
The history of rioting in New Hampshire runs a course 
parallel to its social, political and economic trends. 
Viewing these through the perspective of mob behavior 
focuses political issues and points up economic difficul- 
ties while shedding light on social ideals.  The study of 
rioting in New Hampshire has shown that the nature of the 
William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 
(London, 1824), I: 513-521; See also A.S. Batchellor, ed., 
New Hampshire Laws (Concord, 1913), I; 355. 
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V_ 
mob changed as the society became more complex.  This is not 
to say that rioting accounted for the changes themselves, 
nor that rioting was a direct result of social transition, 
nor that it was remarkable that upheaval occurred in a 
society undergoing rapid change.  The telling questions 
remain; when rioting occurred, how it occurred and why, and 
what the answers reveal about the issues of a particular 
time period. 
An incidence of mob behavior can reflect more than 
merely the immediate cause of the riot.  The historical 
value of the riot becomes apparent with a close scrutiny 
of the mob.  What actually happened?  What were the origins 
of the mob, its aims and aftermath?  Was the outward be- 
havior of the mob rational or irrational?  How large was 
the mob, who opposed it and who led it?  Who or what was 
the target or villain?  How effective were the opposing 
forces of law and order"  Ultimately, there is more to be 
gained from these questions than simply an insight into the 
values of the popular mass. 
Civil unrest in New Hampshire pointed up the colonists' 
fear of corruption (later of "conspiracies") and the 
British fear of disorder and "tumult", the strength of 
factions and the usefulness of "proper" political alliances, 
the gradual change in centers of acknowledged authority, 
the inadequacy of the imperial government, and the unifica- 
-3- 
tion of the citizenry for the sake of the public good.  The 
study of rioting in New Hampshire has illuminated areas 
where traditional social ideals blended with newly arisen 
political ones, where responses to power became inflamed 
with ideology, and where incompatible British and colonial 
views of law and order failed to accommodate changing ideas 
on political rights, constitutionality, and the nature of 
government. 
The study of mob behavior has served as a convenient 
measure of social, economic and political stability.  More 
important, it has much to reveal regarding the question of 
what ingredients are necessary to achieve an orderly, stable 
society, a society that maintains liberty. 
Perhaps the most interesting parallel between the 
development of New Hampshire's society and the character 
of its mobs is that at the time when the colony suffered 
its most dramatic change, the complete transformation of its 
I 
system of government in 1775/1776, the character of mob 
behavior underwent an equally drastic transition.  As the 
colonists sought to articulate their ideas of "good 
government" and individual rights in response to acts of 
parliamentary power, the mob took to the streets with pre- 
viously unrecognized principles.  The necessity of main- 
taining an ordered resistance to British tyranny, initially 
through extralegal political organizations, transformed the 
-4- 
sine qua non of the mob from special interests to the 
"Cause". 
Recognizing the manipulation of the mob for the sake of 
the revolutionary thrust reveals something of the nature of 
the provincial mob.  Since the pre-revolutionary riots did 
not prepare the people for independence, nor form a pattern 
suitable for arguments of historical inevitability, the 
study of pre-1776 rioting remains important in and of it- 
self.  The consistent character of the pre-revolutionary 
mob underwent a dramatic redefinition once it had to meet 
the challenge to order, the turning point from imperial to 
republican government.  For this reason, the changed charac- 
ter of the mob pointed up society's acceptance of its 
trends. 
The history of rioting in New Hampshire is a history 
of "self-defense", the defense of special interests and the 
right *to a secure and prosperous existence.  Notably absent 
from the pre-revolutionary mob was the zeal for broader 
issues, a fervent ideology.  The discontent was something 
more immediate:  a threat to one's economic security or 
one's own life, with the external enemy trampling those 
rights protected by the Crown.  The villain remained some- 
one or something close at hand (i.e., a British official), 
not an encumbering imperial system.  The mob was interested 
in security for itself.  Thus, the pre-revolutionary mob 
-5- 
provides an insight on the needs, desires and values of 
ordinary men and reflects on the stability of the society 
-5a- 
CHAPTER I 
"It is rather to be wondered that there are 
not more riots when we consider the natural 
imbecility of an administration where every 
civil officer from the Governor to the Con- 
stable are dependent on the people for annual 
support; such dependence had influenced per- • 
sonal interests and destroyed the respect and 
confidence necessary to subordination." 
Governor John Wentworth, 176 8' 
On the night of January 25, 16 83, Edward Gove, one of 
the wealthiest citizens of New Hampshire and a deputy to 
the Assembly from Hampton, set out on horseback from the 
capital at Portsmouth to the homes of various council and 
assembly members in the four towns of the province.  His 
mission:  to persuade the men to join him in armed resis- 
tance to the "unprecedented tyrannical" acts of  Governor 
Edward Cranfield.  Gove hoped to prevail upon the friend- 
ship and good conscience of  his fellow deputies to form 
an armed party to accompany him back to the capital. 
Gove's colleagues shared his sentiments, but only to 
a certain point.  The governor's act of prematurely dis- 
solving the "uncooperative" assembly angered the already 
John Wentworth to Anthony Belham, August 9, 1768, 
Wentworth Letter Book No. 7, p. 130-136, quoted in Jere 
Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism-New Hampshire Politics 
and the American Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 39. 
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indignant deputies, men who resented Cranfield's inter- 
ference with their economic perogative.  However, the sight 
of Gove at their doors heavily armed and anxious for a con- 
frontation brought their better judgement to the fore. 
Gove claimed he would not lay down his sword until he 
knew who would hold the government. Yet, his plan was so 
impracticable that when one alarmed citizen went to inform 
the Cochecho magistrate, deputy Peter Coffin, of Gove's 
intentions, Coffin refused to believe him. 
Although Gove was a decent and honorable man, those 
well acquainted with him hesitated because they knew he was 
given to erratic emotional behavior occasioned by his 
2 
sleeplessness, heavy drinking and "distemper".  Gove's 
colleagues felt sympathetic toward his passions, but could 
not yet condone armed resistance or rioting. 
For those reasons, Gove managed to enlist only twelve 
men to follow him to Portsmouth.  His unfortunate party. 
included his own son, John, as well as Robert, Joseph and 
John Wadleigh, the young sons of deputy Robert Wadleigh, the 
2 
Hampton Rates, 1680, xn Documents and Records Relat- 
ing to the Province of New Hampshire, Nathaniel Bouton, ed. 
(Concord, 1867, 40 vols.), 1: 424.  (Hereafter cited as 
Provincial Papers.); John M. McClintock, History of New 
Hampshire (Boston, 1388), pp. 101-103; Provincial Papers, 1 
491; Deposition of William Waldron before council, Ibid~T 
pp. 458-9; Everett S. Stackpole, History of New Hampshire, 
(New York, 1916, 2 vols.), 1:  132-133. 
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second wealthiest man in the province, William Healey and 
Thomas Rawlins, men not on the voting lists of the pro- 
vince, and two servants of Gove. 
At this time, Gove's colleagues, Richard Martyn and 
Captain Reuben Hull of Dover, fearful of what Gove might do, 
informed Governor Cranfield of Gove's plan.  The governor 
dispatched messengers to Exeter and Hampton with warrants 
for Gove's arrest.  Having heard that Justice Weare and a 
constable were repelled by Gove alone at Hampton, the 
governor ordered the full militia of the province to stand 
ready. 
V     The actual riot on January 27,1683, consisted of a 
momentary charge of Gove's mounted party toward the opposi- 
tion.  The scene of Gove's arrest must have been a somewhat 
ludicrous sight.  With swords drawn, Gove  led his heavily 
armed and outnumbered party, complete with blazing trumpet, 
into the hands of the Hampton militia. 
The governor himself had set out to meet Gove, but re- 
turned to the capital when he heard of the arrest.  The 
Hampton militia secured Gove's party with chains and a 
guard.  The trumpeter, Nathaniel Ladd, son-in-law of Coun- 
cillor John Gilman, escaped and a "hue and cry" was sent 
-8- 
throughout the province for his return. 
The riot was an act of folly brought on by the per- 
sonal anger of one man who became the self appointed leader 
of a rather sorry group of rioters.  It was not a proper 
reflection of the frustration that was felt, although more 
moderately expressed, by his colleagues.  The first pro- 
vincial government of New Hampshire, the administration of 
Edward Cranfield, had been an aggravation to the inhabitants 
and governor alike.  Yet, at the time of the Gove riot, the 
people were not properly unified in their discontent nor 
ready to focus their dissatisfaction on the already 
defined villain. 
The New Hampshire colonists were a fighting people, 
particularly when the stakes included their property and 
purses.  What had begun with the bad temper of Edward Gove 
would resurface with greater significance in the form of 
community violence armed with community approval. 
The English Privy Council, prompted by Robert Mason 
and Edward Randolph, had nominated Edward Cranfield to the 
lieutenant governorship in 1682 with an eye toward securing 
provincial recognition of Mason's claims to a large part of 
3 
Stackpole, History, p. 143; Exeter Rates, 1680, in 
Provincial Papers, 1: 426; Edward Gove to Court of Sessions 
January 29, 168 3, Ibid, p. 4 59; Edward Randolph to Lords 
Committee, Ibid, p. 494. 
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New Hampshire's soil.  Mason had secured his title from the 
Crown through the original grant of James I to Mason's 
grandfather in 1620.  However, in the minds of many colo- 
nists, the rights to the soil were not determined so simply. 
The settlers claimed, upon natural rights, that the land 
was theirs by improvement, defense and long-use, and that 
Mason, on account of his non-residence, had not made any 
such contribution. 
The wealthy planters of the province were openly hos- 
tile toward Mason and his announced intention to charge 
quit-rent on his lands and to dispossess recalcitrant set- 
tlers.  Mason's arrogant attempts to establish authority in 
New Hampshire embittered the already influential planters. 
These men, such as Richard Waldron, Richard Martyn and John 
Gilman, were protective of their land, its resources and 
their own influence in the province.  They endeavored 
(often without scruples) to undermine Mason's chances for 
profit. 
4 
Title of Robert Mason to Province of New Hampshire, in 
John S. Heness, ed., Transcripts in the English Archives Re- 
lating to the History of New Hampshire (New York, 1876), 
p, 75; Second Address of the General Court, June 1630, 
Provincial Papers, I: 412; For information on the Mason 
title and its significance, see Otis G. Hammond, "The Mason 
Title and its Relation to New Hampshire and Massachusetts", 
American Antiquarian Society Proceedings, n.s. 26 (October 
1916): 245; Narrative of Proceedints of Council, in Robert 
Noxon Toppan, ed., Letters and Papers of Edward Randolph 
(Boston: Prince Society, 1898), 26: 104-107. 
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Prior to Cranfields' commission, Waldron, Martyn and 
Gilman had petitioned the king to annex their lands to 
Massachusetts, a connection that would maintain the plan- 
ters' status without interference from "pretended claimers". 
New Hampshire had, in fact, been under Massachusetts jur- 
isdiction for forty years when, in 1679, Edward Randolph 
brought to the province the commission constituting the 
first president and council of New Hampshire and terminating 
the old jurisdiction.  Randolph had informed the imperial 
government that with "patronage and direction" the various 
interests in the colony might be capable of working with 
royal officials for "reform".  Thus, the Privy Council ap- 
pointed the "various interests" (i.e., the "Massachusetts 
men") to the new provincial government.  These men fought 
long and hard against Mason, Randolph and their proprietary 
supporters for influence in the province and for the support 
5 
of the ordinary citizens. 
What proved to be the downfall of the Cranfield admin- 
istration, his aggressive desire for profit, made easier 
the wealthy planters' task of promoting the people's resis- 
tance to the proprietors.  The campaign to degrade the pro- 
5 
Account of the Land Agents at Boston, in Jeness, Tran- 
scripts, p.74; Second Address of the General Court, Provin- 
cial Papers, I: 409-410, 412; Cutt Commission, Ibid, p.373; 
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the 
West Indies, 1681-1685, April 30, 1681, p. 91. 
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proprietory interests.  The campaign to degrade the proprie- 
tary interests began even before Cranfield's arrival.  Just 
prior to 1683, Waldron and Martyn used their council appoint- 
ments to block attempts of the proprietors to establish roy- 
al authority.  For example, the councillors could select 
those who were qualified to vote, and thus admitted to elec- 
tions only those whom they knew supported their own concerns. 
Waldron responded to those who accepted Mason's questionable 
promises of fair land deals with threats of contempt of the 
government. 
Mason's insistent declarations of land confirmations 
and quit-rents were repeatedly torn down by Waldron, who 
calimed that "no such papers should be put up to amuse the 
people".  Edward Randolph, as collector of customs, was 
brought before the council charged with behaving insolently 
by seizing and searching provincial vessels.  For this, he 
was fined thirteen pounds.  Likewise, Randolph's deputy, 
Walter Barefoote, was fined ten pounds for his "high and 
presumptuous" manner in setting up a customs office without 
leave from the council. 
Mason continued his attempts to persuade the people to 
accept his leases, threatening to fell their houses if they 
did not.  Rumors circulated about Mason's design to "en- 
slave" the people by making them pay two shillings for every 
chimney and ten shillings for every room in which they kept 
-12- 
a fire.  All this added up to an atmosphere of suspicion, 
and the new governor walked right into it. 
A frustrated Mason had petitioned the Lords Committee 
to investigate the council's behavior and suly enforce his 
title.  Thus finding the orders of the council "incongruous 
and absurd", the committee appointed Edward Cranfield, a 
minor official at Whitehall,to the lieutenant governorship 
of the province.  Mason, who heartily recommended the ap- 
pointment, mortgaged the whole of the province to Cranfield 
for twenty-one years as security for the payment of one 
hundred fifty pounds per annum for seven years.  The Lords 
Committee also suspended Waldron and Martyn from the 
council. 
What appeared to be: a losing battle for the planters' 
interests — and those of the majority of the inhabitants — 
did not remain so for long.  The colonists did not reject 
the idea of a governor, nor did Cranfield arrive in the 
colony with a pessimistic or vindictive outlook.  But he 
did expect his office to be profitable.  At first, Cranfield 
believed that Ilason had misrepresented the humor of the peo- 
Toppan, Letters and Papers of Edward Randolph, 26:107, 
104-106; Provincial Papers, 1: 423; Jeremy Belknap, The 
History of New Hampshire (2nd ed., 3 vols., Boston, 1813), 
1: 14 7-148; Chamberlain to Lords Committee, Jeness, Trans- 
cripts , p. 96; Petition of Robert Mason, Ibid, p. 112; 
Belknap, History, 1: 153-4. 
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pie whom he found so agreeable, and thus he restored Wal- 
dron and Mason to the council.  Also, Cranfield refused to 
prejudice the people by adopting the restrictive measures, 
such as the restraining of wood-cutting on New Hampshire 
soil, recommended by Mason and Randolph. 
Cranfield reported that Mason had been mistaken to 
think that he could "fright" the people into compliance with 
him.  However, equal numbers of the proprietors and planters 
within the same council proved too volatile a combination 
for anyone's temper.  The favorable impressions of the 
governor were short lived. 
In regard to passing laws beneficial not only to the 
province, but to its officials as well, Cranfield noticed 
a stubborness and a growing  solidarity among the deputies. 
Knowing the inhabitants and their money were not easily 
parted, Cranfield feared he would have trouble getting the 
assembly to award him a salary.  He was correct, for the 
assembly did not necessarily consider the support of the 
government to extend to the governor's recompense.  Cran- 
field soon thereafter found the people "very critical in 
all words and expressions". 
During Cranfield's administration, the grievances of 
the settlers, although directed toward the officials hold- 
ing power by royal approbation, did not involve a question- 
ing of the king's authority in the province.  The inhabi- 
-14- 
tants did not oppose royal officials upon sophisticated 
political notions, but upon more immediate interests, for 
which the people believed the king to be a protector, a 
symbol of justice to whom they could turn. What was to 
Mason and Cranfield a purely pecuniary interest was to the 
landed inhabitants their soul and support, for they had 
risked much. 
In all fairness, the assembly should not have expected 
Cranfield and Mason to be self-sacrificing men.  The criti- 
cal question was the province's ability to bear the neces- 
sary taxes.  In 16 81 the Council had reported that with long 
winters and barren soil there was hardly enough food raised 
to support the inhabitants; also, many homes and estates 
destroyed in the last Indian war had not fully recovered. 
For want of improvement in the land, the inhabitants 
7 
"groaned" under the taxes already assessed.   In the mxnds 
of the settlers, Cranfield  and Mason threatened to make the 
situation more difficult.  Certainly, the governor had not 
anticipated his financial disappointment. 
7 
Cranfield to Lords Committee, in Heness, Transcripts, 
pp. 121, 125-127; see Cranfield Commission in Provincial 
Papers, I: 4 33; New Hampshire State Papers, vol. 17 of Pro- 
vincial" Papers, p. 5 80; First and Second Addresses of the 
General Court, March and June 1680, Provincial Papers, I: 
409-410, 412; Address of the Council to Lords Committee, 1 
May 1681, Jeness, Transcripts, p. 89* 
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As the Cranfield government increased its pressure for 
fincances, the people became unified in resisting the burden 
of higher taxation.  The external threat promoted social 
solidarity between the wealthy planters and the ordinary in- 
habitants.  When the governor blocked the normal channels 
of redress, this solidarity provided the strength necessary 
to support more violent measures. 
Angered by the incooperative demeanor of the Assembly, 
Cranfield adopted more desperate measures in his search for 
finances.  At a meeting of the assembly on January 20, 1683, 
one week before the Gove riot, the governor and the assembly 
came to a stalemate over the revenue issue, neither side 
accepting the proposals of the other.  Knowing that the 
assembly would honor only their own bills, the governor dis- 
solved the assembly upon the authority of his commission. 
Deputy Edward Gove, questioning the "unwarranted" pro- 
ceedings, was chastised in front of the assembly by Cran- 
field and threatened with indictment at the Court of Common 
Pleas.  When the other assembly members left for their 
homes, Gove rode from the capital with other intentions in 
mind. 
Gove's colleagues shared his distress over Cranfield's 
domination of financial matters, but did not suffer the an- 
ger and humiliation that triggered Gove's violent reaction. 
They were not yet convinced of Cranfield's avarice, nor 
-16- 
were they prepared to take part in violence.  The instabil- 
ity of Gove's temperament at a time of political stress 
drove him to seek an armed party to riot at Portsmouth.  His 
friends, shocked and saddened by his behavior, chose to re- 
main on the side of the law. 
Gove's pathetic display of mob force was not successful 
in its aim of overthrowing the governor.  The militia over- 
whelmed Gove's young party.  Cranfield had decided to make a 
martial case of the "rebellion" and ordered the prisoners 
to be severely chained and guarded.  Had Cranfield indicted 
Gove on a charge of conspiracy against the province or dis- 
turbance of the peace, both criminal offences, it would have 
been a much simpler matter.  But "Publique Rebellion", the 
provincial counterpart of levying war against the king (13 
Q 
Charles II, c. 25), was a capital offence.   With this act, 
the governor aroused the deepest sympathies of those who 
could not otherwise condone riotous behavior. 
At the trial before the council and selected jurymen 
three days after the riot, all pleaded not guilty to the 
charge but admitted to the fact.   Gove received the full 
blame for his actions, the jury finding him guilty in accord 
g 
Belknap, History, 1: 159; Cranfield to Lords Commit- 
tee, Jeness, Transcripts, p. 132; Randolph's account of the 
rebellion, Provincial Papers, I; 494; Belknap, History, 1: 
156; New Hampshire Laws, Albert Stillman Batchellor, ed. 
(2 vols. Manchester, 1904), 1: 1,19. 
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with its duty.  Judge Richard Waldron pardoned Gove's 
younger comrades-in-arms after Deputy Robert Wadleigh 
testified that the boys did not understand Gove's trea- 
sonable intent. 
Edward Randolph exaggerated the matter when he report- 
ed to the Lords Committee that Gove intended to murder Cran- 
field and Mason.  Nevertheless, the governor, with his eye 
on Gove's estate, sent the prisoner in chains to the tower 
of London and forced Gove's wife and ten children out of 
doors.  Assigned to accompany Gove to England, Randolph, 
holding petitions from Gove's family and friends, finally 
realized that Gove was a distracted man and not a criminal. 
Within three years Randolph secured a pardon for the pen- 
itent Gove from King James II.  Although Cranfield had 
confiscated Gove's estate, the king ordered his property re- 
turned upon suit for the two hundred pounds taken from the 
9 
estate.  In 1686, Gove sailed for New Hampshire. 
The significance of the riot became apparent in the 
actions of a governor who thereafter felt he had the upper 
hand and in the resistance of the settlers who saw an av- 
aricious and unjust man.  The Gove riot proved to be the 
9 
Bradley Chapin, "Colonial and Revolutionary Origins of 
the American Law of Treason", William and Mary Quarterly, 
3rd ser., 17 (1960): 4-6; Stackpole, History, 1; 134-136; 
Provincial Papers, I: 4 59, 4 61; Batchellor, New Hampshire 
Laws, 17 118, 137; Otis G. Hammond, ed., New Hampshire Court 
Records, 1640-1692, (New Hampshire, 1943), p. 398. 
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turning point in the governor's provincial career.  Cran- 
field was determined that the assembly would no longer weak- 
en his power through their control of the purse.  Hoping to 
sever his financial dependence on the assembly by refusing 
to reconvene them, Cranfield began to look in every angle 
of government for an opportunity to make money. 
Since the governor and council had the sole legal right 
to govern the province, Cranfield, taking it upon himself to 
insure the support of the government, decided to make the 
council more amenable to his interests.  Therefore, the 
governor replaced the influential anti-Ilason council members 
with men more qualified for his purposes.  The governor and 
his new council made their own tax laws, changed the value 
of current money, banned all public meetings without leave 
from the justices of the peace, established fees of office, 
and forbade constables to collect any town or parish rates 
until they first collected taxes imposed by the council. 
The law required constables to collect all rates within 
one year or have their estates distrained by a warrant from 
the treasurer.  To make difficult matters intolerable, Cran- 
field punished refractory members of the assembly by appoin- 
ting them constables, forcing them to collect those taxes 
they had once refused to levy on their constituents. 
Cranfield justified his actions upon the pretext of raising 
money necessary for defense against the French and Indians. 
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He informed the Lords, Committee that the assembly was 
"disorderly" and that he felt obliged to levy taxes without 
their approval.  As William Vaughn, an excouncil member de- 
clared, "Money he came for, and money he will get." 
Governor Cranfield succeeded temporarily in building 
a political machine out of the old proprietary party, 
freely choosing his subordinates and packing juries.  How- 
ever the colonists' alarm, their fear of corruption in the 
government, and their overt response to the arbitrariness 
of the governor proved stronger than all the support that 
Cranfield could muster. 
As historian Edmund Morgan explained, the colonists 
did not, prior to the Revolution, think of corruption as a 
threat posed by the executive to the "integrety and inde- 
pendence" of their assemblies.  Rather, corruption lay in 
the simple avarice of the executive, the royal governor's 
John Farmer and Jacob B. Moore, eds., Collections 
Historical, Topographical, Biographical Relating Princi- 
pally to New Hampshire (Concord, 1823, 2 vols.), 2: 156; 
Provincial Papers, I: 249,488; Batchellor, New Hampshire 
Laws> 1: 25; Belknap, History, 1: 164-165; John F. Burns, 
Controversies between Royal Governors and their Assemblies 
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1923), p. 244; Journal 
of William Vaughn in Belknap, History, 1: 4 81. 
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predisposition to use his office as a means of obtaining 
wealth.   Since the governor's salary was a legislative mat- 
ter, the provincial assemblies normally exercised some con- 
trol over the governor's financial aspirations.  However, 
Cranfield had wrested that perrogative from the New Ham- 
shire assembly and thereby blocked off a major avenue of 
redress. 
The contention which existed over provincial taxes came 
to a head in 16 84 in a tax collection riot.  Throughout the 
year, Cranfield1s marshals suffered a variety of abuses at 
the hands of a people determined not to pay illegally lev- 
ied rates.  Richard Waldron publicly declared his intention 
not to pay his taxes, and many others followed suit. 
Late in December 16 84, ex-deputy John Foulsom, a new- 
ly appointed constable, reported to the provost marshal that 
they would pay only those taxes levied by the assembly. 
Soon afterwards, the provost marshal, Thomas Thurton, tra- 
veled to Exeter to demand of John Foulsom a fine of fifty 
shillings imposed upon him for failing to collect one penny. 
Alison G. Olson, Anglo-American Politics, 1660-1775 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 70; Herbert L. Osgood, 
American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 3 vols.) 3~1 340-357; Edmund S. 
Morgan, "Royal and Republican Corruption", The Development 
of a Revolutionary Mentality (Washington, Library of 
Congress, 1972), p. 93. 
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At Exeter, the townspeople treated Thurton with insolence. 
The wives of John and Moses Gilman threatened him with scal- 
ding water if he tried to collect the rates.  Thurton quick- 
ly returned to Hampton to obtain a writ from the governor 
demanding payment. 
Ignoring the threats, Thurton and his associate John 
Mason, son of Robert, set out for Exeter.  Hot on their 
heels was a group of club-carrying men, including the Rev- 
erend John Cotton and his shillalah, taxpayers Joseph Swett 
and John Sanborn, and husbandmen from Hampton, Joseph and 
Samuel Cass, Jacob and Ebenezer Perkins, Daniel Clements, 
Samuel Calcot and Aaron Sleeper.  At the home of Moses 
Gilman, the mob assailed Thurton with bad language, handling 
him roughly, and mocking him for carrying a sword at his 
side while collecting taxes.  Thurton and Mason retreated 
to widow Sewell's hostelry for shelter, but their taunters 
followed them and set the constables' horse loose.  As 
Thurton and mason ran from the hostelry, the mob beat them 
over the head and body. 
Thurton's persistence annoyed the would-be taxpayers 
who thought they had made their point clear.  A few days 
after the beating at Exeter, a riot occurred when Thurton 
went to Hampton to collect a civil fine from Samuel Sher- 
burne, a man who had been convicted of beating another cit- 
izen.  Thurton took Sherburne to the home of Justice Henry 
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Roby.  There, Moses Gilman, Samuel Levett and Henry Lam- 
prell attacked Thurton and beat him while Sherburne es- 
caped.  Justice Roby intervened on Thurton's behalf, but 
he was cudgeled as well.  Thurton ran from the house after 
Sherburne and found him outside with twenty or thirty men 
armed with clubs.  The mob seized and bound Thurton, put a 
rope around his neck and dragged him for a mile and a half. 
Finally, the mob put Thurton on a horse, tied his legs un- 
derneath and drove him out of the province.  A troop of 
horses under Robert Mason, the chancellor, was called out to 
12 
suppress the riot, but not one trooper appeared. 
Although Thurton registered formal complaints, the 
local authorities made no arrests.  In contrast to the Gove 
riot, the power of  Cranfield's government was not as strong 
as the force of public opinion and was not able to command 
a respect for lav/ and order.  Although the settlers' vio- 
lence was not inevitable, they had found that they could not 
beat Cranfield within the political system as long as he 
and his men tightly controlled the government. 
Since there was no legislative control over the passing 
of revenue bills, the inhabitants found no other recourse 
12 Provincial Papers, 1: 4 96; Deposition of John Foulsom 
in New Hampshire Historical Society Collections (Concord, 
1824, 23 vols.), 1: 264; Council Records in Provincial 
Papers, 1:496, 549-550, 431; Deposition of Thomas Thurton, 
Ibid, p. 551-554; Stackpole, History, p. 149. 
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but to resist the execution of the laws.  This they accom- 
plished in the riot by refusing compliance, and Thurton 
was the unfortunate target of the settlers' frustration over 
Cranfield's injustice.  The taxpayers rose up against the 
marshal, not because of political ideals concerning im- 
perial government, but out of the necessity of relieving 
themselves from an economic burden and personal harrassment. 
Unfortunately, the unpopularity of Cranfield's subor- 
dinates doomed his chances for support even before he ar- 
rived in the province.  The principle bone of contention at 
that time was Mason's determination to asset his rights of 
title to New Hampshire.  Although the solicitor general 
in London declared Mason's claim good and legal, public 
opinion rose against him because his methods were less than 
honorable.  He refused grants to squatters and angered 
locals by posting declarations for delinguent tenants to 
pay up or suffer eviction by force. 
With the help of Cranfield, Mason served executions on 
ex-councillors John Cutt, Thomas Denial, and Captain John 
Pickering, Portsmouth's wealthiest citizens, and the Rev- 
erend Joshua Moody for their petitions in favor of Massachu- 
setts control.  Within three years, 1681-1684, Mason brought 
forty land suits into the provincial courts.  With the 
assistance of Cranfield, who had a financial stake in the 
outcome, the packed juries decided each case in Mason's 
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favor. 
The decision of a court in favor of the proprietor 
did not ensure the collection of rents.  Mason's deputies, 
such as Daniel Mathews, beat down doors and broke open 
trunks and chests in a futile effort to get payment.  The 
deputies' attempted intimidation strengthened the resolve 
of the people to forcibly resist the collection of rents. 
Additional suits were served for nonpayment, but the 
settlers managed to successfully discourage collection, 
particularly after Captain dickering beat Deputy Mathews. 
In retaliation,  Cranfield jailed ex-coucillrs Waldron, 
Vaughn, and Elias Stileman, the Reverend Joshua Moody and 
other leading men for "stirring up" the people. 
The arrogance of Edward Randloph as customs collector 
brought violence down upon his deputy searchers as well. 
That the  antiproprietary settlers acted outside the law 
was without question.  Their response to Cranfield and Mason 
demonstrated the society's resolve to protect its interests 
and the returns of its toil, however profitable or meager, 
and its determination to resist any outside interference 
with its chances for a more prosperous existence.  With the 
New Hampshire people, the necessity of rioting was its 
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 •     1 ^ own justification. J
The composition of the mob during this period sup- 
ports the contention that colonial rioting was not a 
function of the "rabble", the discontented minority who 
sought to stir up trouble upon slight provocation.  Well- 
to-do planters and better classes of people were logically 
involved in unrest over taxation because it was in their 
interest that the government assess fair rates on their 
property; it was they who stood to lose by the government's 
avarice. 
Cranfield blamed the insolent determination of the 
people to resist royal government on the ministers of the 
Congregational Church.  At least, this was his excuse to 
14 the Lords Committee.    However, the resistance to corrup- 
tion in the province crossed religious, economic and social 
boundaries.  The governor's political indiscretions omitted 
few with land and money. 
13 Order on the Mason claim, Provincial Papers, 1: 451; 
Franklin S. Sanborn, New Hampshire-an Epitome of Popular 
Government (New York, 1904), pp. Ill, 106; Journal of 
William Vaughn, Provincial Papers, 1: 526 passim; Stackpole, 
History, 1: 141;"Provincial Papers, 1: 431,571. 
14 For this concurrence about the composition of the 
colonial mob, see Gordon Wood, "A Note on the Mobs in the 
American Revolution", William and Mary Quarterly,3rd ser., 
23 (1966) 635-642; Cranfield to Lords Committee, in Jeness, 
Transcripts, p. 130. 
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Although the settlers were aware of the difficulty in- 
volved in removing a governor, they decided that their best 
chance of redress lay in their right to petition the king, 
and to do it secretly.  Ex-Deputy Nathaniel Weare, armed 
with petitions from the four major towns, journeyed to 
London to act as agent for the province.  William Vaughn 
promised to send the council records and personal deposi- 
tion after him in support of their case.  Cranfield heard 
rumors of petitioning and declared his intentions to dis- 
cover the offenders.  As Peter Coffin declared, "It would 
be the best haul he ever had, worth one hundred pounds a 
man. " 
Although the governor's council refused Vaughn the re- 
cords and the governor promptly jailed Vaughn for contempt, 
agent Weare met with a favorable response from the Lords 
Committee.  It ordered Cranfield to send the council re- 
cords and depositions to London and to answer the charges 
brought against him.  Knowing he was a defeated man, Cran- 
field did not wait for the Committee's final report.  He 
requested and received a leave of absense from the province, 
During the last few months of his office, Cranfield 
wrote Sir Lionel Jenkins that he was "absolutely ruined" in 
the discharge of his duties.  Lord Halifax, president of 
the Privy Council, sent a final rebuke in April 16 85 after 
the Committee had formally discharged Cranfield from office, 
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The main concern of Halifax was that Cranfield had not pur- 
sued his duties regarding proprietary title to the soil. 
His comission instructed him that, should the inhabitants 
refuse to agree with Mason, Cranfield was to "interpose 
and reconcile", not to dispossess.  He was instructed to 
send such cases fairly and impartially stated for His 
Majesty's determination.  Halifax denounced Cranfield for 
holding courts in New Hampshire and allowing titles to be 
15 decided there, with unreasonable costs involved. 
Cranfield had aroused widespread discontent by un- 
wisely pressuring a stubborn people to accept measures that 
ran counter to their most basic economic and social inter- 
ests, and with means that the law could not support.  In 
Cranfield's opinion, the unreasonable people "cavilled 
against his majesty's commission" and not his person, and 
that "time would show that no man would be acceptable to 
them who puts His Majesty's commands in execution". 
The wearied governor declared it his "greatest 
happiness" to remove himself from the "unreasonable" people. 
15 Petition of the inhabitants against Cranfield, 
Provincial Papers, 1: 557; Deposition of Peter Coffin, Ibid, 
p. 563; Cranfield to Sir Lionel Jenkins, Jeness, Tran- 
scripts, p. 159; Lords Committee to Cranfield, Provincial 
Papers, 1: 572; Lord Halifax to Cranfield, quoted in 
Sanborn, Popular Government, p. 108. 
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Cranfield's departure from the province cut short the con- 
tension over taxes, allowing the assembly to resume its 
normal legislative functions under a temporary successor, 
Walter Barefoote.  Although Barefoote was Mason's friend 
and supporter, the success of the settlers' petition 
against the governor not only removed the immediate threat 
of corruption, but absorbed through proper channels a 
large part of their discontent. 
The arbitrary nature of Cranfield's rule brought con- 
fusion down amongst a people who chose to resist its in- 
iquities.  The inadequacy of such dominion was only one of 
the lessons to be learned from the disorder of Cranfield's 
government.  The force that erupted in the tax collection 
riot and its success in resisting payment made the settlers 
significantly aware of the power and influence of community 
solidarity. 
V' 
The settlers' dependence on their land and its re- 
sources as a means of livelihood provided a common interest 
that crossed class boundaries.  When outside forces threat- 
ened those interests, the unification of the citizens offer- 
ed an effective defense, a factor socially significant 
throughout the history of the province.  The riot of 1684 
Provincial Papers, 17: 602; McClintock, History, p. 
105; Burns, Controversies, p. 251. 
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accomplished more than its aim of informing the governor 
that his revenue would not be raised.  It informed the 
settlers as well that they could protect their own polit- 
ical and financial resources if they united for the sake 
of the common interest. 
-30- 
CHAPTER II 
"Prospects for Private Interest" 
" they laughed at the orders of the Board 
of Trade against it (illegal timber traffic) 
and so they would at those of the king, as 
they know very well that nothing but an act 
of Parliament can hinder them." 
Lord Bellomont, 1700 
The failure of the Cranfield administration did not 
discourage Edward Randolph's design to form a party to 
support proprietary interests.  Convinced the Massachusetts 
Puritans would never be, loyal or useful subjects, Randolph 
fought against the pro-Massachusetts interests in New 
Hampshire.  He planned to establish the authority of his 
group through the Mason claims, thereby rendering the 
government more amenable to royal control, while making 
himself and Mason rich men.  That the majority of the set- 
tlers resisted proprietary control was of no great concern 
to Randolph.  He and the litigant Mason continued to dis- 
affect the people and to attribute their resistance to 
"Puritan disloyalty". 
Lord Bellomont to Board of Trade, quoted in George 
Chalmers, Introduction to the History of Revolt in the 
American Colonies (2 vols., Boston, 1845), 1: 282; Edward 
Randolph to Dr. Lloyd Bishop, in Toppan, Letters and Papers, 
27: 17; Sanborn, Popular Government, pp. 83-88. 
-31- 
Randolph's assessment of the settlers' discontent con- 
tained some truth.  Randolph, Mason and their deputies were 
part of a class of fortune-hunting bureaucrats who saw as 
much room for their own as for imperial gain in a growing 
colonial administration.  The Puritan strains in New Hamp- 
shire were not predisposed to accommodate outsiders who 
sought to make a profit from New Hampshire soil.  More im- 
portant, these officials turned a blind eye to the needs 
of a chnging society by trying to enforce a strict im- 
perial bureaucracy.  Because Mason and Randolph virtually 
ignored the settlers' requirements in an expanding economy 
and sought to enforce a bygone social system, they had as 
little success in soliciting colonial allies as Governor 
Andros would have in Massachusetts. 
By the 1690s, the discontent in New Hampshire, as in 
all New England, was taking on larger aspects.  The late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were a time of 
great significance in the colonies' transition from English 
to American Provinces.  The social instability of the era 
produced a marked strain on colonial institutions.  After 
the revolution of 1689, colonial trade increased in impor- 
tance, particularly with royal efforts to bolster sagging 
colonial revenues. 
The economic burden of the Navigation Laws encouraged 
illicit trade with foreign ports, creating an atmosphere 
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of suspicion and unrest.  At the end of the seventeenth 
century, the commercial system itself was not the direct 
cause of the uprisings that swept the colonies.  Rather, the 
economic burdens of the era intensified social strain, 
bringing into the open conflicts between imperial pressures 
2 
and the local need to pursue private interests.   There 
was money to be made in the provinces, and the settlers of 
New Hampshire were determined that not all of the profit 
derived from their soil would fall into imperial coffers. 
The arrest and imprisonment of Andros, Dudley and Ran- 
dolph in 16 89 did not reduce the pressures in New England of 
tighter commercial control.  It also did not remove the 
threat of the reexamination of land titles.  In New Hamp- 
shire the conflict between competing local and imperial 
interests remained a primary public issue.  Although the 
cause for the proprietors passed into other hands in the 
1690s, the contention between the proprietary and pro- 
Massachusetts interests continued through the turn of the 
century with equal disorder and confusion.  Ultimately, the 
settlers' concern over land titles was resolved in the pro- 
2 
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vincial courts.  Prior to that time, however, the tension 
over land rights confused the peoples' notion of their 
legal responsibilities.  In one instance, issues of common 
land usage precipitated a riot amongst frustrated and 
discouraged husbandmen. 
Competition for control of the colonial timber traffic 
added to the atmosphere of unrest over land rights.  While 
some royal officials tried to clamp down on illegal timber 
traffic, others enjoyed the profits themselves which en- 
couraged the settlers to violate the Navigation Laws.  The 
conflict over both land and timber rights cannot be 
reduced to one between the "haves" and the "have-nots". 
The unrest that led to rioting in New Hampshire was notice- 
ably devoid of class hatred.  Rather, the conflict arose 
between two small but influential groups competing for 
power, one with official sanction, the other supported by 
the sympathies of many inhabitants. 
In February 1690 the provisional government of Massa- 
chusetts took charge of New Hampshire on the petition of 
hundreds of New Hampshire residents who sought to relieve 
themselves from proprietary claims.  The list of petitioners 
included principally those settlers involved in the fight 
against Mason, families such as the Waldrons and Wentworths 
of Dover, the Vaughns, Martyns, Pickerings, Langdons and 
Sherburnes of Portsmouth, the Weares and Goves of Hampton, 
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and the Gilmans and Wiggins of Exeter.  These Families 
were part of the provincial elite, names that figures 
prominently throughout the history of the province. 
The Massachusetts jurisdiction over New Hampshire was 
only temporary.  In 1691 Samuel Allen purchased from Robert 
Mason's two sons the original Mason title minus any acreage 
already sold.  Allen immediately hired his son-in-law John 
Usher to act as lieutenant governor.  Usher thereupon as- 
sumed the rather incompatible roles of administering the 
government and prosecuting suits over land ownership at the 
same time. 
John Usher was not a man to make friends within the 
province.  Jeremy Belknap remembered him as one who was 
loud and stern, quick to find fault and yet determined to 
be obeyed.  Soon after Usher arrived in New Hampshire, he 
informed the Board of Trade that the people were "against 
kingly government".  He felt there was "no greater slight 
put upon the king's commission than by those who petitioned 
to be annexed to Massachusetts".  He was determined to 
bring the "insulters" to submission.  With this attitude, 
he unfortunately prejudiced himself against those with whom 
3 
he was to work in the government. 
3 
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. The relationship between Usher and the assembly was 
reminiscent of the Cranfield administration.  The main point 
of controversy was finances.  In 1696 the assembly refused 
Usher a salary of the grounds that the province was taxed to 
the limit to provide for defense.  They suggested he seek 
added means of support from the king.  Usher promptly re- 
scinded the assembly's privilege of specifying appro- 
priations, pressuring them to make general grants for his 
L 
own application.  Claiming that the province was unable to 
support a separate government, the assembly agreed to 
approve certain duties if Usher would support their petition 
for annexation to Massachusetts.  Usher, with proprietary 
interests in mind, firmly refused. 
In 1697, the Privy Council appointed William Partridge 
lieutenant governor of New Hampshire, but Usher refused to 
accept the tentative appointment and continued to press his 
authority over the assembly.  Partridge labeled the annexa- 
tion plea a "sulleness and aversion" to royal officials, 
rather than a plea for financial support.  However, the 
assembly preferred Partridge's less restrictive presence 
and lack of blatant proprietary bias. 
As soon as Partridge's leniency restored some measure 
of tranquility in the government, Samuel Allen arrived in 
New Hampshire to resume control, "officially" reappointing 
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Usher lieutenant governor.   This act angered the assembly 
and council, most of whose members were involved in the pro- 
Massachusetts faction.  Some members, such as Peter Coffin 
and Nathaniel Weare, withdrew from the legislature.  Others 
became determined to resist, with force if necessary, the 
encroachment.  For their "Disobediance to King and Parlia- 
ment" (and refusal to recognize Usher) Allen promptly sus- 
pended William Vaughn, John Hinckes and Richard Waldron, Jr. 
from the council. 
Since Partridge^ appeared to be within his legal rights 
as lieutenant governor, the suspended council members saw 
their chance to make trouble for the proprietors by active- 
ly supporting Partridge's claim to the government.  In 
fact, their support ran to bodily removing Usher from the 
government chambers.  According to Usher's report to the 
Lords Committee, Hinckes, Waldron and Vaughn "seized his 
majesty's government on 8 (February), 1696/7" with the in- 
tent to "raise an army to apprehend and seize my person, as 
may appear by a proclamation requiring all persons not to 
yield obediance".  Usher exclaimed that the province was 
without a government and in a lamentable condition. 
A 
Burns, Controversies, p. 251; Belknap, History, pp. 
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Usher undeniably exaggerated his report of the coun- 
cillors intentions to "raise an army".  Rather, these men 
vehemently disputed Usher's authority within the government 
and endeavored to do business without his presence. 
The assembly embarrased Usher by denying to the Lords 
Committee any disorderly conduct on the part of the members. 
The assembly assured the Committee that the province had 
never been in a more peaceable condition nor had there since 
Partridge's arrival been any disturbance other than that 
which Usher himself had created.  They requested relief 
from Usher's overbearing influence, desiring to be governed 
by a more moderate hand. , Later that year, the Committee 
directed Usher to administer the government only until 
Allen's commissioned successor, Lord Bellomont, arrived in 
the province.  At that time, Bellomont would present 
5 Partridge with his commission as lieutenant governor. 
The recurring troublesome issues of finance, the pro- 
vince's responsibility to provide for defense and to support 
a governor at the same time, were just part of the contro- 
versy that split the government.  The conflict between the 
proprietors and the inhabitants had much to do with special 
5 
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interests.  During the time in which Waldron, Vaughn, 
Hinckes and others opposed Usher's authority in the govern- 
ment, Usher was collaborating with Allen for possession of 
provincial "wastelands". 
William Vaughn petitioned the Lords Committee on be- 
half of the province to inform them that Samuel Allen 
claimed as wasteground great quantities of land which had 
"always been enjoyed by the inhabitants as common to their 
tenants".  Vaughn compained against the several suits which 
Allen had brought against him and others to recover estates 
which their ancestors had possessed "for above sixty years". 
- 1 '- 
When Partridge became lieutenant governor, Usher, as Allen's 
heir, managed the suits. Because Usher's misdemeanors had 
prompted several prxncxpal men to leave the government, 
Usher had "disgusted" the inhabitants and had made himself 
"totally unacceptable" to them as a leader. Vaughn there- 
fore requested that the Committee prevent Allen's patent to 
make Usher lieutenant governor and further prevent Allen's 
taking any more wastelands. 
Discontent within the province grew when Allen tried 
to recover his losses in court.  Men who had developed and 
improved the land and paid for its defense firmly disputed 
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further payment to Allen and Usher, men "universally 
hated" throughout the province.   In a rapidly growing so- 
ciety, it was natural that men with prospects of their own 
should resist outdated restrictions on their interests. 
The settlers' broadening economic and social outlook did 
not easily accommodate officials who pressured them with a 
bygone view of society.  In public opinion and in practice, 
the settlers found ways to shrug off the restrictions. 
Although the royal government recognized Allen's claims 
as proprietor, the provincial courts were not so convinced. 
In August 1699 the Supreme Court of Judicature ruled against 
Allen's suit to recover three hundred pounds from Richard 
Waldron Jr.  Not satisfied with the decision of a court 
where the judges and jury were "tenants", Allen appealed 
directly to the Kin in Council.  In Allen's mind, the case 
was significant beyond the value of three hundred pounds 
and would determine the right of the proprietor to the whole 
7 provxnce. 
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Usher was determined tjhat his opposition should answer 
for its stubborn insolence.  While the Council considered 
Allen's appeal against Waldron, Usher complained to the 
Lords Committee about another touchy subject, one that in- 
volved the major "special interest' of the province.  The 
Lords Committee was well aware of the illegal timber trafic 
from New Hampshire to Portugal, but it was not a problem 
that could readily be controlled from England. 
Enforcement of trade regualtions required sufficient 
supervision by royal officials, a proper court system to 
prosecute violations, and a willingness on the colonists' 
part to comply.  Unfortunately, the imperial system had 
none of these.  Colonial laws restricted the cutting of tim- 
ber except on private property, but the inconsistency of 
authority in the province undermined enforcement.  Although 
the Act of Frauds (1696) partially remedied the confusion 
over the proper court for offences against the acts of 
trade, it was not until 1722 that the Naval Stores Act 
brought white pines regulations under colonial admiralty 
jurisdiction. 
By far the weakest link in the system was a lack of 
binding supervision by royal officials.  This was due to 
either an inability or an unwillingness to restrict illegal 
trade.  In 1700, Portsmouth customs inspector Robert Arm- 
strong informed Lord Bellomont of the preparations to cut a 
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"considerable quantity" of planking for transport to Lisbon. 
Newcastle himself had seen the two ships in from Lisbon. 
The Lords Committee had directed that Bellomont inquire 
about Usher's charges against the illegal trade.  Bellomont 
did not reside in New Hampshire and requested the informa- 
tion on the timber traffic from reliable colonial sources. 
Following his receipt of Newcastle's letter, Bellomont an- 
grily told the Lords Committee that the colonists "laughed" 
at the Committee's orders against the Portuguese trade.  As 
Bellomont had learned, the problem was two-;fold.  The 
colonists were not specifically restricted in the trade by 
an Act of Parliament, but only by the Committee's prohibi- 
tion.  Yet, even more encouraging to the illicit and pro- 
fitable trade was the compliance of certain royal officials. 
Bellomont had discovered that the increasing traffic owed 
much to the enterprise of the popular Lieutenant Governor 
o 
Partridge. 
It seemed that the inhabitatns' support of 
Partridge's claim to authority was not entirely a re- 
PRO, London, CO 5/362, Usher to Lords Committee, 13 
October 1701; L. Inivin Wroth, "The Massachusetts Vice- 
Admiralty Court", Law and Authority in Colonial America, G. 
A. Billings, ed. (Barre, Massachusetts; Barre Publications, 
1965), p. 34; Batchellor ed., Laws, 1: 5 October 1607; PRO 
CO 5/862, 5 March 1701, and Newcastle to Bellomont, 8 
November 1700, Chalmers, History of Revolt, 1: 282-283. 
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suit of their respect for his commission or their hatred 
of Usher and Allen.  Where Usher pressed for restriction 
and subordination, Partridge flattered the inclination of 
the settlers to expand their land and timber interests. 
Bellomont ordered Partridge to explain the charges 
against him.  Partridge did not deny the exports to Portugal 
but assured Bellomont that he had certificates from Survey- 
or John Bridger declaring the timber on board unfit for His 
Majesty's service.  Partridge argued in favor of the trade, 
claiming that the growth of New England would yearly require 
the clearing of land to provide bread for the peoples' sus- 
tenance.  In Partridge's mind, the trade of unsuitable tim- 
ber was to the "greatest advancement" of the king's revenue. 
Continuing the trade would improve the lot of the people, 
thereby increasing their consumption of England's manufac- 
tures and strengthening their dependence on the mother 
country. 
Bellomont did not buy one word of Partridge's argument 
and declared that he would not allow Partridge or anyone    v 
else to load one stick of plank on any but an English ship 
without the king's approval.  That Partridge would justify 
his argument with the point that there was no Act of Parlia- 
ment against it infuriated Bellomont.  He replied, "I don't 
say that there is, but there are reasons of state for so 
doing some things and preventing mischief that law givers 
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did not imagine would be practised." 
The colonists were little concerned with "reasons of 
state".  Where economic prospects were at stake, the inter- 
ests of Parliament.  If the products of their labor were 
not specifically restrained by law, then the timber could 
be freely exported.  Both Allen and Bellomont pressed for 
Partridge's removal on a technicality.  Partridge had been 
appointed by King William, but had not been subsequently 
confirmed by Queen Ann.  The Queen's Council ordered Par- 
tridge removed for his unreasonable conduct and officially 
9 
replaced hxm with John Usher. 
Growing prospects within the timber trade pointed to 
issues of land rights and ownership, thereby increasing re- 
sistance to "antiquated" proprietary claims which worked 
against private enterprise.  In 1702, the Queen's Council 
affirmed the decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
in the Allen vs. Waldron case.  The Council asserted, 
however, that the ruling was not final in its nature as 
Allen supposed.  Instead, the Council adjudged that the 
"appelant be left at liberty to bring a new action in 
9 
PRO, London, CO 5/862, Partridge to Bellomont, 2 
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or Bridger of a timber violation; PRO, CO 5/862, Bellomont 
to Partridge, 22 April 1700, CO 5/911, Petition of Samuel 
Allen, 20 April 1703; CO 5/911, Order in Council re Par- 
tridge's removal, 2 9 April 1703; Burns, Controversies, p. 
255. 
-44- 
ejectment" in the New Hampshire courts in order to try his 
title to certain quit-rents.  Allen soon took advantage of 
his liberty and brought Waldron back into the courts in 
1704. 
The trial of Allen vs. Waldron, which terminated in 
1707, proved to be the culmination of the controversy over 
land titles, with one riot over land boundaries occuring 
during its progress.  The trial was important for the two- 
fold effect it had upon the people's discontent over land 
rights issues.  As the major legal and political event in 
the province, the trial focused economic and political 
questions of land usage and ownership, uniting the people 
in their determination to exercise their full, free usage 
of the land.  Second, the favorable outcome of the trial 
absorbed most of what might have been a more violent re- 
sponse on the part of the people. 
The petitioning of many of the inhabitants for annex- 
ation to Massachusetts had proved an unsuccessful attempt 
to resist the Allen claims through a change of government. 
However, the legal channels of the courts eventually satis- 
fied the will of the people against proprietary restric- 
tions.  Although Samuel Allen died in 1705, his son Thomas 
pursued the suit in London through his mother, Mrs. 
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Elizabeth Allen, as attorney in New Hampshire. 
Prior to the trial's outcome in 1707, the controver- 
sial issues of land ownership embroiled many sectors of the 
province, touching off a riot in 1704,( over town boundaries 
and common land.  Governor Dudley of Massachusetts, mindful 
of the people's will regarding the Allen title, addressed 
the New Hampshire assembly with a plea for an amicable 
settlement of the land rights issue.  The answer of the 
assembly provided a summation fo the province's difficulty. 
The assembly stressed the fact that the inhabitants 
had claim to land only within town boundaries, a total of 
less than one-third of the province.  By the same token, 
the people had nothing to offer as a "grievance" if the 
other two-thirds were to be adjudged to Allen.  The assem- 
bly claimed that the bounds of the six towns did not pro- 
vide enough feed and timber for the province.  The people 
needed the remainder of the land open in common to feed 
cattle.  In the minds of the inhabitants, their cost in 
time, blood and labor over the land far exceeded its current 
market value. 
The inhabitants' argument for their need of the land 
PRO, London, CO   5/862, Queen in Council re Allen 
Petition, 17 December 1702; Provincial Papers, 2: 545; ibid, 
1: 574-5, rejection of Vaughn's appeal, 6 November 1683; 
ibid, 2: 514-562, Allen vs. Waldron Trial. 
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angered Lieutenant Governor Usher.  He seemed to think 
them spoiled since Massachusetts paid high land taxes and 
New Hampshire very little even though New Hampshire was the 
most exposed in the Indian war and required more money for 
defense.  As for the town bounds by which the inhabitants 
made claim to the land, Usher declared to the Lords Commit- 
tee that the four or five years since the bounds were 
appointed were nothing compared to the years behind the 
Mason claims. 
Legally, the assembly had no right to settle town 
bounds or dispose of land, yet it had done just that.  The 
bone of Usher's contention was an act passed by the assembly 
in 1701 allocating "sundry lands" between Hampton and Mass- 
achusetts to be settled within the bounds of existing towns, 
giving all persons settled there title and interest to the 
land. 
The assembly's indiscretion prompted the Queen's Coun- 
cil to repeal the act in 1703, and the Council requested 
Governor Dudley to inform the assembly.  Soon after the 
publication of the repeal in New Hampshire, a riot broke 
out in Hampton over the question of legal town limits. 
Those who had settled within the boundaries drawn by the 
assembly had paid rates and "done duty" to their towns, 
only to find themselves without land ownership with the re- 
peal of the act.  The anger and lost security of these 
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people, coupled with the current "heat" over land rights, 
instigated twenty men to riot within the town.  In July 
1704 a mob pulled down a fence of an enclosure belonging to 
Samuel Roby of Hampton.  Apparently, the husbandmen, in- 
cluding John Gove, did not know the fence belonged to Mr. 
Roby.  They meant only to protest the barrier against 
common usage and believed the fence stood upon town commons. 
The riot alarmed Governor Dudley.  Even though Dudley 
asserted that the nature of the riot did not directly affect 
Samuel Allen's rights of proprietorship, Roby not being 
Allen's tenant, he expected the next "thing of that sort 
might do so".  He therefore urged that Lieutenant Governor 
Usher take severe measures to discourage the people from 
a similar incident. 
The rioters came forward and attested to their guilt. 
Usher turned the matter over to the Superior Court charging 
the justices to proceed according to the law, taking secur- 
ity for the men's appearance in court.  Also, Governor 
Dudley urged the jury to find the defendents guilty in the 
hope of preventing further rioting.  The jury conceded. 
There was not, in 1704, a specific riot act in the 
provincial law books, and the men were most likely fined 
according to the damage done to Mr. Roby's property.  The 
attitude of the governor might have discouraged further 
rioting.  However, it is also likely that part of the 
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settlers' public outrage over land rights was ameliorated 
by the optimistic outlook form the Allen vs. Waldron trial. 
In 1707 a court decision which disallowed the Allen 
claim for quit-rents owed by Waldron sufficiently abated 
the major land controversy.  Thomas Allen appealed to the 
Queen's Council following the decision, but due to the 
"distresses of war", the Council suspended judgement on" tHe 
appeal.  In 1715, before the Council properly heard the 
appeal, Thomas Allen died.  His death finalized the suit 
which his heirs, as minors, did not renew.    The end of 
this litigation coincided with the beginning of an era of 
greater expansion within the province, fifteen years with- 
out serious factional conflict. 
In many ways, the colonists' resistance to the at- 
tempts of imperial officials to bind them with restrictive 
measures points up areas where those restrictions fell hard 
against current social and economic trends.  Their resis- 
tance also points out areas where British and American 
PRO, London, CO 5/863B Part 1, J. Dudley to assembly, 
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views on law and order were becoming seriously diver- 
gent.  As A.S. Batchelor states in New Hampshire Laws, 
principles and methods in the colonies of ownership and 
control of lands and forests which ancient systems and 
modern statutes had established in Britain were, in impor- 
tant features, inapplicable to the new country. 
Where law is an "adaption of principles of action to 
12 the physical and political conditions" in a country, 
proprietary claims had becom outdated, if not seriously 
amiss, in the colonies.  The inhabitants' resistance to 
Mason, Usher and Allen was not an example of "disorder" in 
the society, although the mother country so viewed it.  On 
the contrary, constant, determined opposition was a function 
of a society becoming strong enough and ordered enough to 
support intentions for the public good. 
In case of the burgeoning timber trade, where the best 
prospects for profit lay outside the law, resistance seemed 
natural on the -basis of the inclinations of human nature. 
However, in an occupation where local physical conditions 
controlled its development and character, the application 
of law fixed in Britain proved futile in controlling the 
timber trade or the uses the colonists made of it. 
It was not the law itself which placed restrictions 
12 Batchellor, Laws, 1: xiii 
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upon the landowners and lumbermen of New Hampshire.  That 
power was in the hands of royal officials comissioned to 
enforce the law, and the success of the restrictions depend- 
ed upon the officials1 tenacity.  Officials with attitudes 
such as those of Partridge encouraged licentiousness and the 
failure of the law.  Since Partridge's lenient attitude 
toward smuggling was not an uncommon one in the colonies, 
trade within the timber industry grew without strict respect 
for the demands of the royal government.  Time and practice 
rendered many self-seeking attitudes natural, if not accep- 
table, among certain groups of lumbermen. 
Such attitudes existed comfortably within the timber 
industry as long as they were not practically and severely 
opposed by an outside authority.  Up until the 1730s the 
trade continued without stringent surveyance and without 
many courtroom convictions for timber smuggling. 
Ultimately, trouble arose when cutting restrictions 
were increased by law and supervision. In New Hampshire, 
the mdst blatant example of the colonists' propensity to 
serve their own needs and interest within the timber in- 
dustry happened when one dutybound surveyor demanded the 
prerogative of the king's woods and respect for its offic- 
ials.  He was answered with a riot near the Exeter mills. 
z' 
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CHAPTER III 
"The King's Wood" 
"...swearing was no part of my character 
until I came into this pious country, but 
with the saints and their pretended sanc- 
tity and at the same time stealing what 
belongs to His Majesty and robbing him in 
open defiance of the law, when the power 
is taken from me to prevent it...it would 
provoke a man of more temper than I to 
swear." 
Surveyor General David Dunbar,17 34 
The mast-tree riot of 1734 involved mob action which 
concerned extablished economic values, including reverence 
for personal property, opposition to the English white pines 
act, disrespect for authority, apathy of local government, 
political competition and personal revenge.  As an inci- 
dence of deliberate violence, the mob had a specific target 
in mind and an emphatic message for that target.  The mob 
also marshalled the silent support of the provincial govern- 
ment. 
The Piscataqua River district and the town of Exeter 
were the chief centers of the New Hampshire logging indus- 
try.  By supplying mast materials to the Crown, the indus- 
try became the chief source of. wealth for the province.  Up 
until 16 8 8 the lumbering industry had developed with little 
interference from England.  After the succession of 
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William and Mary, however, the lumbermen experienced a 
long period of attention and regulation. 
The long struggle with the French put great demands 
upon the English shipyards to replace the losses and keep 
the navy afloat.  At the same time, the hostile attitude of 
Sweden threatened the supply of naval stores from the Bal- 
tic.  As advocated by the mercantilist theory, an alterna- 
tive source of naval materials would prevent an unfavorable 
balance of trade with the Baltic, would divert the colon- 
ists from manufacturing woolens by offering them a profit- 
able alternative, and would give New England a more profit- 
able place in the imperial system. 
Of course, the success of that program depended upon 
encouraging the productivity of the New England sawmills. 
To the Board of Trade, such encouragement had its couter- 
part in applied restricitons to prevent waste.  To pre- 
serve the mast pines (those pines more than twenty four 
inches in diameter at a place three feet from the base of 
the tree) the Board of Trade comissioned surveyors to in- 
spect the New England forests and millyards.  Their job 
was to cut the "Broad Arrow", a sign of the king's property, 
into the reserved pines. 
The efforts of lumbermen and merchants to thwart the 
duties of the surveyor showed the failure of Britain and 
New England to coalesce their interests in the timber trade. 
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In spite of the royal navy's needs, cutting lumber and con- 
verting it into boards and joists provided more profit than 
naval masts.  The masts cost as much to float down the river 
as the price paid by the naval agents to the lumberman. 
Since the cut pines could furnish four or five logs /worth 
fifteen pounds in smooth boards, the colonial woodsman, 
with business interests to protect, ignored or openly defied 
the law and sawed pines reserved for the king. 
Had the White Pines Law applied only to trees of poten- 
tial use to the navy and had it been framed with concern 
for colonial property, it might not have provoked as much 
opposition as it did.  However, the law also reserved pines 
unfit for naval use and restricted the colonists in their 
supply of marketable lumber.  Many people thought the law 
was an affront to private property and just plain foolish, 
because it reserved more trees than the navy could ever use. 
The colonists accepted subordination to the English 
Parliament as a nornal condition of colonial dependency. 
Yet, the convenience and necessity of a profit-making enter- 
prise established other priorities for many men.  Customs 
Inspector Robert Armstrong remarked in 1721 that in the 
previous twenty years, where one mast had been sent to 
England on contract for the navy, the lumbermen had cut 
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five hundred "mast" pines for other uses. 
Thus, the surveyor general had a difficult day.  He 
had to deal with local interests while protecting the 
king's wood and bringing violators of the law to justice. 
When the Board of Trade commissioned lieutenant governor 
David Dunbar surveyor general of New Hampshire, in 17 31, it 
informed hin that the record of his predecessors contained 
more words than deeds.  The Board assured Dunbar that the 
forest policy would succeed only through the example of 
convictions in the vice-admiralty courts.  Any surveyor 
who exercised his duties diligently had to be unpopular. 
But Dunbar, an over-zealous, profit-seeking and threatening 
man, established himself as the perfect villain in the eyes 
of the millmen who flaunted their disregard to his office. 
To compound the difficulties of his job, Dunbar was a 
member of a group in opposition to Governor Belcher, who 
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resided in Massachusetts.  The governor had many friends and 
relatives with large land interests in disuputed areas in 
New Hampshire.  Belcher and Dunbar had been avowed enemies 
since the failure in 1730-of Dunbar's Irish settlement at 
Pemaquid, Maine, in which riots had broken out over mishan- 
delled land claims.  Belcher had responded by sending in 
troops to quiet the disorder, making Dunbar appear foolish 
and incompetent. 
Upon the death of New Hampshire Lieutenant Governor 
John Wentworth in 1730, Martin Bladen, secretary to the 
Board of Trade, convinced the Board over Belcher's objec- 
tions to appoint Dunbar as Wentworth's successor. Since 
Belcher had compelled John Wentworth to depend on him for 
a salary, leaving him to be content with the paltry fees 
from registers, certificates and licenses, Belcher had made 
a mortal enemy of Wentworth*s son, Benning.  Together with 
Benning Wentworth and colleague Theodore Atkinson, and also 
influential men like Bladen and John Thomlinson in England, 
2 
Dunbar became part of a faction opposing Belcher. 
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After taking office in New Hampshire, Dunbar pointed 
out a clause in Belcher's commission which called for the 
lieutenant governor in New Hampshire to assume the position 
of commander of the province in the event of the. governor's 
death or absence from the colony.  In Dunbar*s mind, Bel- 
cher's residence in Massachusetts made him permanently ab- 
sent.  Belcher virtually ignored Dunbar's commission and 
allowed Richard Waldron, as secretary of the council, to 
act as lieutenant governor.  Belcher appointed justices of 
the peace sympathetic to his landowner friends and granted 
the best timberland in New Hampshire as private property. 
This act either removed the lands from Dunbar's jurisdic- 
tion or forced the arrogant surveyor to violate the sanc- 
3 
tions of private property. 
Prior to the White Pines Act of 1729, an act designed 
to thwart accommodating colonial lawyers, the colonists had 
resisted the restrictions of the courts and legislatures. 
However, with the prospect of courtroom acquittals lessened 
after 1730, the millmen looked for weaknesses in the sur- 
veyor rather than legal alternatives. 
Dunbar, on the other hand, prevented by Belcher from 
This Richard Waldron is the great-grandson of the 
original councillor and Mason opponent, and grandson of 
Allen's foe; Osgood, American Colonies, 3: 332; Schultz, 
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enjoying the spoils of his office, pressed for the seizure 
of logs and courtroom convictions as a means of deriving 
money from his authority.  Maximum penalties for violation 
of the law included the confiscation and sale of timber 
illegally cut, up to one year's imprisonment and a fine of 
one hundred pounds, one half of which would go to Dunbar as 
"informer".  With few convictions during Dunbar's first 
year, his deputies endeavored to make their money by grant- 
ing illegal timber licenses, accepting bribes and selling 
seized mast trees at auctions.  This further confounded 
Dunbar's duties, and he became determined to set the system 
aright. 
The millmen did not welcome Dunbar's visits to the 
sawmills, nor the burden of proving their property.  With 
his forst seizure, Dunbar outraged the millowners by threat- 
ening to "girdle" the pines, making a deep cut in the cir- 
cumference of the tree and killing it by presenting the sap 
from rising.  He also proposed a public registration of 
sawmills that would limit and control production by license, 
The resulting rude and uncooperative demeanor of the mill- 
men did not discourage Dunbar, and he threatened them with 
persistent personal appearances.  To discourage the auda- 
city of the surveyor once and for all, the millmen of 
Exeter, the most "troublesome" in the whole province, re- 
sorted to violence to answer Dunbar's attempts to seize 
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lumber at a private mill. 
Late in March 17 34 the surveyor traveled up the Exeter 
River on an inspection tour to see what he might discover 
at the Exeter sawmills.  With the help of his deputies, 
Dunbar became convinced that the planking produced at one 
mill had been cut from mast pines.  Dunbar questioned the 
local people, including one selectman, as to the name of 
the mill and its owner.  The surveyor learned that it was 
the Pickpocket Mill, but all further questions received 
4 
silence citizens received a rather vigorous caning.   On 
this same tour, Dunbar discovered an estimated seven thous- 
and feet of white pine boards cut from forfeited logs at 
the Copyhold  Mill.  He immediately returned to Portsmouth 
to acquire a writ from the Court of Admiralty to formally 
seize the logs and confront the millmen with their crimes. 
On April 5th Dunbar journeyed back to Exeter to the 
Copyhold Mill, having written ahead to order a local offi- 
cial (who was himself a mill owner) to attend him on his 
arrival and guard him from "insults".  Having foolishly 
announced his intentions to his adversaries, Dunbar had a 
rather different reception than what he had planned. 
4 
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Hollering, shrieking and the discharge of small arms in 
the woods contiguous to the mill saluted him. 
There, Dunbar confronted Major Nicholas Gillman who 
denied knowing the men (although two of his sons were among 
the group) or what they were up to.  While the intruders 
ran "to and fro like Indians" in the woods, Major Gilman 
asked Dunbar what he planned to do with the forfeited 
boards.  Dunbar untactfully replied that if he could not 
sell the boards to defray the cost of prosecution, he would 
separate them from the uncondemned boards and burn them. 
The sting of Dunbar's answer angered Gilman, who declared 
that no boards would be burnt on his lands, and that the 
king had no business there.  Disgusted by the major's dis- 
respect, but fearing for his own safety, the surveyor re- 
treated.  Once he had turned his back, the men came out of 
5 the woods, laughing and talking with Major Gilman. 
Nicholas Gilman was a natural leader of the Exeter 
millmen's efforts to resist both the pines act and surveyor 
Dunbar.  The Gilman family owned one of the largest mills at 
Exetor and had many influential friends, including Governor 
Belcher and Secretary Waldron.  Nicholas, who had charge of 
5 
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the mill, was a grandson of first councillor John Gilman 
and was himself a justice of the peace and commander of the 
local militia. 
Dunbar took his complaints to the council, but Secre- 
tary Waldron told him that the council had no business ad- 
vising him on  such matters and that he should seek a law- 
yer.  Deciding to take matters into his own hands, Dunbar 
returned to Po.rtsmouth and hired ten men to go to Exeter by 
boat to mark with the broad arrow trees totalling up to 
four hundred feet.  Dunbar ordered Major Gilman to instruct 
an officer and twenty men to go to the Copyhold and Black- 
rock Mills to protect the hired deputies, but again 
Dunbar announced his intentions to the wrong person.  Con- 
fident of his authority, Dunbar planned to follow the next 
day along with Justice of the Peace Samuel Perkins.  Sheriff 
Russell of Exeter agreed to meet Dunbar upon his triumphant 
arrival. 
The deputies landed at Exeter on the night of April 
23rd and went along to the public house of Captain Samuel 
Gilman to pass the evening in a leisurely fashion.  Mean- 
while, a number of "unknown" men, actually Exeter millmen 
and local sympathizers, assembled at the public house of 
Zebulon Giddings.  There they disguised themselves as 
Indians with the intention of rioting against the deputies. 
The thirty "Indians" proceeded to the quarters of the 
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hired men and seized them as they went to bed.  The rioters 
handled the deputies roughly, beating them or hurling them 
out of windows, down the stairs and out the door, threaten- 
ing them with their lives.  Four rioters carried one of the 
deputies to the mill and threw him from a pile of boards 
twenty feet into the mud.  At the same time, a few of the 
Indians went down to the river to find the deputies' boat 
at Colonel John Gilman's and there ripped its sails and 
bored holes into its sides.  Frightened and bearing the 
marks of their misadventure, the hired men attempted to 
return to Portsmouth.  However, as they were slowly patch- 
ing their boat, they met a rather surprised and enraged 
surveyor. 
Contrary to Dunbar*s accusations, the rioters had no 
intentions of killing him or his deputies, but wanted to 
insure that Dunbar would not again hire strangers to inspect 
local mills.  Simon Gilman had facetiously told Peter 
Greely, Dunbar's henchman, that the local people had hired 
three notoriously fierce Natick Indians to kill' Dunbar and 
Greely as they went to Blackrock Mill.  Gilman assured 
Greely that the Indians had already received their money and 
a quart of rum each day.  That Colonel John Gilman had ear- 
lier told Dunbar not to go to the mill for danger was proof 
in Dunbar's mind of Gilman's complicity in the affair. 
Dunbar became suspicious of three Exeter justices, 
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Major Nicholas Gilman, Colonel John Gilman and Major 
Barthelomew Thyng, who gave him reason to believe "by their 
excusing the matter" that they had some knowledge of the 
affair.  Dunbar had ordered the justices to examine the 
wounded men, at which time the justices claimed they heard 
nothing of the riot until nine o'clock the next morning. 
To Dunbar that was "scarce credible" when "the outcry for 
murder was heard more than a mile from town". 
The enraged Dunbar desired to issue a proclamation 
while "this thing was hot".  He approached the eight members 
of the council, six of whom virtually ignored his accusa- 
tions.  The council eventually agreed to examine the justi- 
ces, but would not take part in a proclamation which was 
properly the governor's business.  Knowing word of the 
council's lack of action would encourage further abuse, 
Dunbar wrote directly to Governor Belcher to request that 
he take "stron measures" to punish the offenders. 
The mutual antagonism between Dunbar and Belcher, as 
well as Belcher's friendship with the accused, precluded 
PRO, London, CO 5/10, Dunbar to Belcher, 25 April 
1734; CO 5/876, Depositions of Deputies taken at Exeter to 
Navy Board, 24 April 1734; See Charles H. Bell, History of 
the Town of Exeter (Boston, 1888), p. 72 passim; Deposition 
of Peter Greely before Samuel Penhallow, Provincial Papers, 
18: 54; CO 5/876, Dunbar to Council, 26 April 17 34; CO 5/10, 
Dunbar to Belcher, 29 April 1734; CO 5/876, Dunbar to 
Council, 26 April 1734. 
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any worthwhile investigation of Dunbar's charges.  The 
governor's public measures amounted to amnesty offers, a 
pair of announcements in the Boston newsletter and the 
Portsmouth Weekly Rehearsal offering pardon to the offenders 
if they would come forth and explain what had prompted the 
attack on Dunbar's party, an explanation obvious to the 
people of Exeter. 
Belcher also wrote to Secretary Waldron to advise him 
of the steps the council should take in the affair.  "I don't 
mean that the council must act out of line or take any 
extrajudicial steps," Belcher said, but "its best they meet 
and do all they can at this extraordinary juncture and upon 
so nice and critical an affair."  Belcher desired to "law- 
fully preserve" the woods, but was also determined to pre- 
vent any complaints against the governor and council. 
Convinced he knew who was responsible for the riot, 
Dunbar insisted that Governor Belcher deprive the millmen of 
public office.  However, many of them, including the Gilmans 
had recieved their civil and military appointments from 
Belcher.  Belcher stood by them, explaining that he remain- 
ed confident that local leaders did not take part in the 
rebellion.  Belcher emphatically told the surveyor that re- 
moving the millmen from office would leave no one qualified 
to fill the legislature, which consisted largely of men in 
the timber trade.  Belcher also said he would accept, as the 
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council did,the justices' acquittal of Major Gilman, 
Colonel Gilman and Major Thyng, and the three other justices 
of the peace whom Dunbar accused of complicity.  Not until 
October 19, 1734, did the assembly order a strict examina- 
tion of the riot.  Since the offenders could not be iden- 
tified and no one answered Belcher's proclamation, the local 
7 
authorities did not attempt any arrests. 
Even though the riotous millmen had acted against the 
letter of the law, they insisted upon their right to pro- 
tect their economic interests.  When Dunbar threatened that 
right, the millmen retaliated with measures devised with a 
particular purpose in mind.  The unity of the millmen in 
their resistance to the surveyor and the intensity of their 
purpose made plausible and rational their use of violence. 
It also enabled the men to "get away" with their treacher- 
ous deed through a measure of community acceptance.  Fearing 
the loss of their property at the hands of a man they dis- 
liked and desrespected, the millmen could not be bothered 
with political scruples.  In that sense, their riotous be- 
havior, although illegal, was entirely rational. 
Boston Weekly Newsletter, 2-9 May 1734; CO 5/876, 
11 May 1734; Belcher Papers, 2: Belcher to Waldron, 9 May 
1734; Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings 
(Cambridge, 1894), 6th series, VII: 61; CO 5/10, Dunbar 
to Belcher, 29 April 1734; CO 5/876, Belcher to Dunbar, 
2 May 1734; Belcher's Proclamation, CO 3/876, 11 May 1734. 
-65- 
The study of the timber riot offers more than an in- 
side look at the political and social values of the lumber- 
men or the workings of the provincial timber economy.  The 
fact that the riot was an expected and more or less accepted 
event provides an interesting perspective on the turbulent 
politics of the 1730s, particularly on the gain and loss of 
power among factions. 
Since political spoils within the province depended 
upon the power of the governor, men like Richard Waldron 
and the Gilmans with a "calculated influence" with the 
incumbent exercised a greater prerogative within legal 
spheres.  In the eariy 1730s, Governor Belcher had many 
supporters and he used his solid bloc of patronage ruthless- 
ly.  By the same token, he easily gained as many enemies. 
The removal of Walpole from the Townshend administration 
and the death of Belcher's friend, Samuel Shute, hurt 
Belcher's standing in London as well as in New England. 
This gave Belcher's enemies an open chance to present their 
\ 
\ 
disputes to the home government. 
As Belcher expressed it, Lieutenant Governor Dunbar 
put himself at the head of a party who constantly opposed 
the governor's efforts in New Hampshire.  Belcher felt that 
Dunbar's allies, Councillors Benning Wentworth and Theodore 
Atkinson, had assisted Dunbar in "embroiling" the affairs of 
the province and "making mischief" within the assembly. 
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Belcher had made great enemies of Wentworth and Atkinson 
by humiliating Benning's father, Lieutenant Governor John 
Wentworth, with a paltry salary.  Belcher had also removed 
Atkinson from his position as collector of customer and 
appointed a less competent friend as successor. 
Wentworth and Atkinson had seen in Dunbar's dispute 
with the governor and his timber friends a chance for re- 
dress.  Wentworth, Atkinson and their agent John Thomlinson 
had a growing influence in London, particularly with Martin 
Bladen, a powerful member of the Board of Trade.  Belcher's 
opposition sought to undermine his influence with the home 
government, thereby cutting at his power in Boston and 
Portsmouth as well.  These men bombarded the Board of Trade 
with correspondence unflattering to Belcher and stirred 
up resentment against royal authority in New Hampshire to 
embarrass the governor.  Dunbar even forged a letter to the 
Admiralty Office "from Exeter township".  The letter placed 
the blame for the riot on Belcher for encouraging the towns- 
people to disobey the "wicked" timber law and the "Irish 
o 
dog" of a surveyor. 
Schutz, "Succession Politics", p. 503; CO 5/076, 
Belcher to Lordships, 2 8 May 17 34; Osgood, American Colon- 
ies, p. 332; CO 5/926, Wentworth to Board of Trade, 8 May 
1747; Provincial Papers, XII: 58-59. 
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The lawlessness in the timber industry and Belcher's 
personal treatment of Dunbar were the main lines of re- 
taliation for Wentworth and Atkinson, men who also saw in 
Belcher's removal a chance to increase their own wealth 
and influence in the province.  Belcher sought further alli- 
ances in the province by influencing judges and controlling 
the council.  However, these tactics of delay did not hinder 
the opposition's appeals to London.  Agent John Thomlinson, 
skilled in applying public pressure, informed the Board of 
Trade that Belcher witheld all perquisites and emoluments to 
the dishonor of the lieutenant governor, and that Dunbar's 
work as surveyor general had been "greatly hindered" for 
want of power held by Belcher.  Thomlinson declared  that 
the people's disobediance to Dunbar was in imitation of the 
governor who encouraged them to treat Dunbar as a "cypher". 
While Wentworth and Atkinson tried their influence 
against Belcher's, Dunbar and New England landowner Samuel 
Waldo, timber agent of Joseph Gulston's English firm, press- 
ed for revenge against the timber smugglers.  Dunbar insis- 
ted to the Board of Trade that the riotous "Exeter town" 
had no timber of its own and stole from neighboring towns, 
hauling the logs to their own mills.  Though Dunbar and his 
deputies had seen logs marked with the broad arrow sawed in- 
to boards and planks lying in the millyards, he could not 
pinpoint the offenders.  Dunbar stated that three million 
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feet of white boards had been shipped out of New Hampshire 
in one season, which meant the destruction of two thousand 
trees. 
Dunbar solemnly declared it his intention, should he 
discover the offenders, to sue in an action of damage to 
the value of all logs and boards then under condemnation. 
Since Dunbar could not pin the guilt on any one party, 
William Shirley, advocate general, claimed that he could 
not justify stopping all vessels as potential transporters 
of condemned boards.  Without catching the smugglers "red- 
handed", Dunbar did not have a solid case to bring to the 
courts.  Nevertheless, Dunbar was not alone in his fight 
against the millmen.  Joseph Gulston, contractor for naval 
masts from New England, complained to the Admiralty Office 
that impudent New Hampshire landowners were suing his tim- 
ber agents for trespassing.  The landowners threatened to 
destroy trees cut by the agents and to block hauling roads. 
Likewise, agent Samuel Waldo spared neither time nor money 
9 
battling the landowners in the courts. 
9 
Schutz, "Succession Politics", pp. 511-515; CO 5/876, 
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In actual fact, Wentworth and Atkinson were little 
concerned with timber smuggling.  Their main interest in 
the uproar was Governor Belcher's demise and their own 
growing sphere of influence.  Dunbar and Waldo were left 
to try their rights against the millmen in the courts as 
Belcher endeavored to protect his landowner friends.  The 
memorials of agent Thomlinson representing Belcher's "evil" 
treatment of Dunbar, were sincere and a successful wedge 
against the governor's influence in London.  Belcher sent 
Jonathan Belcher, Jr., Richard Partridge and Francis Wills 
to plead his case against the "ill manners and impudence" 
of Wentworth and Atkinson, councillors who opposed the 
"king's service and the good of the people".  In truth, the 
quarrel between Belcher and the Wentworth-Atkinson faction 
had much to do with Belcher's resistance to the creation 
of a land bank, the right of the assembly to elect its own 
speaker and the Massachusetts-New Hampshire boundary dis- 
pute, three issues championed by the land-speculating Went- 
worth. 
Wentworth and Atkinson gained support from other in- 
fluential council and assembly members who were displeased 
with Belcher's unfavorable handling of the border dispute 
and his interference with the prerogative of the legisla- 
ture.  Wentworth thus asked Thomlinson to lobby on their 
behalf in London.  As Thomlinson knew well, the boundary 
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issue was closely tied to the Wentworth family's aspiration 
of land ownership.  Many of Wentworth's friends were also 
interested in the return of provincial offices meted out to 
Belcher supporters.  Wentworth had made common cause with 
Dunbar, Waldo and the royal timbercutters on the one hand 
and then gained support amongst landowners and merchants 
looking to expand their interest in New Hampshire's south- 
ern regions.  The combination of Wentworth and the clever 
Thomlinson proved too much for Belcher whose influence in 
London and in New England declined as that of the merchant- 
Wentworth faction grew. 
Dunbar never regained any stature (or profit) as sur- 
veyor, and he gratefully sold his office to Wentworth in 
173 7.  However, the case for Dunbar and the 1734 riot was 
not finished with Dunbar's resignation.  Wentworth saw his 
trump card in William Shirley, an influential name in 
Massachusetts.  To Belcher's great embarrasment, Shirley, 
as advocate general, conducted an investigation into timber 
smuggling in New England and confronted Belcher with the 
1734 riot.  The investigation had revealed that Belcher's 
friends and relatives in New Hampshire and in Maine were 
concerned in timber smuggling".  Like Dunbar, Shirley had 
not been able to pinpoint any names in New Hampshire with 
enough certainty to bring the lumbermen to court.  However, 
he was able to name the Frosts of Maine, Belcher's close 
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friends, as lumbermen taking advantage of "vague" restric- 
tions.  Belcher believed that Shirley would soften his re- 
port on account of their friendship and Shirley's knowledge 
of "local politics".  Nevertheless, Shirley probed deeper 
and prepared court cases against the Frosts with the aid of 
Dunbar and Waldo. 
To add fire to the campaign against Belcher, .Mrs. 
Shirley passed protests against Belcher to the Duke of New- 
castle, a family friend.  Mrs. Shirley, with information 
from Belcher's opposition, became convinced of her husband's 
political opportunities in Massachusetts and sought to 
further his career.  The aggressive "Mrs. Gypsey", as 
Belcher called her, united her husband's friends in London, 
directoing clashing interests against Belcher.  Growing 
favoritism toward Shirley, who was seen as the new power in 
Massachusetts, hit hard at Belcher's control of patronage. 
This severly undermined the governor's influence over local 
politics. 
Some support for Belcher remained among his pro- 
J. Belcher to R. Belcher, R. Partridge and J. Wilks, 
2 October 1734, Massachusetts Historical Society Proceed- 
ings, VI: 135, 127-134; Ibid^ see preface; Schutz, "Succes- 
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1739, p. 163-65. 
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Massachusetts landowning friends.  However, the Wentworth 
group had appealed to Whitehall with a massive campaign and 
had proved their influence with the Board of Trade, notably 
with Martin Bladen.  The Board was not entitled to dismiss 
a governor, but could indeed make his job a difficult one 
if it demonstrated to provincial politicians that the gov- 
ernor did not have its support.  By the time William Shirley 
took office as Governor of Massachusetts, Wentworth's 
supporters were enlisting Shirley's help  to propose a 
separate governor for New Hampshire.  In 1741, Benning 
Wentworth became the Governor of New Hampshire. 
Governor Belcher's friendship with the timber smugglers 
was not a direct casue of his demise, although his opposi- 
tion used this information in the campaign against him. 
In fact, the change in provincial leadership scarcely affec- 
ted the foreign timber trade.  Governor Wentworth was a 
merchant and a businessman, and his main concerns were the 
family landholdings and money from its timber.  The gover- 
nor made friends easily and was eager to support the busi- 
ness interests of the province, wherever the profit lay. 
Schutz, "Succession Politics", pp. 518-519; Belcher 
to Richard Partridge, 7 May 174 0, ^Massachusetts Historical 
Society Proceedings, VII: 283; Olson, Anglo-American 
Politics, pp. Ill, 133. 
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At the same time, he strove to maintain the internal peace 
that would satisfy the home government. 
By the 1740s the Wentworth influence was widespread, 
touching nearly all political, social and economic aspects 
of provincial life.  Except for the loyal friends of 
Belcher, men like Waldron and the Gilmans, the majority of 
the wealthy and influential, particularly in the Portsmouth 
area, formed a "court party" around the governor.  The size 
and power of the Wentworth faction kept at bay most serious 
threats to its influence. 
The greater calm and prosperity of the 1750s reduced 
the political and economic tensions that had previously led 
to civil discontent and rioting.  Therefore, the riots 
which occured prior to the 1760s were the result of issues 
not depending on political or economic upheaval, issues 
such as social and personal prejudice and the life of a man 
at the hands of a British recruitment party.  By the 1760s, 
however, altering political and economic trends brought new 
tensions to the surface of provincial life.  These tensions 
became evident in rioting of another kind with a more last- 
ing effect on the temper of the province. 
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CHAPTER IV 
"The Wentworth Oligarchy" 
"...0, the happy silver age 
when magistrates, profoundly sage, 
O'er spread the land; and made it seems 
Justice ran down the street in streams" 
Portsmouth Mercury, 1765 
The rioting that occurred in the 1750s gained its 
strength from the conditions surrounding Wentworth rule. 
The complacency of the administration and the excess num- 
bers of dilatory magistrates within the province enabled 
any group weilding to community support to use extralegal 
means to effect local justice.  The weakness of local 
authority gave the people the opportunity an inclination 
to riot for the good of the community.  The imperial scope 
of the governor's concerns, together with an ineffective 
magistry, left local matters in the hands of ordinary citi- 
zens.  These citizens were men not concerned with court 
politics or maintaining a position of favor with the gover- 
nor, but with the protection of more personal and immediate 
interests.  Flexible political and legal codes of Wentworth 
rule made rioting an effective weapon of community justice, 
an extralegal measure which appeared less sensational 
against the background of the governor's indiscretions. 
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The well-to-do, influential men who formed a court 
party around the governor enjoyed the rewards of political 
prefernece on a broad basis.  These men, mostly family 
members, found their way into comfortable governmental pos- 
itions with Wentworth's indiscriminate use of patronage. 
More than a political faction or the socially elite, the 
"clan" appeared largely as a merchant monopoly with re- 
sourceful connections in London.  These connections, togeth- 
er with the the wealth and influence of the Wentworth party, 
allowed the governor to be as tolerant or vindictive in 
provincial matters as he chose. 
Wentworth and his associates were represented at White- 
hall by John Thomlinson, merchant, mast contractor, deputy 
pay-master of his majesty's troops in North America and a 
political associate of the Duke of Newcastle.  As a London 
merchant and mast-contractor, one of his main interests was 
a lucrative trade with the Piscataqua merchants.  Governor 
Wentworth, together with his brother-in-law Theodore Atkin- 
son and brother Mark Hunking Wentworth, the three wealthiest 
merchants in the province, acted as New England subcontrac- 
tors for Thomlinson.  Benning Wentworth had been in debt 
when Thomlinson persuaded Shirley and Newcastle to appoint 
him Governor of New Hampshire.  By 1752 Wentworth had amass- 
ed a spectacular fortune with the help of his connections. 
Thomlinson also performed a great diplomatic service 
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for the Wentowrth administration.  He obtained mandamuses 
placing the clan in various offices and advised them 
accordingly.  If internal disputes withing the province put 
the governor in an embarrassing position, Thomlinson saw 
that the matter was not heard before the Privy Council or 
the Board of Trade.  Thomlinson's influence in London was 
only part of the scheme that contributed to the confidence 
of the governor.  Thomlinson was the ministry's chief source 
of information about New Hampshire and, from the Wentworth 
point of view, the provincial mast trade secured Thomlin- 
son 's cooperation.  Often those in the ministry who were to 
judge the effectiveness of the Wentworth administration re- 
mained ignorant of matters in the province. 
As Governor, Wentworth was concerned with "appearances" 
within the province and wrote convincingly to the Board of 
Trade of his devotion to royal prerogative and his official 
instructions.  He also made sure the Board knew of his part 
in successful military campaigns.  Yet, as his opponent 
Richard Waldron remarked, the one thing that would "break 
Wentworth in pieces" was the waste of the king's timber.  As 
Surveyor General of New England, Benning Wentworth was no- 
Portsmouth Mercury, October 7, 1765; see Provincial 
Papers, VI: 60; Provincial Papers, XVIII: 165-166, 169,187; 
see Daniell, Republicanism^ pp. 5-8; Provincial Papers, V: 
23-242; 336; Daniell, Republicanism, pp. 9-15. 
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toriously lax, doing almost nothing to enforce preservation 
while at the same time ensuring the ministry of his dili- 
gence.  A true merchant, Wentworth saw that the trade pros- 
pered.  As long as Thomlinson delivered masts in England, 
the Board of Trade was happy with the provincial government. 
The family-dominated mast trade was very profitable for 
the Wentworths and for any others who managed to join them. 
Mark Hunking Wentworth, with near control of the American 
mast trade by 1760, willingly sold mast timber to supply 
that wants of those in need, at his own price, and auctioned 
seized timber back to its owners.  Trade kept up briskly for 
anyone with an interest in timber and most of settled New 
Hampshire engaged in the trade.  As Waldron said, only a 
court of inquiry would expose the affair, and "moving in 
it would be one of the most unpopular things in the 
world".2 
Such circumstances put Wentworth in a position to con- 
struct a broad economic and political foundation to 
support his provincial authority.  The governor was able to 
2 
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maintain internal harmony and present a picture of compe- 
tence to his superiors.  The extensive land holdings of the 
Wentworth clan, including the purchase of the old Mansoman 
proprietorship, enabled the governor to give generous grants 
and quick confirmations to settlers and quit claim deeds to 
existing towns.  In a province where there was little cash 
or liquid capital in the people's hands, the inhabitants 
made few complaints.  By 1765 the governor and council had 
granted one hundred twenty four townships, the governor own- 
ing one hundred thousand acres himself. 
Granting land was one means of bestowing valuable pa- 
tronage and spreading influence; bestowing government offi- 
ces was another.  In this, the governor spared neither 
friend nor foe.  In fact, Wentworth's appointments for jus- 
tices of the peace were so numerous that the office became 
an object of ridicule.  As Jeremy Belknap stated, there 
were twenty five justices of the peace in the province when 
Wentworth took office, and he appointed that many more in 
Portsmouth alone.  Civil and military commissions were 
given generously to friends at the expense of the governor's 
rivals, many of whom lost their offices to make room for 
the underaged or incompetent.  These rivals were the friends 
of ex-governor Belcher, pro-Massachusetts men and some 
Congregationalists.  Richard Waldron, secretary of the 
province, judge of the inferior and probate courts, council- 
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or, justice of the peace and unofficial lieutenant gov- 
3 
. ernor under Blecher had lost every office by 174 3. 
Removing Blecher's men from the courts and council de- 
monstrated that Wentworth wanted cooperation in return for 
social prestige or influence with land grants.  However, 
it seemed that there was little disapproval of the system, 
and Wentworth's merchant oligarchy were better educated and 
more qualified for governmental and judicial posts.  As 
were Jere Daniell pointed out, the ordinary citizen was 
not troubled with exclusiveness on the bench and rarely 
went farther than a local justice of the peace. 
The governor did not have the same control over the 
legislators, who were elected locally in town meetings and 
expressed more limited concerns, rather than imperial in- 
terests or the needs of the merchant aristocracy.  Went- 
worth had to ensure that the legislature allowed him to 
please the home government, and the governor and assembly 
had some fierce squabbles during the 1740s.  The issues of 
3 
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contention were primarily appropriations, issuance of 
paper money, extension of representatives to the assembly, 
choice of a house speaker and land patents.  Wentworth's 
prime advantage in the disagreements was his financial inde- 
pendence fromi the legislature.  The lower house included in 
its membership many of the governor's enemies who waged a 
massive campaign between 1744 and 1740 on the "grass-roots" 
level to oust the governor.  To these men, family control 
of the province left it like a "field of battle after the 
fight is ended; the common people being compared to the 
carcasses and those who are chief in power to the vultures." 
However, by the mid-1750s, most of these men lost their ar- 
dor or came to terms with Wentworth over the years; Waldron 
4 
died in 1753. 
The political and judicial conditions within the pro- 
vince in the 1750s supported the rioting that occurred 
during the decade.  The inefficiency of the magistry, par- 
tiality in the courts and an administration secure in its 
power provided an atmosphere of leniency with regard to 
matters of personal and social justice.  The jailbreak riot 
4 
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of 1754 and the recruitment riot of 1757 were not threats 
to family rule, but were two separate occasions when local 
citizens took the law into their own hands.  The success 
of the rioters reflects a measure of acceptance on the part 
of a people who lived in a .flexible political society. 
It was an occasion of misplaced trust that brought 
outrage and murder to a frontier town in New Hampshire.  The 
attempt of the local authorities to prosecute the murderers 
of two Indians prompted a riot by persons who would not have 
whitemen jailed for the murder of two lawless redskins.  The 
jailbreak riot of 1754 was not a demonstration of political 
or economic dissatisfaction.  Instead, it revealed signifi- 
cant attitudes regarding deeply established social values 
and fears.  Local prejudice against two Indians provoked a 
riot which successfully replaced official lawfulness with 
provincial social justice. 
Due to the exposed nature of their property, the inhab- 
itants of the frontier towns found it difficult to defend 
their land during the Indian wars and surprise attacks.  The 
people had suffered much at the hands of the Indians, losing 
property and men, valuable to the growth of the province. 
The people feared the Indians, but often sought compatability 
with them, providing mutual services and hospitality. 
In May 1752 Sabbatis and Cristo, two Indians friendly 
with the inhabitants of Canterbury, arrived in town for a 
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"visit".  On two separate occasions James Lindsay and Josiah 
Miles, local farmers, invited the Indians to their home for 
a meal and some drink.  Accepting the farmers' hospitality, 
the Indians professed their friendship to each man as they 
enjoyed an evening together, exchanging new of neighboring 
towns.  However, in each case, after bidding good-by, the 
Indians betrayed the farmers' trust and stole the Lindsay's 
slave "Tom" and the Miles' slave "Peer". 
Not until May 1753 did the Indian Cristo return to Can- 
terbury, this time with another friend, Plausway.  Both were 
members of the Canadian Saint Francis tribe, notorious ene- 
mies of the English.  At this time the two Indians approach- 
ed the Lindsay home looking for more hospitality, but re- 
cieved a very different welcome.  Mrs. Lindsay reporached 
the thieving Cristo and forbade the Indians to enter her 
home.  Mrs. Miles, with Mrs. Lindsay at the time, further 
rebuked them.  The enraged Indians responded wildly and 
threatened the two women with their lives. 
Their reputations already blackened by tales of their 
unreliability and deceit, the Indians' dangerous behavior 
led to warnings throughout the neighboring towns.  In 
August 1753 Cristo and Plausway appeared in Contoocook.  Un- 
fortunately for the Indians, the frontiersmen were prompt 
at avenging an injury, and the fact that the threats against 
their homes and families came from unworthy Indians made them 
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that much more intolerable. 
With that in mind, husbandmen Peter Bowen and John 
Morill invited Cristo and Plausway into Bowen's home for an 
evening of "frolic".  After encouraging the Indains to drink 
heavily, Bowen, when the Indians' backs were turned, unload- 
ed the charges in his own and Morill's guns.  The hosts then 
suggested that the four of them venture into the woods to 
play hunting games, switching weapons for fun.  The two 
frontiersmen, tomahawks in hand, expected the Indians to 
turn on them once they were alone.  After a short time of 
mutual amusements, Bower saw his own unloaded gun in 
Cristo's hands flash behind his back.  Using that as an ex- 
cuse for self-defense, Bowen and Morill raised their toma- 
hawks and slaughtered the Indians, burying them along side 
the road in a shallow ditch. 
To add to the gruesomeness of this affair, Bower and 
Morill were careless in concealing their crime.  Dogs -un- 
covered the remains of the Indians, and the reminder of the 
murder lay in full view of the citizenry for months after 
the crime.  Eventually in February 1754 Thomas Barrett and 
Ephraim Hones of Contoocook went to the Officials at Concord 
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with accusations and evidence for the murderers' arrest. 
The townspeople had concealed or just ignored the crime 
for five months, which indicated their sympathies.  When 
Barrett and Jones reported the crime, everyone knew who had 
committed the murder.  Bowen and Morill were arrested and 
sent to the jail at Portsmouth in March of that year.  They 
did not openly admit to the murder, but could not deny it. 
News of the arrest caused great excitement, but with mixed 
feelings.  Public opinion generally favored the frontiers- 
men on the basis that no white men should be imprisoned for 
killing Indians who themselves had killed and robbed in 
that area. 
On March 20th, the night before the prisoners were to 
appear in court, a mob of disguised men from Canterbury, 
Contoocook and neighboring towns arrived in Portsmouth. 
They stormed the jail, knocked down the door, kicked the 
irons off the prisoners and set them free.  The local magis- 
try offered rewards for the rioters' arrest, but the con- 
venience of the rioters' disguise provided sufficient ex- 
cuse for civil inaction.  The authorities did not attempt to 
rearrest Bowen and Morril, and the men went about in public 
Testimony of Ann Lindsay and Elizabeth Miles, Provin- 
cial Papers, VI: 301-3Q7; Affadavit of Thomas Barrett and 
Ephraim Jones, 9 February 1734, Provincial Papers, VI: 263; 
Stackpole, History, II: 97. 
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with no fear of litigation.  However, the people acknow- 
ledged that had the government attempted to arrest the riot- 
ers, it probably would not have succeeded, because the men 
were some of the more "substantial" in the community. 
Governor Wentworth addressed a letter to the assembly 
to express his abhorrence at the rioters* breaking down the 
doors of the jail, particularly during the session of his 
majesty's supreme court which met across the street.  The 
governor's letter was prompted by one which he received 
from Governor Shirley in Massachusetts.  Shirley had been 
concerned that the Indians, having heard of the "barbarous 
murder" in New Hampshire, would avenge the deaths.  The 
provincial government responded with an effort to appease 
the Indians, to whom they presented gifts, a symbol of 
"wiping away the blood". 
It would seem that the government put more energy into 
appeasing the Indians than it did toward prosecuting the 
murderers or the rioters.  This showed something of the 
attitude of the magistracy, whose feebleness could not match 
civil unity.  The rioters' own prejudice and their assesment 
of community response motivated and supported the successful 
Hon. Chandler Potter, Farmer's Monthly Visitor, Sep- 
tember 1853, in Provincial Papers, VI: 265; Chalmers, His- 
tory of Revolt, p. 29 8; Governor Wentworth to Assembly, 
Provincial Papers, VI: 267; Chalmers, History of Revolt, p, 
7W. 
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endeavor to release the prisoners, men jailed for an il- 
legal act which the people judged a favor to the community 
and an act in its defense.  The local authorities' tacit 
acceptance of the colonists' rationale for the riot along 
with its deference to the colonists' will gave the riot 
an unspoken legitimacy.  The governor did his duty, and left 
the matter in local hands.  The offenders remained unpunish- 
ed- * 
Fear of another murder, this time at the hands of a 
military posse, caused an anti-recruitment riot three years 
after the jailbreak riot at Portsmouth.  As in 1754, this 
riot involved men who took the law into their own hands to 
effect social justice. 
During the 1750s the treat of the French and Indian 
advance forced the province to exert itself militarily with 
all the men and money it could spare.  The severity of the 
threat had prompted the government in New Hampshire and in 
London to push the inhabitants to extend the bulk of their 
resources for defense.  The extensive frontier of the pro- 
vince required a great number of men, although the people 
regarded the New Hampshire quota as excessive.  The assem- 
bly had been reluctant to agree to the large recruitments 
and appropriations called for by the home government, parti- 
cularly on account of their questionable ability to provide 
the funds and their discouragement after a number of de- 
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feats.7  For this reason, the unpopular British recruitment 
parties could not afford to lose any of the men they had 
trained. 
The riot of 1757 involved farmer Job Kenniston who was 
concerned for the life of his son, a deserter,captured by a 
recruiting party at Brentwood in December 1757.  That con^ 
cern brought a mob of family, friends and local sympathizers 
down upon royal troops in the attempt to rescue the young 
man.  The commanding office of the posse, in an angry letter 
to the governor, revealed the motivation and rationale of 
the rioters. 
On December 31, 1757, Lieutenant William Cook of the 
First Royal Regiment informed Governor Wentworth that his 
recruiting party had received "rough treatment" while tak- 
ing up a deserter at Brentwood that week.  The party had 
arrested John Kenniston, who had deserted the regiment of 
Sir William Pepperill.  In Cook's words, the people assem- 
bled after the arrest in a "riotous and tumultuous manner" 
and rescued the prisoner.  When Cook's party retreated, the 
mob followed them and beset the house where the party had 
gone for shelter.  The lieutenant also wrote that the mob 
intended to murder his party, an exaggeration to bolster his 
7 
Fry, New Hampshire as a Royal Province, pp. 514, 516; 
Chalmers, History of Revolt, p. 299. 
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attempts at redress. 
The leaders of the mob were Job Kenniston, father of 
the deserter, his other son, Joseph, and a close friend, 
John Arkison.  Their personal concern for the safety of the 
prisoner drove them to riot.  Cook thought that the "blood 
for blood" cry was meant to irritate the people to take re- 
venge for another man enlisted at Brentwood and shot for 
desertion at Oswego.  The recruiting party's previous exe- 
cution proved the rationality of Job Kenniston's fear for 
his son's life.  He wanted to insure that the party would 
leave Brentwood without a prisoner and not return again for 
his son. 
On the night of the riot, the lieutenant sent a sold- 
ier in disguise to the home of Justice Vasey with a letter 
to acquaint the judge with the details of the riot.  Cook 
hoped the judge would act to quell the disorder or arrest 
the rioters.  The judge merely replied that it was too late 
in the evening and that he would see to the matter in the 
morning. 
Finding no protection from the authorities, and think- 
ing that the mob had dispersed, the recruiting party left 
Brentwood the next afternoon.  Cook's party had .not gone far 
when the axe-carrying mob returned and pursued it for four 
miles to Kingston, again besetting the home in which the 
party had gone for shelter.  The next day, the recruiting 
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party made its escape by going four miles out of its way 
while the mob awaited at Amesbury, the supposed route. 
Lieutenant Cook and his party did not attempt to return to 
Brentwood. 
Cook may have exaggerated the harassment in his account 
so that his party would not appear weak or foolish.  With 
calculation, Cook informed Governor Wentworth that he had 
notified the adjutant general of the riot in order to en- 
courage Wentworth to take positive action.  On January 11, 
1758, the governor addressed the assembly with his concern 
over repeated instances of mobs assembling and interrupting 
the officers employed in his majesty's service.  Wentworth 
requested the publication of an act ot punish the offenders 
and prevent future similar occurrences.  However, respon- 
sibility for the investigation of the riot rested with local 
officials and witnesses, and the governor did not become 
further involved. 
No known official measures resulted from the governor's 
address, nor did the local authorities take any punitive 
action.  Local sympathies were on the side of the Kenniston 
family, because it and its friends resisted, for legitimate 
reasons, and outside force whose actions they could neither 
judge nor trust.  The fact that the Kennistons were Quakers 
may or ma;y not have encouraged these sympathies.  The 
Quaker family had the choice of sending their men to war or 
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or paying a "quota tax" instead.   The Kennistons, being 
poor farmers, had chosen to send their sons for enlistment. 
Whatever their feelings for the military cause, they right- 
fully feared for John's life. 
The two riots of the 1750s remain significant for what 
they reveal about the flexibility of Wentworth's rule and 
the weakness of his local authorities.  The governor's re- 
liable London connections, who kept embarrassing matters 
from the home government, may have encouraged the governor's 
laxness in these two matters.  Although it was the people 
who often suffered from the weakness of their rulers, the 
mob was able to take advantage of a dilatory magistracy by 
taking the law into their own hands for non-political mo- 
tives.  When their sense of justice was threatened or abus- 
es 
ed, rioting offered an acceptable and necessary response for 
the Kennistons and the people of the frontier towns.  As 
with the riots of earlier New Hampshire history, the key to 
understanding the aims and motivations of the mob lies in 
the most basic aspects of life, in the right to protect and 
defend one's property, security and private interest. 
g 
William Cook to Governor Wentworth, Provincial Papers, 
VI: 641; Wentworth to Assembly, Ibid, pp. 640-641; Edwin 
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-90a- 
When this personal interest encompassed a large number 
of people, it greatly strengthened the power and influence 
of that interest, which became the common good.  If the 
common good was threatened, it stirred a defensive force 
strong enough, rational enough and legitimate enough to 
provoke and sustain riotous behavior.  The resulting solid- 
arity of the people gave substance to the mob, without which 
the act of rioting could not be feasible nor successful, in 
spite of the feebleness of the magistrates.  With mob vio- 
lence, the need and the will to protect the common interest, 
ingrained with the prejudices of one's economic and social 
existence, surpassed considerations of legal penalties and 
personal harm.  In that sense, the purposeful response of 
the community was neither trifling nor fickle. 
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CHAPTER V 
"The Threat to Family Rule" 
"Laws and regulations which prove very ef- 
fectual for small communities by no means 
answer the same good when they...become 
more extensive..." 
New Hampshire Gazette 
"I trust in policy(revenue by force of law) 
will not be attempted; but as to the right, 
it undoubtedly is held to be so." 
Lord Rockingham 
The Wentworth government had small chance of weathering 
the turbulent pace of the 17 60s.  Although the governor's 
sphere of influence overrode the factionalism that under- 
mined royal authority in other colonies, the political and 
economic sensations fo the decade made family control an 
outdated phenomenon.  Anglo-colonial ties strained as the 
mother country reasserted English standards on a maverick 
offspring.  At the same time, the colonies showed their 
uneasiness in a filial role after the war.  The threats to 
Wentworth rule accelerated on both sides of the Atlantic and 
demonstrated the increasing divergence between English and 
American thought, lifestyle and goals. 
New Hampshire Gazette, February 25, 1774; Lord Rock- 
ingham, quoted in G.T.K. Albemarle, ed., Memoirs of the 
Marquis of Rockingham (London, 1852, 2 vols.),2: 254. 
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One threat to the Wentworth administration came fron 
within from the growth of a fluid, speculative society.  By 
1763, the colony had shown its ability to govern itself and 
had long bypassed its earlier stage of complete colonial 
dependency.  By 1770, royal domination became nearly as un- 
necessary as unwanted in a society that set its own stan- 
dards for the furture.  Second, the pressure from a home 
government for financial support of its imperial policy 
forced the colonial administration to forsake its local 
popularity to maintain the favor of London, and vice versa. 
The governor worked hard at appearances, but found the 
pressures of fluctuating political trends beyond his dip- 
lomatic capabilities. 
Benning Wentworth's greatest advantage as governor was 
that his political leverage was favorably entwined with his 
financial status.  Peter Livius, a wealthy Englishman who 
came to Portsmouth in the 1760s, remarked in disappointment 
that the lucrative masting trade remained in the hands of a 
few "associated gentlemen of very.large fortunes".  These 
men, Livius discovered, had surveyor general Wentowrth 
"entirely at their devotion".  The wealth Wentworth received 
from the naval mast contracts enabled him to deal generous- 
ly — and often indiscriminately — in land, an effective 
political technique.  In 1764, Wentworth granted land to all 
but three of the thirty-one representatives in the lower 
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house.  During the Stamp Act Crisis the next year, the 
2 governor granted entire townships to deserving legislators. 
At a time when the colonial legislatures were making 
profound advances on the prerogative of their governors, 
Wentworth maintained his ascendency over the New Hampshire 
lower house.  The reasons for that were not entirely politi- 
cal.  In 1765, New Hampshire elected thirty-four men to the 
legislature.  Nearly all of the representatives lived within 
a few miles of the commercial center at Portsmouth.  At 
that time, the frontier settlements were not fully repre- 
sentated; the Merrimac Valley towns voted for only seven 
seats.  In contrast to the prosperous coastline, the inter- 
ior inhabitants were mostly small farmers with enough pro- 
perty for a modest living.  There was plenty of western land 
available for Portsmouth speculators, and the favor of the 
governor was the key to ownership.  Wentworth's political 
authority benefitted from his ability to reward his suppor- 
ters in everyday governmental affairs. 
During the first ten years of Wentworth1s administra- 
tion, a group of men within the legislature united in 
2 
Daniell, Republicanism, pp. 33; Peter Livius to John 
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opposition to the governor.  Led by Richard Waldron and 
his "Mew Light" supporters, the contention was as much 
personal as political.  These men disapproved of the Went- 
worth scheme of political favors and partiality which ex- 
isted in a closed political system.  They attempted to block 
financial and military proposals and to stifle impressions 
within the home government of the governor's loyalty to his 
instructions.  As Waldron remarked to Sir William Pepperell, 
"I suppose our assembly expect to be landlords of  thousands 
and thousands of acres, esteeming but reasonable, for gener- 
ous grants of money, to have a return of as generous grants 
of land." 
Governor Wentworth succeeded in defending family con- 
trol as well as royal prerogative.  Through generosity and 
compromise, he prevented the growth of any more serious 
threats to his leadership.  Waldron died in 1753.  Later 
protests within the legislature, through 1765, were sporadic 
and without consistent leadership. 
3 
Jackson Turner Main, "Government by the People: The 
American Revolution and the Democratization of the Legis- 
latures", William and Mary Quarterly, 3 ser., 23 (1966): 
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The most significant of these protests concerned the 
means of extending representation throughout the' province 
and whether this privilege belonged to the governor or the 
assembly.  Wentworth knew the importance of spreading his 
influence into new settlements and guided the election of 
sympathetic candidates to the lower house.  However, Benning 
Wentworth did not encounter as much difficulty with this 
issue as did his more adamant successor, John Wentworth. 
If the house refused to seat newly elected members, the 
governor did not force the matter.  Although Wentworth 
complained of house control of approviations, disputes 
concerning sources of revenue, judicial salares, and rais- 
ing troops and supplies, he conveniently did not aggravate 
such "sticky" issues as house representation and county 
division. 
To add to the smoothness of the administration, the 
governor's council consisted of friends and relatives -- 
the "clan" — who backed their benefactor in disputes with 
the lower house.  Complaints outside the legislature, such 
as partiality within the courts, and a merchant community 
closed to outside competition, were common enough.  Yet no 
protest within the colony from the governor's opponents was 
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4 
forceful enough to topple Wentworth's rule.   That power 
remained in London, in the hands of the hone qovernment 
which looked unfavorably upon his negligence. 
The scope of the governor's political control in the 
province perhaps contributed most to the colony's conserva- 
tive image during the Stamp Act Crisis.  The formal politi- 
cal behavior of the province was certainly less newsworthy 
than the readical efforts of its neighbor to the south. 
There was nobody in New Hampshire to resemble what Richard 
Maxwell Brown called'the "patriot infrastructure" of 
Boston.  The popular politics of New Hampshire remained far 
less sophisticated.  Even the representatives to the legis- 
lature did not attempt to shake the system to the extent 
of officially electing delegates to the Stamp Act Congress. 
Although the colony did not follow all the leads of 
Massachusetts, the angry and rebellious spirit aroused by 
the ominous passing of the Stamp Act was not lost in New 
Hampshire.  Compared to the political temper of the previous 
two decades, the Stamp Act occasioned an almighty uproar un- 
like previous sporadic protests.  The rioting and protests 
4 Chalmers, Loyalists, p. 297; Danxell, Republicanism, 
p. 25; Wentworth to Board of trade, 13 August 1760, CO 5/ 
928; Provincial Papers, VI: 722-26, 749, 766; Belknap, 
History, III: 256; Peter Livius quoted in Acts of the Privy 
Council of England, Colonial Series, 1720-1745 (London, 
1912), VI: 535. 
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that occured in New Hampshire during that crisis were an 
indication of a newly united colonial sentiment which cut 
across social and political lines. 
From the imperial pont of view, England's post-war 
debt required the financial cooperation that the colonies 
had not given during the war years.  To meet the demands of 
its imperial policy, the home government found the income 
from existing trade sources inadequate.  Also, the colonial 
assemblies could not be sources inadequate.  Also, the colo- 
nial assemblies could not be coerced into raising the need- 
ed funds.  The Grenville ministry therefore decided upon 
financial experimentation and settled onto previously un- 
tried methods of taxation.  The Stamp Act of 1765 was an 
attempt to raise money by obligating the colonists to buy 
stamped paper from the government or imprint with a rubber 
stamp local newspaper of pamphlets.  What made the thought 
of direct taxation more undesirable was that the act speci- 
fied that the colonists pay in specie, a commodity alarming- 
ly scarce. 
The colonists had sufficient time to consider the im- 
plications of the act from its announcement in 1764 to its 
passage in November 1765 and repeal in 1766. During that 
time, concerned citizens discussed numerous aspects of the 
colonies' legal and political relationship with Great Bri- 
tain.  Aside from the act serving as a menace to colonial 
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prosperity, arguments against it delved into "constitution- 
al" and "natural" rights.  Various pamphlets and resolutions 
recorded on paper what the more erudite colonial mind was 
questioning:  the right of Parliament to tax the colonies 
without the consent of their legislatures. 
The bulk of the colonial population was concerned with 
the effect of a direct tax on the money in their pockets. 
Certainly the Stamp Act affected nearly everyone to a great- 
er or lesser extent.  Intricate deliberations on the finite 
limits of government, on virtual representation and on the 
rights of Englishmen were not on the lips of every colonist, 
but a radical anti-revenue enthusiasm, embued with slogans 
taken from the formal resolves and projected in propoganda, 
spread to all parts of the province.  From subtle criticism 
to violent outrage, the anti-Stamp Act spirit was all but 
unanimous in colonial America. 
In New Hampshire, most of the educated men who engaged 
in the ensuing constitutional debate were closely aligned 
with the governor and so sought to moderate the tensions. 
Richard Maxwell Brown, "Violence and the Revolution", 
Essays on the American Revolution, Stephen G. Kurtz and 
James H. Hutson, eds. (University of North Carolina Press, 
1973), p. 98; Provincial Papers, VII: 92; See Looney, "The 
King's Representative", pp. 131-141; Andrews, Colonial Back- 
ground of the American Revolution, pp. 131-140; Edmund S. 
Morgan, "Colonial Ideas of Parliamentary Power, 1764-1766", 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., V: 3 (July, 1948) 
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This did not limit their criticism of English policy.  The 
provincial government forwarded a severe protest to the 
British government through John Thomlinson in England.  Al- 
though New Hampshire officially refused to send delegates 
to the Stamp Act Congress, the government gave formal appro- 
val to all resolutions of that body which denied, with qua- 
lifications, the right of Parliament to tax the colonies. 
The tendency of the government to remain loyal to the 
governor did not discourage public debate on other levels. 
It also did not inhibit the desire of the colonists to 
challenge the initiative of Parliament regarding taxation. 
Although there was little polemical literature in New Hamp- 
shire, Massachusetts newpapers aroused keen public interest. 
Political issues were widely discussed by Congregational 
ministers and by the public at large in casual tavern gath- 
erings.  Since New Hampshire's official newspaper, the Port- 
smouth Gazette, remained conservative and uncritical of the 
home government throughout the Stamp Act Crisis, Ports- 
mouth's more liberal minds founded the rival Portsmouth 
Mercury. 
The publishers of the Gazette printed very little of 
dissension in other colonies and did not come forth as a 
source of information on the Stamp Act Congress.  On the 
other hand, the Mercury brought conflicting issues into the 
open, providing a base of information at local gatherings. 
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The Mercury called for New Hampshire's men to take a stand. 
It was, at times, critical of the Wentworth administration, 
but always of "those men...who artfully make themselves 
respectable to both sides".  A good number of men took a 
public stand; protest demonstrations and rioting reaged in 
Portsmouth.  Although the protests were not as violent as « 
those staged in Boston, the rioting in Portsmouth in Novem- 
ber 1765 was equally demonstrative of colonial opinion. 
Because the Stamp Act affected the colonial supply of 
specie, sentiment within the province ran along the lines 
of self-defense.  The issue which brought ment to the streets 
was their won political and economic security.  The people 
were not oblivious of broader issues of imperialism and 
Parliamentary control, but such issues were not the basis 
of their protests and rioting at that time.  Although the 
principle behind the Stamp Act was indeed vital to Britain's 
imperial status, it was the more immediate effect of the 
act and not its tangent constitutional issues that fired the 
riotous spirit in New Hampshire. 
The range of constitutional debate in 1765 showed more 
fear of what might lie ahead in terms of financial and leg- 
Daniell, Republicanism, p. 60; Belknap, History, II: 
227; Daniell, Republicanism, p. 53; Portsmouth Mercury, 21 
January 1765, quoted in Daniell, Republicanism^ p~.   5 3; 
Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 33, 47. 
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islative encroachments than speculation on autonomous plans 
of action.  It was fear that made the outrage viable in any 
occupation, social class or political camp.  In Portsmouth, 
Henry Sherburne, Woodbury Langdon, Samuel Cutts and other 
persons of literary ability", formed the Portsmouth Sons of 
Liberty.  The Sons, men not directly connected with the 
governor, strove for full provincial participation in 
colonial resistance to the Stamp Act. 
The Sons of Liberty drafted a series of citizen's re- 
solutions, organized protest demonstrations against the act, 
held mock judicial proceedings to judge those who agreed to 
use stamps, and pressured Portsmouth citizens to petition 
for repeal.  Local mobs forced appointed Stamp Distributor 
George Meserve to resign his commission.  In conservative 
corners, the Sons gained a reputation for encouraging what 
Nathaniel Meserve called a "Damned Rebellious Spirit". 
Bonfires raged in Portsmouth as mobs gathered to protest 
the hated act by burning members of Greville's minstry in 
effigy. 
As local feeling ran high, the damage from popular 
outbursts went occasionally beyond the mob's purposeful 
limit.  The Portsmouth Stamp Act Riot on November 1, 1765, 
took place in "professed design" to oppose Parliament's 
passage of the act.  Although the gathering was meant to be 
a sign of public opinion, the "Riotous manner" of the assem- 
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"loyal" I'ortsnouth suLuxts, while at the demons t r a t : :-. , 
"did damage , break and spoil .1 house built at -;ur ex;<-:-..He 
for the purpose of worshipping '»od" .  The six pe t 1t i- :.<■ r n 
clained they had suffered a great loss.  The b . 11 d: r. ; had 
stood "useless" for six months.  Although they had, repaired 
it fruqally, but at "no small sum", the church remained 
marred. 
By July 1766, the Stamp Act had beer, repealed for 
nearly five months, and much qood feel in.: had been rest ri- : 
in the province.  In that sense, the Portsmouth petiti •:•. 
imploring the governor for redress was much after the 
fact, but could be received with equanimity.  None of 
the rioters was punished for misconduct, and the community 
did not seem to regret the riot.  It was likely that the 
governor tried to offer some small recompense to the 
4- • 4. ■ 7 petitioners. 
The Stamp Act protests were significant m revealing- 
the growing divergence of opinion between America and 
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Groat Britain in areas of governmental and comnercial 
policy.  The repeal of the act restored colonial confidence 
in the ability of Parliament to legislate for benefit of 
trade.  However, in many ways, it was a false satisfaction. 
The repeal of the act postponed the confrontation between 
ways of thinking that had by that time grown apart.  The 
cumbersome British colonial administration could neither 
accommodate nor appreciate the vast changes that had occurr- 
ed in eighteenth-century America.  Neither side realized the 
full implications of the divergence in 17G5.  At that time, 
the colonies did not seriously question their legal depen- 
dence on the mother country. 
In New Hampshire, the inhabitants rioted on the basis 
of fear and insecurity.  Although they were concerned with 
issues of policy determination, the rioters had not been on 
the streets to defend colonial autonomy.  Rioting in 1765 
was a matter of more immediate interests, and the public 
still considered the British government, as based on its 
constitution, a protector of those interests.  Not until the 
1770s was imperial policy examined as a broader issue, mak- 
ing the cleavage in British and American political opinion 
so painfully apparent that it could not be ignored. 
Although it had been difficult to draw the line between 
imperial and local authority, the Wentworth administration 
did not have to bear the brunt of the conflict.  The Sons 
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of Liberty gave Wentworth's opponents and opportunity to 
make trouble for the governor, but the majority of the in- 
habitants were not at that time placing blame on the ruling 
obligarchy.  The Portsmouth Mercury folded in 1766, and the 
Gazette pointed out that the government could be in the 
hands of more authoritatian rulers than the Wentworths. 
During the crisis, Wentworth, by his ability to ignore 
pressure from the home government, gained a reputation for 
protecting local institutions against arbitrary imperial 
measures.  The governor did not effectively attempt to halt 
or punish protestors in Portsmouth.  He merely told the 
Board of Trade that there had been nothing he could do. 
The governor had not pressured his associates either.  He 
later declared that he had not recieved official notifica- 
tion of the act.  Wentworth's relatives, Daniel Rindge and 
Daniel Pierce, along with Councillor David Warner, framed 
the Portsmouth remonstrance against the act.  When Parlia- 
ment repealed the act, the assembly, on behalf of the 
o 
province, toasted the governor. 
With the end of the crisis, the focus of New Hampshire 
politics was on the governor's activities and the role of 
g 
For information on the weakness of the Rockingham 
Ministry at the time of the Stamp Act, see Gipson, Inger- 
soll, p. 221; Daniell, Republicanism, pp. 60-61, 52; New 
Hampshire Gazette, 30 May 1766. 
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the legislature in the province.  Unfortunately for Went- 
worth, the renewed attention on his monopolistic methods of 
government was not to his advantage.  The Board of Trade 
disrupted the political calm for Benning Wentworth as hear- 
ings began on his indiscriminate land grants and methods 
of judicial appeal. 
As Jonathan Belcher had said of Wentworth, "Guts can 
sometimes do more than brains."  Although Belcher had under- 
estimated (or would not admit) Wentworth's political sagac- 
ity, the governor's "guts" certainly made him a wealthy 
man.  It had also gotten him into serious trouble with the 
home government. 
In 1750, Governor Wentworth had laid claim (in the 
name of New Hampshire) to the region west of Connecticut. 
He had previously secured a commission from the Crown to 
grant lands within that area upon a quit-rent basis.  The 
New York government severely protested.  Within the next 
ten years, Connecticut experienced a decline in land value 
due, in part, to the desire of large numbers of inhabitants 
to settle the newly opened area along the upper'Connecticut 
River.  By 1760, Wentworth was in the midst of a scheme of 
granting to New Hampshire people the  Connecticut River 
lands which had been surveyed into townships six miles 
square.  Wentworth reserved for himself a block of five hun- 
dred select acres in each of one hundred and forty towns as 
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his fee. 
The New Hampshire governor also granted townships in 
Vermont, on land claimed by Hew York's government, keeping 
thirty thousand acres for himself.  In 1764, the Board of 
Trade ordered that Wentworth stop surveying west of the 
Connecticut River and later recommended that much of the 
land become part of New York.  Although the governor attest- 
ed to the validity of his grants in the Portsmouth Gazette, 
the Board of Trade was adamant that Wentworth had exceeded 
the limits of his authority.  The land scandal prompted a 
full-scale investigation into Wentworth authority in New 
Hampshire. 
By the mid-1760s, the Wentworth political foundation 
in London had crumbled, and so had the governor's good 
appearances.  Newcastle and his supporters had fallen from 
power with the accession of George III, and the Grenville 
9 
Belcher to Richard Waldron, 13 January 174 2, Belcher 
Papers, III, no. 112, New Hampshire Historical Society, 
Concord, New Hampshire, quoted in Daniell, p. 37; Cadwalla- 
der Colden, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative 
to the Colonial History of the State of New York (11 vols., 
Albany, 1853-67) VII: 598; see New Hampshire Land Grants, 
1749-1791, Provincial Papers, X, no. 3; Gipson, Ingersoll, 
p. 261; Benning Wentworth to Board of Trade, 14 August 
1763, CO 5/938; Board of Trade to Benning Wentworth, 8 
November 1765, CO   5/942; Provincial Papers, VII: 62; 
Daniell, Republicanism, p. 37-38. 
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'."he    invest:  :i'i    :.       *    Wer.tw   :: 
.:.: .iv rar.t' res 
■   .  »  -  .   -* 
accuse;: Her. r. ir. : Went worth '■  
disobedience" .  The  jove r r.o r ' s   sys'.cr  '  :ra:.t .:. ; La:. : : 
passed the plans for settlement outlined : r. :.;s ::.:>t: . •- 
tior.s.  In the Board's opinion, the plans .".a. 
nore with an eye to private interest than p-hli-- aivar.t.j :•• . 
In addition to the formal charges a.rair.st tr.e ; verr. r' :> 
9 
land deals, the Board noted judicial l r re ;u 1 ar :1 : es ;:. 'he 
courts, as well as the passina of "aLsurd, : r.cor. ; r ...' ..s a:v: 
unjust" laws.  It was their conclusion that kr/err.-.r Went- 
worth rewarded his relatives and lined his own pockets. '7:.< 
Board therefore recommended to the Privy Council that it 
dismiss him. - v 
Denninq Wentworth was not left m complete iis ;r,ic" ; n 
New Hampshire. The governor's nephew, ,'ohr. '..'entwo r t. h , tra- 
veled to Enqland to call upon friends and men of inf..er.ee. 
One such man was distant kinsman Charles Watson-Wentworth, 
the Marquis of Rockinqham. The two men struck up a mutual 
friendship and soon prepared a petition on Bennim Wer.t- 
worth's behalf with the help of G.W. Trecothick, former 
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: ;:iirii-ss jKir'.r.fr ■"'.     ' .>:\:\   7:;>T;1 I nsi >r. .  When 5 '.o^k i njh.ir ;.iir.- 
'• i 7-.1 r.i st <• r 1.1 1 c-' >:-. ♦ r ■ > 1 '. rnr    '.riT.villo \:\    !"()>, ."ohr. Went - 
w< r t:; took hold -)f the op|jort-.;r.ity to restore ?h<- strength 
ol the f.ir.ily [wsitinn.  William l.eqqe , Karl of Da r tmv.it h 
an.l new President of the Board of Trade, promisee! the gover- 
nor's nephew "any favor".  Soon afterwards, Dartmouth and 
Rockinqhan offered John Wentworth the governorship of New 
Hampshire. 
Apparently, the younger Wentworth declined the offer 
lonq enough to avoid the oath to enforce the Stamp Act; he 
also needed time to convince his uncle to resign his posi- 
tion to save his honor.  Benning Wentworth resigned after 
twenty-six years in office and received formal thanks from 
the porvincial legislature.    Immediately, John Wentworth 
went to work on restoring the confidence of the council, 
courts and the home government in New Hampshire's provin- 
cial authority. 
When John Wentworth became governor in June 1767, New 
Hampshire had a population of fifty-two thousand, sparsely 
settled over ninety-eight towns.  By that time, bitter ten- 
s Daniell, Republicanism, p. 37; Board of Trade to 
Privy Council, lu July 1764, CO 5/942; Provincial Papers, 
XVIII: 560-567; Daniell, Republicanism, p. 39-40; 
Provincial Papers, VII: 116. 
-109- 
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Thar was .I.:.- lar :<-ly t   tht- .'. r.ir^ari r; hy the ;;<-.»c .a:;t 
ili-aurchy of Nt-w iiur.psh l r«-' s s rial and jxjiiti^al 1 iff. 
Tht- St.-ai-oa.st.ul plain ami Great Bay Tidewater region support- 
ed half the colony's population, paid two-thirds of provin- 
cial taxes and hold the capital city, Portsmouth.  The area 
was known for its "conservatism" and the close contact of 
its merchant classes with royal officials. 
Another section, separated from the coastline by geo- 
graphical and social characteristics as well as poor 
communication, was the Merrimack Valley and its contiguous 
towns.  Massachusetts' influence on this area was stronq, 
because that colony had granted and settled the valley 
towns.  Richard Upton termed this area an "outpost of rad- 
ical republicanism", which was perhaps overstating their 
disrespect for the institutions and vested interests of the 
seacoast obigarchy.  The Valley section was the seat of the 
lumbering industry, as well as a hardy Scotch-Irish popu- 
lation which remained self-suffiecient with small farms. 
Tor those men, money was scarce.  They blamed the govern- 
ment's refusal to issue paper money on the conservative 
mercantile class in Portsmouth. 
The third section, the frontier region, coincided with 
the Connecticut River Valley. Many of the frontier inhabi- 
tants were pioneering men accustomed to the politics of 
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■.' •r.:\>■■.•'. xr r. .      7 >w.n leaders resented lh'-:r Jfirv; ;ivm 1 i t t 1 • * 
r ;•.' ■ j.iit x:\   ?};<• ; ■• r >v ; :u; x \ 1  : ■)'.•■• r r.r.t-r.r .  The ;'cn{ r.il i;.i- 
?m:i D! all  r ■)*.••> rimer, t ar.ii [MUUK'S I;, i'ort snout!, was ;■>.< ■■ t 
\. ■■■>   tin'ir pa r t l ru Kir aJvanta.jc .  In New iiar.pshiri', the 
joviL'rnnc'it rcvolviHi about the royal governor and not a 
charter or constitutional system.  Although the qovemrvnt 
functioned in the interest of its merchant oliqarchy, it war. 
a jovernnent that functioned with relative efficiency. 
The administration of   John Wentworth miqht have be^-n 
every bit as assured as had been that of his uncle, but the 
chanqinq political scene in England and America pulled the 
carpet of family control out from underneath him.  Went- 
worth was an even-tempered, learned and liberal man, but he 
did not qovern in "even-tempered" times.  The new governor's 
leverage suffered when the Wentworth's London connections 
lost political footing.  Also, economic setbacks and sec- 
tional tensions in New Hampshire gave rise to internal poli- 
tical opposition.  Although friends and relatives remained 
in provincial offices, circumstances outside the governor's 
control eventually undermined his reputation in the pro- 
vince.  The challenge came from a people who increasingly 
identified the governor with a system of imperial authority 
they learned to distrust. 
In England agent John Thomlinson and his commercial 
associates, who had an interest in New Hampshire, lost their 
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a ; : :: ; Th. ;~1 ::.:.. r. was ill,  ».'. i h: s s r-. , wr.  n ;!;! .'. IVI- t a V. «•:; 
v.-r , iiici i :i . *) .  '.:.<• WcMworri; s ,irr.i:; ;<T-«r. t :> v; si: r.«-w 
a ; <• :i t s were :v>; as s ucces;; '.  .; 1 i«v'a.;:ic ri";:;. ;r.ii- ti«-s :-<•' «<■<■;-, 
r.rvjiish contractors ami New Harr.psh l re had wt'.iXcni'!.  ?:.<• 
withdrawal of troops at th.e end of the French and   Indian 
War terminated contracts that provided specie to tropps. 
.'■tore inportant, the resulting decline m the nast and naval 
stores trade cut timber contracts and eroded mast prices. 
Wentworth's friend Trccothick could not take the place of 
Thorn1inson; new mast contracts went to others with more 
influence at Whitehall. 
By the 17 70s many of Wentworth's political associates 
in Enqland had fallen from power.  With no where else to 
turn, internal political disruptions forced the governor to 
rely on Whig connections.  Rockingham did not regain the 
ministry after 1770, and Wentworth opponents, including 
some wealthy Portsmouth merchants, had every opportunity 
to find open ears in Lond.  In 1770, Councillor Peter Livius 
(whom Wentworth had ousted from the judiciary and who 
brought his commission in England) launched an unsuccessful 
campaign to disgrace the governor.  That campaign drove 
Wentworth to look in all quarters for support, to new mast 
contractors, legislators, and old enemies in the Waldron and 
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With :ar liy v'or.troi wr.iktT.ivi r»:i i*oth si •,!<•;;  -! ?!;c 
At iar.li/,  *')r;n Wentworth's task >■ *: Srrvir. ; t h<- h■ >r-.t-    ;< vi-rn- 
m*-nt and New Hampshire A mul taneous 1 y bvcarrn- iar norc un- 
wieldy then his predecessor's.  Wentworth was a sincere and 
capable politician with, more imagination than most of his 
colleaques.  However, internal disruption dunnq his term 
resulted from the pressures of imperial policy, and the 
stabilizing influence of Wentworth was of small consequence, 
In the sense, the political temper of the province from 
1770 onward was largely out of his hands. 
In 1767 announcement of the Townshend Duties brouqht 
renewed outrage in New Hampshire.  The ministry designed 
the act to strengthen customs procedures and admiralty 
courts, thereby increasing the efficiency of the colonial 
revenue system.  The act also established a resident Board 
of Commissioners in Boston to clamp down on trade violators 
Provincial Papers, VII: 166-170; see Upton, Revolu- 
tionary New Hampshire, pp. 1-3; Daniell, Republicanism, p. 
51; Provincial Papers, XVIII: 543,658; For information on 
the decline of the masting trade, see Albion, Forests and 
Sea Power, pp. 271-276; Daniell, Republicanism, pp. 41-47. 
Peter Livius waged a tireless campaign to oust the governor; 
the Board of Trade approved of the idea, the Privy Council 
did not.  For more on this, see Provincial Papers, XVIII; 
623-650; Ibid, IX: 304-363; Acts of the Privy Council of 
England, Colonial Series, VI: 370-375; Ibid, VI: 529-536 
-113- 
:
:
 . •:. 1 .iws ■«•>•:<• ariat :.--~a t  ! ..rtsi1 ;!!; interests, I  -.t .»:. ;ry 
!■'••. •."»! r.'Tv.r,';a:-;t s ,->.i,i :. t a:!or-.l t , v-,t their rt- r >•.■>:-." : 1 •• 
tic:;.  I:vlar..i c- >rr. uri i,t. i<-s ha,I ,-->npara t i vc 1 y less to I s«- i y 
their sjrntc.st:; and s > \;r<}ed the a ssrrl ly and " ;ood ._* I t i/ens" 
to taki' action.  The acvrnor, on the other hand, did not 
desire to alienate the ministry, especially since knrkin;- 
ham and Trecothick had little influence in it. . He there- 
fore announced his intention to fiqht opposition to the act, 
Protest against the Townshend Duties never reached the 
stage of street violence and rioting partly because the 
governor, with little choice, allowed the people's griev- 
ances to circulate through normal channels.  Had the act 
remained in force for a longer period of time, formal 
protests might have proved insufficient.  Nevertheless, 
the act affected "special interests" and not a unanimous 
populace.  Public opinion fluctuated as the governor strug- 
gled to regulate the manner of protect and control the 
political tension between the sections.  It was largely due 
to the governor's initiative that the province remained 
"moderate" at that time. 
On February 19, 1768, House Speaker Peter Gilman laid 
before the assembly a Massachusetts circular requesting 
that the colonies unite in protest against the new revenue 
laws. The governor successfully pressured the assembly not 
to answer the letter.  Instead, it voted at a later date to 
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.»:.,:    i:',t ir.it.'   kn-wl«'d;«-"   • .• f    •:•..•   ; r-. <•: : r. :<•   .ill   v<-.i   ::;rr   •       •;<•:- 
•If   t :;«•   no st    ".'X|H'di,ir.t.    .iritl   t-qi; 11. abl <■ "   nx-tho.i   ■>;    t ,ix.i t i    n . 
Ir.   August, the assorbly rt'ccivrd t.".<- '.' l r ; l n l a Peso 1 •.•<•:; 
and concirri'ii with its sent irnent .  The assrr.bly javr their 
petition of approval and letters addressed to Trecothick 
and the Virginia House of Burgesses to Speaker C.ilnan to 
sign and send on.  However, at the governor's request, dil - 
nan kept the papers in his house.  The governor then wrote 
the ministry mentioning that the assembly did not respond 
to the Massachusetts Circular.  As Jere Daniell stated, some 
of the Lower House representatives miqht have known of this 
plan, but failed to acknowledge it bacause they wanted the 
House-proposed county division, supported by the governor, 
passed by the home government. 
News of the Boston Massacre prompted concerned citi- 
zens in Exeter to call for an investigation into the assem- 
bly's course of action over the Townshend Duties.  The in- 
vestigation revealed Gilman's "negligence", and the assem- 
bly quickly ordered him to forward the papers.  The petition 
fiasco aroused criticism not only of Wentworth, an otherwise 
popular governor, but of the whole legislature.  The mishap 
encouraged declarations that the public take more interest 
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.i !.i:r..s'    lrjMT.ui    a.; t )v ■> r : t y .      Many   ■-iti-'er. s    !<• •   * V  * • 
radical activity ut    the Mansach ;:;<• t t s assenMy was an .;:.- 
1 avorable contrast to New liar.psh l re.  They worried over the 
legislators' behavior, tearful that the elected represent a- 
tive could become dupes of royally appointed officials'. 
Ic.-en the New Hampshire Gazette recommended that o:.ly those 
candidates who supported the "people's nqht" be elected 
to the House.  As a Gazet to correspondent noted, the people 
had once thouqht it impertinent to enquire into House trans- 
actions.  However, the townsment were at that time recommen- 
ding public galleries in the House and written instructions 
for their representatives.  After the petition incident, the 
Gazette called the new fervor over elections "a mighty 
bustle made a Saturday in the afternoon by one that has 
12 been loitering all week before". 
Public concern over internal reforms contributed to 
New Hampshire's relatively conservative stance in inter- 
12 
Governor Wentworth to Board of Trade, 1 May 1769, CO 
5/94 5; Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 6; Provincial 
Papers, VII: 130,107,190-192 248-255; Upton, Revolutionary 
New Hampshire, p. 8; Daniell, Republicanism, pp. 71-72; Pro- 
vincial Papers, VII: 286; Daviell, Republicanism, pp. 64-65; 
New Hampshire Gazette, 6 May 1750, 13 .May 1763; Ibid, II May 
1770, quoted in Daniel1, Republicanism, p. 72. 
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e,i • he CX,-I!-T,.'::: <■:-. ♦:.»■ "fiar«-" that dis t ; rhed ♦ h«- ;v: ;h- 
lM>nr. : province.  Rampant |)ctiti(ir.ir.i; in New Hampshire 
crit.iCi.il of the hone .jovo rnrnont and similar to that in 
Massachusetts caused Wentworth to interfere.  The governor 
thought it a "critical tine to eradicate such erroneous 
principles and disorderly conduct".  He ordered the peti- 
tions "torn to pieces" in public view and procured a general 
public censure of the towns in question. 
Since the trouble in New Hampshire appeared minimal 
compared with that of neighborinq colonies, officials at 
Whitehall thanked Wentworth for his decisive and exemplary 
actions.  Yet the governor knew how tenuous was order in the 
province.  He realized that with the growth of the colony 
in size and political awareness, he was treading on very 
soft ground.  As Wentworth remarked in 1768, the "order, 
peace and obedience of the province" depended on "extending 
the power of the government into new settlements".  Other- 
wise, he predicted, the people would "increase in dangerous 
strength of ungovernable disorder, licentiousness, and dis- 
regard of government".  Althought the passage of the Town- 
shend Act did not directly cause rioting, the governor 
rightly feared the possibility of future disturbances. 
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A *.Ii 1 r*.I facts'ir behind New Har.psh 1 re ' s c>:-.se rva t : sr was 
the 1:1: ! ;ITH--' o! the :K)WTf .1 merchant ci.is;;  <r. the " p. ■ > r. - 
importation" movement.  The seacoast aristocracy feared t he 
effect of such measures in tines of economic distress.  By 
1770 all other major seaports hod accepted import control 
and Boston merchants declared intentions to cut off exj>orts 
to New Hampshire.  New Hampshire towns outside of the coast' 
al reqion likewise pressured Portsmouth for action. 
The qovernor was pleased when Portsmouth continued to 
vofje aqainst a non-importation resolution.  The merchants 
wanted moderation in public behavior but, in keeping with 
their interests, petitioned the home government to repeal 
the act.  Certain merchants outside the V.'entworth sphere 
of influence declared themselves to be as "patriotic" and 
"independent" as any man in the province.  However, few 
men of means in 1770 could afford to stick their necks 
out too far.  As Governor Cadwallader Colden of New York 
said of the colonial merchant classes: 
"All men of property are so sensible of their 
danger from riots and tumults that they'll 
not rashy be induced to enter into combin- 
ations which may promote disorder for the 
future, but will endeavor to promote due sub- 
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!!(>•..■<.•■.•.• r , ?h«' repiMl neasurt-s ci.il i r. ■■> t f r .1 i 1 cit <• ill %r .»..*<•:; 
'■>! Lit'a-iT.i.'S;; and the lovcmor dn! not Kij.r.r into 1 faisf 
con: ldt-nce .  As Went wor t h expressed his fet-lir.i.s to Iy>rd 
Hock in.jh.cin, "I fear the present calm does not proceed fror. 
content; alienation takes deeper root in these quieter tine:; 
than when much evaporated in passion."  The qovernor had 
watched the colonies pass judgement on unfavorable policy 
and had witnessed their defiance.  Although Wentworth had 
maintained order during his first three years in office, he 
could not hope to suppress the increasing political criti- 
cism of a system he knew would not fundamentally change. 
Wentworth recognized the faults of an imperial administra- 
tion misinformed about the colonies by self-seeking offi- 
cials on "hasty visits" to London.  Also, men at Whitehall 
formulated policy to suit the needs of England alone and the 
interests of their associates.  In the colonies, officials, 
Daniell, Republicanism, p. 36; Wentworth to Treco- 
thick and Apthorp^ 23 May 1768, Wentworth Letter Book, I: 
115, quoted iin 'Daniell, Republicanism, p. 49; Ibid, p. 54; 
Petitions for repeal of the Townshend Act, Provincial 
Papers, VII: 248-255; Governor Colden of New York, quoted 
in Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 11. 
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the rt-warls of pro' it aria h • -r.< > r t ak<-r. '. r' >r his h.ir.ds , r:.«- 
jovernor had no ntvins to "resist am: rejulat«- t h<- : r.! : r. 1 t <• 
exertions o: human dispositions, pass 1 or.s and interest:;" . 
In the tines of crisis in the colony, the people had. 
every right, through legislation and public voice, to f 1 :h.t 
for economic and social security.  Even the governor thought 
the laws controllinq currency absurd, and he endangered his 
standing in London by supporting the legislature's bid for 
specie.  When the economy was tight and special interests 
were threatened, public outcry was inevitable. 
On the other hand, the governor did not question the 
right of Parliament to tax or legislate for the colonies. 
He believed the colonists should accept taxation by the 
mother country and not doubt the role of parliament in their 
political lives.  In the Governor's mind, rioting for the 
sake of economic and social welfare was one tiling.  However, 
taking to the streets for reasons of constitutional dissent 
was another dangerous and foreboding matter.  As Uentworth 
wrote to Lord Rockingham early in 1770, the resistance of 
the colonists had been coming to rest on political princi- 
ples; this resistance, he warned, was "infinately more 
120- 
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14 > John Wentworth to Lord Rockinqham, 2 3 July 1771, 
quoted in Danioll, Republicanism, p. G5; \.'entworth to 
Anthony Belham, 9 August 176C, Wentworth Letter Book, VII 
130-136, quoted in Daniell, Republicanisn, p. 59; Ibid, 
pp. 58-59. 
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"...'vi-.is or '■'-.■i:\c-   o-T.t ::..<•;; r» .■:'<■ r. der.it •• 
rt.,ui any to the s ;thwar!; yet, at the 
sarne t l rse , ti'-,th ri'.i'.art'S re t; ■> su:;<ost 
that the -.jr. ion of the oolonies in srnti- 
nt'nt is not d iv l ded nor lost I r. New liar; - 
sinre, althouqh they have hitliortn been 
prevailed upon to abstain t r>r. acts of 
qeneral violence and outrage of the laws 
of their own course.  How ion--: it will re- 
main so is impossible to forsee; I confess 
much qood may not reasonably be counted 
upon while the unhappy distractions in the 
Massachusetts Bay gain ground and spread 
with such violence." 
Governor John Wentworth, 17 74 
Prior to 1773 New Hampshire had been "unfruitful 
ground" for Boston agitators, particularly in bustlinq, 
commercial Portsmouth.  Although the fighting spirit rose 
slowly in New Hampshire, the colony had the precedent of 
its neighbor to follow when confronted with disturbing 
political issues.   During the last four years of John 
Wentworth's administration, 1771-1775, the disturbing issues 
became increasingly numerous.  As Britain pressed it imper- 
ial authority, New Hampshire fell into line with colonial 
sentiment and became committed to resisting the encroach- 
ment. 
John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, 13 September 1774, 
Provincial Papers, VII: 414; Upton, Revolutionary New 
Hampshire, p~.   16. 
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'.":.<■   s'r'fss .-.r;:;<,d by i breach wit:. t:;<- rv>ther i':.;:,'ry 
;.:■•; ;ht people t >.:<•♦ h«-r :nt-- ;r'>-..ps.  ',.':.<• th<-r r»od<-r at «•  >r 
radical,  jm.ip ri'snl'.v IJCCM.",*' an absolute tor 'J;r lr.sti :a- 
t mn and e f !'cc t r.'r ni*ss of any ant 1 - inpc r i a 1 action.  The 
range of qroup activity was vast; fror. local citizens' 
connitU'cs, to riotous mobs, to a delegated Continental 
Congress.  However diverse, each and every qroup had cormon 
ground -- an undisputed purpose and a unified citizenry for 
the impact of that purpose. 
The leqality of such pro-revolutionary groups would 
certainly have been disputed by many participating members. 
Yet, objective thinking was not the temper of the times, nor 
was the question of legality a relevant point.  The politi- 
cal crises required that men take a stand on the imperial 
issue and preferably on the side of the "people's liber- 
ties".  The crumbling colonial relationship forced men to 
rexamine their role in the community.  It also urged men to 
take matters of general welfare into their own hands when 
normal channels of government became impotent. 
In New Hampshire, the association of political issues 
with mob action was a turning point in the concept of riot- 
ing.  It began a trend of activity that garnered acceptance 
as well as usefulness as the colonial breach widened.  The 
gradual introduction of a "Grand Cause" into the scheme of 
rioting gave the mob a much broader base on which to act. 
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i: ; < • r , :_> i < ■  i < ■ * > ■ i ~ ; :.<■ '.    a:.  i *""• : •  :..•;• a ;:. e i ' '. i' 
a:-.: .     v-w }'. tr: :;.'. : : >■ »• >:;■<•:: .;.«• : :.::.« 
r ■; ■ i • s >'.    ;; i :r, 1 : 1 oa:u:< ■   and r.ar.y •/.!:cr :; ■:: rr i she s •>' 1<-H:> 
note r.'iniKVti'i! with ant 1 - lr.pc r 1 a 1 sentirvon* .  '..'*:.«• t :.>-i   .i.:t ir. ; 
out of fear, ilctrrnination or S'.ipcrciliousnr.ss, the ri-rters 
were men threatened by a system oninousiy unsuitci to their 
needs and lifestyle.  For many Now Hampshire inhabitants, a 
future of subordination to policy formulated by men out of 
touch with colonial requirements was a future without eco- 
nomic or political security.  The natural desire of the 
colonists to foster their fluid and sol:-suffiecient society 
increasingly outweighted their devotion to the principles 
of Parliament.  The result was a turmoil painful to rioters 
and royalists alike. 
John Wentworth balmed the outrage over the Townshend 
Duties not so much on the act itself, but on the arrogant 
officials collecting the taxes.  Events in New England 
showed that the governor's assessment was valid.  The Board 
of Customs Commissioners, centered in Boston, had introduced 
more stringent customs regulations to govern the colonial 
ports.  The Maine-New Hampshire coastline was an open door 
for smuggling, and the revenue collectors were "cracking 
down".  Those officials, called by Sam Adams a "useless and 
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v.'ry --x; ••:;:;: •.■-• s.'t  >: ■■■'. : i ,•<.•::; , ,!K: ~" :<• *   »:.r a :< ■ ::: .••• t }.«■ 
; .i*.  -it :>•:; than th-'Y did t  f .rti'.cr *.:.<■ r y.il r • • •/«•:. .<• . 
I r.   !'.)rtsrK'.-;t!'. the t' ;:;;jr:; J^rrissi-rnTs had rcn vci 
♦hi- i "u\i 1  lov rr.ricr, t 's t r icrvis ar.J as:; .."M'J'S ' ar,<)r. : t :.<r 
Wcntwortii's bro the r- in- 1 aw , John Iisher! f rrir. t he f.;:;tor,!i 
scrvu-i'.  That left the governor with little nc.ins to j-■ r;.>- 
tect his ship-owning friends, Custons Inspector :".eor.;e 
M.'servi-, appointed by the Board of Trade in 1769, had made 
himself less popular in that position than he had been as 
Stamp Collector.  Unfortunately, he followed on the heels 
of the lax James Nevin, a friend of Benninq Wentworth. 
Meserve's dutiful and contemptuous amnner of seizinq ves- 
sels caused a riot in 17 71 and severely eroded respect for 
royal authority in that area. 
On October 29, 1771, the briq Resolution, owned by 
wealthy Portsmouth merchants Samuel Cutts, William Whipple 
and Woodbury Langdon, arrived in Portsmouth harbor.  In de- 
claring the ship's cargo, the captain "overlooked" one 
hundred hogsheads of molasses.  That cargo was to have been 
secretly unloaded at night in violation of the 1764 Sugar 
Act.  Inspector Meserve discovered the unregistered molas- 
ses, seized the vessel and locked the crew under a guard of 
customs officials.  The local customs officials promptly 
concemned the brig and entered it for prosecution in a 
local court of admiraltv. 
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.' '  . «' :::.:.::;■•  i:. i i: r»-  i «■;•:; .• 1 .: s" 1A a: :<• S 
.1; : A:<:\'.     ::\X >■::•  ;■:;■;  r<• 1 ••.* s : r. ; '':.<•   rzt-v   ,\::.\   ••■\:   ;• .   ".":.<• 
n-b b ■■ •;:•..! th-- ,-.:U-:~s   f : 1 c 1.11 s ar. 1 . 1: > s • ;:; led wi;:, • ?.■• 
,-,ir }'.) .  ".'!'.«•  ;overn r's subsequent proc 1 >ir.i T K .-. jf?c:<;i • '-' 
hundred pounds for 1 n f o mat 1 on leauin; to t lit- cor.v 1 ct 1, •;-. ■. - f 
o:t 'ender s .  However, no one volunteered any farts, an<\   l':.<- 
perpetrators renamed officially unaccountable. 
That episode was typical of the type of problem facir; ; 
the customs service up and down the colonial coast.  Where 
British officials exerted pressure, trouble arose.  A new 
strinqency of revenue regulations led colonists in New 
Hampshire and elsewhere to speculate on their economic 
future.  In Portsmouth in 1768 and anti-customs resolve had 
been drafted in fear that the revenue "extorted" from them 
would be used to support a standing army.  liowcvermuch the 
New Hampshire governor supported the revenue effort, he did 
not want to be identified with external force.  Wentworth 
rightly sensed a "dangerous spirit" amongst the people who 
had begun to think Great Britain intended to "enslave them 
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by r<-r>-    : >rc<-    . 
.';:<■  ;<>•,•<• r ;\, > r ' s task ;i:; Surveyor  •<■;;<■ r.i 1  ^ '::<• V i:,  ;'s 
V.ow,is J.TOVCV! .-qualiy th!': lcult as r..v.'>tl ma s t ' • f f i c 1 a i .<; 
aro.;sed coriter.pt aiui undcniinivi Jus a .it:-.' >r ; t y in lumberm; 
areas to. the |X)int of stirring up nob violence.  The laxity 
or predecessor Benning Wentworth in preventing destruction 
of the woods compromised the position of his nephew John 
before he took office as governor and surveyor.  The lumber- 
men considered any enforcement by the new surveyor a severe 
imposition.  Malone in Pine Trees and Politics contends that 
Benning Wentworth made no more than two confiscations in 
twenty-six years and never prosecuted the law-breaking mill- 
men.  The older Wentworth had ignored royal instructions 
when they threatened to jeopardize his local popularity. 
However, John Wentworth stood by the book as Whitehall 
tightened its imperial administration.  When the governor 
enforced the White Pines Laws, the interior regions protes- 
2 
Darnell, Republicanism, pp. 56-57; Upton, Revolution- 
ary New Hampshire, p. 12; Samuel Adams quoted in Edmund 
Morgan, "The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution", 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 24 (1967), p. 16: 
Langdon, Whipple and Cutts later became popular anti-loyal- 
ist leaders; Provincial Papers, XVIII: 6 06-60 7; Kenneth 
Scott, "Tory Associators of Portsmouth", William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 17 (1960), p. 605; Carl Ubbelohde, 
Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 15 7; 
New Hampshire Gazette, August 5, 1968; Wentworth to Lord 
kockingham, November 2, 1770, quoted in Daniell, p. 57. 
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I :\   ? h <• w 1 :; T e :  ■> t  IT? :, , the s . rvr y J r  ;«- rv<■ r .1 1 ■ r 1< : •• '. 
t h>- I'ls^ataq-^.i i'lvt-r district of H l 1 I sbo ro .:h ."o..;r. ty, • •:;- 
p--oi.il ly the ^h'Dcnts Mills in Weare, put under surv i 1 1 a:v.-e . 
Wrntworth's clopvi t les wen.' par t lculi r ly unpopular in the 
area.  Local lumbermen had previously attacked and beat, the 
intruding officials.  The arrogance of the deputies height- 
ened the nillmen's resistance to encroachncnts on their 
trade, and they fouqht back with mob force.  ' >n April 1 < 
Sheriff Benjamin Whitinq and Deputy John Ouiqly of Weare 
went to the mills at Weare to confiscate indicrimately saw- 
ed loqs.  An anqry mob attacked the two officials and drove 
them out of the Weare area.  Whiting and Ouiqly called for 
the provincial militia to restore order, but the local citi- 
zens did not respond.  The offenders quickly dispersed 
without recrimination. 
Wentworth kept his eye on Hillsborough County which 
proved itself to be one of the most troublesome in the pro- 
vince.  In the governor's mind, there were three reasons why 
that area was inclined against royal authority.  One was its 
proximity to Massachusetts; a second was the Scotch-Irish 
ancestry of its settlers who had emigrated from Ulster to 
escape the persecutions of the British■government.  The 
third reason had to do with the conduct fo two recent royal 
appointees, Edward Lutwyche and John Holland.  Residents in 
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•?■.<•   :.;::::..;«•!■/      .»:<-.»   ':.<■ 1  i   '.. .' v.-■,;:.<■   :•:.;*  :.:;:: 1 ■•    '    r    * .'.<■    : •• - 
•   .: r,     ■ f    I   ■ -.» 1    i.M' ;:::,   .irry     i<-s<- r t •• r :.   r   ■    "'.»:.:; i   :...<•••:, . 
Hollar..},     •:".   the      '!;rr   ha:; .1,    :..>.:   .ir :.»:.;-• :   :    :    :':.<■   >.»;«•    !:    ~ 
a Hillslvr-r-i ::; ■-"r..r.ty ;a:i  ■!'  i ;ri:;o:;er i nde: t «• i •  :.:r. 
Apparently, the prisoner's escape b ;r der.e i • he 1 ;>-.il:, wit:. 
payment of a ! inc.  Went wor th >!ni not hnl i t;;e .-'• .:;:y's ::. - 
habitants completely respons l bl e for t:.«-ir .11 sor .i«.-r s . 
The nob violence at the mils  was typi-al ' ! wh.at. 
Lawrence Sabine termed the "swamp law" of the interi-r 
districts.  Vet, it was not only the inner areas of the 
province that were disturbed by corrupt nv.d   troublesome 
officials.  The inhabitants of the port cities continued 
to resist the "arbitrary authority" of customs officials. 
The citizens deemed that vigilencc was required so that the 
community did not become inattentive to "designing" men. 
The Gazette urged the inhabitants to be most on guard when 
oppression seemed least apparent. 
With rumors of a "plot" by the ministry circulating, 
\ 
\ 
the most routine methods of royal government took on an 
oninous appearance.  Those wary of imperial policy subjected 
the governor and council to a close scrutiny, criticizing 
Malone, Pine Trees and Politics, p. 131; New li ampshi re 
Gazette, nay 8^ 1772; Upton wrote that Whiting and Quigly 
later became notorious Tories; Upton, Re vo1u t i o n a ry N e w 
Hampshire, p. 171; John V.'entworth to Lord Dartmouth, FTovem- 
ber 15, 17 74, Provincial Papers. 
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..\:.:.<i   A:..'. 
• : :: .*.• i •  r~» r .11  i- - ni-r. •■•.  I::   •..';<• . ,i:.' .•<•»::>  '    • ."..■   . - 
:;:,»! .lir.ir.istr.i'. 1 n, t'::«.' iJci  .* .• rr .; l: -r. t •■ \ir«- .1 s s .-;.i- 
t.-d wit:: lrpena: politics and ^ : '.  : -..-: .11 s , -is  disTirvt :r,r 
th:.-.s«' fn.jaq»'d IP. tht- connon lif<-.  Ti-.t■ c>">rr.;i t i:-.d>;l ;<• 1 ■>•. 
tht- fX[H'nsi' of the connon .lood.  Indeed, tht- word I'^rrui-ticr. 
oanv to be defined by its opposites -- virtue, simplicity, 
public spirit and patriotism.  In this sense, "corrupt", 
as used to discredit a living style, became the stamp of 
royal political authority and the officials holdinu power by 
royal approbation.  Howevermuch a paranoia of the times, 
the fear caused a separation of what was American and what 
4 
was British somewhat as "virtue" was separated from "vice". 
In May of 1773 the New Hampshire legislature received a 
circular from Virginia and letters from Rhode Island urging 
the assembly to appoint a committee of correspondence.  The 
men of the committee would maintain communication on matters 
of intercolonial interest.  Fearing the influence of Mass- 
achusetts, the governor strongly suggested that the assembly 
remain uninvolved in such proceedings.  The assembly ignored 
4 
Lawrence Sabme, The American Loyalists, p. 2; Daniell, 
Republicanism, p. 62-631 New Hampshire Gazette, March 1, 
1771; Provincial Papers, XVIII: 623-625; F. Bushman, "Cor- 
ruption and Power in Provincial America", The Development 
of a Revolutionary Mentality (Washington: Library of Con- 
gress, 1972), p. 63; Morgan, "Puritan Ethic", p. 16. 
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•:.»■ I'IVITR or ' s r'-^.ics t. arid that day app- > i.nto-d .1 s t a:.d : r. ; 
.■•orr.it 'wCf >! cr)rrt,.,;;x)niii.T.c<' aril frvjuii"/.  Thr i.-nrr 1 t tcr r<T-- 
Lvrs were synp.-itiict-K- n«-n i'r^r. th<v ol;J jiro; rict.iry party, 
all rrsidirv? in the coastal re ;io:i: two r;>! ;••:;, t ««o l.'.v.'rrs, 
two nt'rch.ints and one pliysiciar..  The next day, 'n'cntworth 
prorogued the legislature for a period of two years, hopm.j 
to end the leqal existence of the committee and preclude 
undesirable meetings. 
Durinq that month, Parliament approved Lord North's 
Tea Act.  The act qave the East India Company of London a 
market monopoly by exempting the firm from the Enqlish tax 
of one shilling.  The exemption enabled the company to low- 
er the price of their tea by nine pence per pound. News of 
the act circulated in the colonies in the autumn of 1773. 
On December 16, the day of the Boston "tea party", Ports- 
mouth held a meeting and declared that the lower price of 
English tea was both unfair competition and a spurious at- 
tempt to make the colonists accept the tax.  The men further 
resolved to prevent any landing of East India tea. 
Numerous other towns, including Dover, Exeter and Hamp- 
ton, followed Portsmouth's example and passed similar "tea 
resolves".  As one Portsmouth resident wrote to a friend in 
Boston, "We are at last aroused from the lethargic disposi- 
tion that has...reigned so long amoung us."  The town re- 
solves blamed "designing" men in the home administration and 
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"ar: itr.iry : ■:■<• r nm«-;.t " f > : ' ?;<• : i r ::.t ' :1 :; i. t .at i, <r. .  If 
N«-w iiir-.psi'.irf cilii'tT.s accepted th<- t>-a tax, "n»>re w* .1 i 
!ni low" . "' 
Tin' tea rosolvi'.s wcf not jdoptc! without s'.me i*r;; i- 
cism.   >f the thirteen nor. selected tu draft the resolves, 
six refused to si.jn.  These six rnen were prominent merchants 
who feared commercial reprisals from the mother country as 
well as the effect of the resolves of the tea market. 
)thers accused Portsmouth "patriots" of hypocrisy.  A 
meetinq of the .Matrons of Liberty resolved: 
"...that the merchants under the pretense of 
guarding our liberties prevented the landing 
of the East India Company's tea; and at the 
same time, sell their own at such an extra- 
vagant price, make it evident it is not our 
interest, but their own private gain they arc 
pursuing." 
Likewise, a Gazette correspondent noted that the resolves, 
a "fashionable trend", had some private interest involved. 
Provincial Papers, VII: 331-334; Olson, Ang1o-Anerican 
Politics, p. 168; John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, June 8~] 
1774 , Provincial Papers, VII: 369; The governor told Lord 
Dartmouth that the assembly's decision to appoint the commit 
-tee was moved by a majority of two; after a warm debate and 
reconsideration, he said, the proposal carried by only one 
vote; Upton, Revolutionary ?:ew Hampshire, p. 13; see the 
Dover Tea Resolves, Gazette, January 14, 1774, Hampton 
Resolves, Gazette, March 4, 1774, and Rochester Resolves, 
Gazette, February 4, 1774; quote in Gazette, December 31, 
1773. 
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l 1 y r ,iv.- ; wi :■..• , : .:.  v. ir. i '!;;." 
News  f the !v>st i:: IV    A--'. ::. ". iy '. ""-4 ir..;:.'  » :.•■- 
w.iv  )* [jr'.-N'S's t - New Har.psh l :<■ .  :"::.•<■ ♦ :•■,,• ; -.•••::;: :..»'. 
been t-nc^ ;r.i ;ed by cr 11 l c I sr-. '<* th<- tea r>- s ■ 1 ■.•<•"• , :.«• :..i ! 
called for now elections and had r''C»:r.'f:>' i * he ,i:;s<T.i, 1 y . 
Wfntworth mrii'iiiatoly asked for laws to conbat i I s o rd<' r % , 
which the house ignored.  The governor stressed that '.:.-• 
"experience of prosperity" in the province1, which, had re- 
sulted fron the former "harmony and diligence" of the in- 
habitants, was the strongest recommendation for continum : 
those principles.  In spite of the governor's efforts to 
deter the assembly from extra-provincial associations, the 
legislature, at the close of regular business, voted to 
establish a new committee of correspondence.  Boston's "dis- 
tressing" circumstances moved the assembly to agree in May 
1774 to help other colonies with organized procedures of 
resistance.  The governor thereupon dissolved the assembly 
for "inconsistency with his majesty's affairs". 
The governor had hoped that a new election would have 
provided an opportunity to reassess provincial politics and 
Scott, Tory Associators, p. 508; The six merchants 
were Theodore Atkinson, George Jaffrey, Daniel Rogers, John 
Parker, George King (Later "Tory Associators"), and William 
Langdon; Matrons of Liberty in New Hampshire Gazette, 
February 10, 17 74; Gazette, June 17, 1774. 
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•.is    :     1 ••   as    1 •• \.l<- z .       !i<-    ' >■ i r ■■ :   ' :. t *    a:\   ■• x;   i:.s ;    :.       '    '.:.<• 
:.;-:<■   w    . I !   w.- i»..•:.   :. :  ;     •   :.• r    L        :> :    '.:.<•   -•■-.:-'.■ s .       •'    :    '. :. \ • 
r«•.»:i >r.   '::<•   : <• s '. r i • l<• !    re; r •• sen. t a• :    :.   *.  ,•   '    w:.s   w ; T :.    : < 1 ; s: 1 <• 
Irn-ruis   as    ir.ii 
!■. l re * s   towns   ,i: 
elected rt'prt'.scnMtivt'S to the le>;islat :r«-.  :<y <-arly '. """•} 
public iriiatv, spurred on by "J'ublicus" ir. the ;a:-et te , 
touched on the issue of the r.a ny unrepresented inhabitants. 
The public ridiculed "virtual representat l ">n" because it 
did not augment the voice of the people.  Since every 
freeholder was entitled to representation, numerous towns 
petitioned the qovernment for seats in the legislature. 
"Publicus" accused the "junto of wiseacres" in Ports- 
mouth, including councillors who had "no business" inter- 
fering with house matters, of opposinq the election of more 
liberal candidates to the assembly.  In truth, the council 
was devoted to the governor's interest.  The councillors, 
including Theodore Atkinson, the governor's father Mark 
Hunking Wentworth, Daniel Warner and five other relatives 
supported the governor's debate with the assembly and his 
efforts to uphold royal authority. 
The support of the council did not compensate for the 
growing autonomy of the legislature.  John Wentworth was not 
a wealthy man like his uncle had been, and he therefore had 
fewer means of developing personal and business relation- 
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w.    i:.' ...i-p. c«- ir. "... i- ::..»:.. 
» 
•»■ r:v : .'.a : t : : «•.: :. i: u *  .»;;<-,»s <•  .'.<• .•::•>..»- 
< • s s t ): < ■ r ■ i r.t  '■    < • x > ■.' ;". l •.'»• i r ::..»•::..  !•*!<• 
AA:-   cat ed ;^;r.lar issues, such as road c r.s t r J.- t l < <:. t  chan- 
nel trace- ariti connect rivers, and county Jivisior,.  He sup- 
ported t he es tabl lshment of Dartmouth College, promised 
quit-rents for road developments and even built a country 
estate at Wolfeboro to ronovc hmself fron the lr.a.je of the 
7 
sea 1x3ard aristocracy . 
The qovernor's efforts to identify with the interior 
districts did not offset the election of liberal candi- 
dates to the leqislature.  The 1774 election resulted in 
victory for Portsmouth candidates William Lanqdon and 
Samuel Cutts, wealthy merchants not connected with the 
Wentworths, and Jacob Sheafe, who had stood by the tea re- 
solves.  Exeter elected the outspoken radical Nathaniel 
Folsom in place of the governor's friend, John Phillips. 
The Boston Port Act was the first of the "Intolerable 
Acts"; Provincial Papers, VII: 335-338; John Wentworth to 
Lord Dartmouth, June 8, 1774, Ibid, VII: 361; Ibid, VII: 
365-367, 369; Daniell, Republicanism, p. 78-79; Gazette, 
March 25, 1774; Daniell, Republicanisn, p. 66; Wentworth 
also appointed John Sherburne, Richard Waldron and Peter 
Oilman to the Council in the 1770s to heal the wounds of 
his uncle's administration; Daniell, Republicanism, p. 70; 
provincial Papers, VII: 232, 306; Ibid, XVIII: 584, 605, 
613, 64 3; John Wentworth to Thomas Waldron, October 25,1774, 
Belknap Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society Collec- 
tions, 6th ser., IV *1891), 56; Provincial Papers, VII: 
17. 
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; »;•-.•• nine r.ew I« ■ I • - nites, ;;•••.•<•:'. later scrvd ?.};•• r<v 1 ..- 
* i ;:'.,iry ■ :■■>*.•<• r:;r.«Ti' .  When t:v ,isser.Lly cnveru- i and •."•••: 
:--r a new c< >r_m r 1 <■<• of correspondence, they dashed the ;•>■.•- 
'•r:i!!'':; hopes tor a legislature urarr.'ulvrd in ex t ra-prov; r.- 
c l a 1 po 1 I t ics . 
At that time, the governor faced two grave political 
problems.  '>ne was the sliding foundation of Wer.tworth 
economic and political influence, l.>oth in Portsmouth and at 
Whitehall.  The other problem was the qrowing provincial 
antagonism to royal government caused by the "arbitrary" 
acts of Parliament.  Certainly the governor had less con- 
trol over the latter difficulty.  Vflien the provincial in- 
habitants took to the streets in defiance of the acts of 
Parliament, the governor was all but helpless to convince 
the people that taxation by the British government was not 
a premeditated attack on their industry and frugality. 
In June 1774 the arrival of a large shipment of East  /~V""^- 
India tea tested the New Hampshire sentiment.  The governor 
expected the arrival of the ship from London and took pre- 
cautions to avoid the destruction of its property.  He ad- 
vised the consignee, Edward Parry, to instruct the Captain 
how to proceed on arrival.  On Saturday night, the 25th, the 
mast-ship Grosvenor sailed into Portsmouth harbor with 
twenty-seven chests of what the Gazette called "that perni- 
cious, destructive and troublesome commodity".  The towns- 
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5 . ij !•• aid :-. t :; ;:;p«-^t t.:.«- r.a* .:•■ >: t:;«.- L-a: ;<>.   .:.,■   jr.i 
Tw) .lays Liter, r.t'wa    <:    ;:>• ».<>a spread ,ir oarvi the -ity. 
The jijru'i'ir'.i'ii ciU/rns railed a rrt'tin-: ar.d ch'»se a c'-nril- 
tee CJ t fli'von to negotiate with i\ury for the removal of tl;r 
car >jo : ror, the town.  After sore discussion, Parry, 1 n a 
"genteel manner", agreed that the tea would not be sold in 
New Hampshire, but would be shipped to Halifax, providing 
that the town paid for the shipment and guarded the tea 
while it renamed in Portsmouth harbor.  The committee 
agreed. 
Twenty-five men watched the tea day and night.  On 
June 30, selected townsment loaded the tea on the sloop 
Mo11y.  Captain Brown paid the duty, and the ship left ac- 
companied by only minor tumult.  As Wentworth explained to 
Lord Dartmouth, "three overheated mariners" (two of whom, 
the governor claimed, were strangers to Portsmouth) had 
endeavored to excite a mob to destroy the tea and the ex- 
porting vessel.  The day before the ship's departure, the 
comptroller of customs told the governor that the mariners 
had gotten drums and were assembling "thoughtless" men in 
the town.  The governor, sherriff and magistrates went down 
to the wharf.  On their way, a messenger told Wentworth 
that councillors Warner and Rindge had heard the noise and 
hurried to the spot of the trouble with other local free- 
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ii'l.I.-rs.  7h«-r<' they s i ienced '::<■   drur.s an i t-»lvi t he ;->•;!<■ 
V  Jisp'Tsr irr.t\U,itcly. ':';.••  ::  ;.  io! t without ! .;r'.:.«'r 
annoyance .mi t :;•• local rilitia rera i :.e i or. ;uui i. 
In .spilt.- ■>: th<-  outburst by certain "l rojiucn.iki'rs", 
the local citizens conducted the '"*. rosvenor tea t ransac t i ■■ >n 
with what the Gazette called the "greatest decency and <;ood 
order ixissibhi, which could have done honor to any society". 
Nevertheless, the anti-tea sentiment renamed strong ar.d   trie 
city quickly appointed a connittce of inspection to help1 
watch for imported tea.  A larqe qroup of Portsmouth citi- 
zens pledqed not to import, sell, purchase or consume the 
"noxious herb". 
On September 8, 1774, the Fox, carrying thirty chests 
of tea again consigned to Edward Parry, arrived in Ports- 
mouth harbor.  The governor expected its arrival and had 
instructed Comptroller Cochran to amke arrangements.  How- 
ever, this time news of the tea's arrival preceded the ship, 
and the townspeople were on the alert.  The night the ship 
arrived a mob gathered outside Parry's house and stoned its 
windows.  Parry sent word to the governor asking for pro- 
tection, and Wentworth immediately called an emergency meet- 
ing of the council and town magistrates.  The governor sent 
his private secretary, McDonald, and McDonald's brother to 
evaluate the disturbance and reposrt of the necessary mea- 
sures.  By that time, the mob had dispersed.  Parry peti- 
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rr..\. I v r ,-r jr)t.r;*i :. 
•f.« ,» ...Mr.-.i*. •(■<• t  i:.v< st: :.»*.«■ • „?.<• r> : . 
• '■ > r r sm i.; t h ■-• i t i .*••:. s held t .wr. :-«•<• t i:\ ; :>  :. ;"<• j t <-r.i*-:  • 
,md 1) t.o iliSv-uss the tea sh ; pr-a-nt .   .'he r*'t ;:. :s ;■.«• r v«- i a:. 
,i "s.i!vty valve" for the i'i.-.-li:w o: iiutra;.' at the re;e.ite! 
audacity of Parry arwi his associates.  A.jam, the towns- 
people decidcil upon a compromise with a-;ent Tarry ami re- 
shippod the tea to Halifax on September li. 
The orderly opposition to imported tea was in lar ?e 
part due to the influence of the moderate merchant class in 
Portsmouth.  The city loaders wanted a "dignified" display 
of sentiment against the encroachments of Parliament.  They 
also wanted to avoid a fullscale harbor riot or another 
"tea party" in Portsmouth.  The idea to reship the tea 
accomplished both aims and helped them to escape the retri- 
bution that the Boston port endured.  The committee that 
investigated the attack on Parry's residence reported that 
hte mob did not exceed a "few persons", chiefly "boys and 
negroes", and ceased rioting before Parry had applied to the 
governor' for help.  The committee also judged that the mob 
had not intended to personally harm Parry.  For that reason, 
g 
the committee did not pursue the case any further. 
Provincial Papers, VII: 334, 359, 369; Ibid, VII: 408- 
411; John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, July 4, 1774; Ibid, 
VII: 409; New Hampshire Gazette, July 1, 1774; Provincial 
Papers, VII: 411-416. 
-139- 
'.    t wr, • >r\r: t r .M-S passt-d r«-s 1 •.•<•:; 
,i iai:i:;t " -:r. 1 aw: u 1 " r>o:,s, ♦:;.• :>•.>• r:;nr was :v > t «.T.C<.- ..r • a ■ j«- ■. i l.y 
thr i<'P.<-ral attitude of the part lcipants.  7h«' i "or t . sr*>ut h 
Cor.n 11 t fc of Correspondencf, aftt-r lerwthy debatr, a;rri-<i 
to endorse :ionir.[xirtation wasuros in t:.<- city.  In sympathy 
with the crippled Boston port, the Portsmouth conmttee 
he 1 pod to raise two hundred pounds volunteer proclamation 
money for Boston agent William Cooper, who scouted the city 
in October 17 74.  Eight other towns followed Portsmouth's 
lead in raisinq money.  What disturbed Wentworth was that 
the amount given by Portsmouth toward the Boston fund was 
four times the local porvincial tax, a sum the governor 
would have been hard pressed to raise for any reason.  It 
seemed that Parliament's measures to punish Boston for its 
defiant behavior convinced many New Hampshire inhabitants 
that an organized protest was both logical and necessary. 
Rumors that Parliament betrayed its own constitution created 
a sense of urgency. 
Prior to the assembly's adjournment in 1774, the speak- 
er had received letters from other colonies requesting the 
election of a general American congress.  The speaker for- 
warded the approved letters to a committee of correspondence 
for action.  The disapproving governor dissolved the assem- 
bly to end the constitutional existence of the committee. 
Nevertheless, the committee summoned its members to an 
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Vx* : !-!•• :a . r< ••' ::: ; : r. !.'.<■ re; r«• .s < • r. t i'.  :v<s wari-t-r : :\ 
■ r * s r> . t ;. 
The ii.n-osc  >: the peet ir. ; h-'id ->.n ."..ly ' , !""*•!, was ♦ > 
The ;')vcrr,(;r , 
t h i ri k l :v; it his duty to disperse su,-h "illegal and unwar- 
rantable proceedings", sent Portsmouth Sheriff Parker to the 
ch.ap.ber to read a proclamation condemning th.e leathering as 
contrary to the "King's Peace".  The members left for a 
nearby tavern.  There the committee agreed to recommend to 
parishes that they choose representatives to meet at Exeter 
on July 21 to appoint two delegates to the congress at 
Philadelphia.  The men also agreed to pay the delegates with 
voluntary funds. 
New Hampshire's support for a general congress made 
the governor quite uneasy; he feared the more radical in- 
fluence of neighboring colonies.  As Wentworth wrote pes- 
simistically to Earl Dartmouth: 
"It is yet uncertain how far the requestions 
will be complied with; but I am apt to be- 
lieve the spirit of enthusiasm, which gener- 
ally prevails through the colonies, will create 
an obediance that reason or religions would 
fail to procurs." 
The governor thought that the province was more moderate 
than any other to the south, but felt that the people's 
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ri'StiMir. i*  :r r  v: .<■:.* •':<■-■:;;»••:. . 
':..«•  ; >v : :v r  iid r..--. t ris •.:;<■ *.:.•■ : ■ 1 
'.'•"M<T; o>,.pl<-i wit:; the c i~ro.r, i t y ' s 'itraje: ,<v«-r in " : r. t 1- 
rr.ii.lc wror, :", that spirit turned into an .: ; 1 y r*>o:.  A 
number of ini-uk.T.t.s in the fall of 1774 demonstratei the 
l nhabi t ants ' onotion.il and ever, hostile attitude toward 
imperial authority.  Prop, riots, to the tyranny of non- 
importation, to "taking up Tories", the colonists' fear  of 
an imperial "plot" precluded reason when dealing with re- 
presentatives of the royal government. 
In October 1774, soon after the Boston agent's visit, 
General Gaqe wrote to Wentworth asking for help in building 
a Boston barracks.  Although the governor worried over his 
shaky authority, he felt it his duty to support the general. 
Wentworth therefore compromised on the request.  He hired 
carpenters near his Wolfeboro estate, but did not tell them 
why they were being sent to Boston. 
The Portsmouth Committee of Ways and .Means, establish- 
ed to uphold the doctrines of the Continental Congress, soon 
9 
Francis (Hillsborough County) Resolves, Provincial 
Papers, VII: 417; Morgan, "Puritan Ethic", p. 14; John 
Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, July 16, 17 74, Provincial 
Papers, VII: 410; John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, July 
T~$,    TT74 ; Ibid, VII: 4 11; John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, 
November 1D^ T774, Ibid, VII: 417. 
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r<> 'K'IV.'-A ,   <>:o:t.vi v " :•■ s i ::;.•.i —-i.i::«- s .<; " •:.:.;:.  .♦ •..'.«• ;:.'<•:- 
i or >'.    the pr- 'V 1 noe .  That r,.i>ir>-:;s i-t t. • ; r< ■'.•«:«•-.:;:. ;.<■; ,»• 
:\)chfStor ,i:ai:;st the -j'ivnr.wr's hinn; a ?er.t , '.u-:.';l,is 
Aust in. 
The Rociu'iUor Connittei: of Corrospo.iiicnct' wrote to 
Austin at Middletown commanding Sun to appear ht'forc then .it 
the house of Stephen Wentworth.  The:1 charqe laid before 
Austin was procuring artificers at Kolfcboro to build bar- 
racks for the Boston soldiers.  The committee and the angry 
local inhabitants, who convened at the Wentworth hone, 
forced Austin to kneel, confess his part in the barracks 
shcerne and ask the forgiveness of the committee. 
The governor confided to Earl Dartmouth that had the 
committee not acted with prudence and consented to call 
Austin before them, the local mob would have done violence 
to both Austin and Wentworth's estate.  Since the three nen 
of the Rochester committee had suspected the motives of the 
mob, they acted publicly to quell the uproar. 
Further to the incident at Rochester, the governor 
noted "several violences" connitted along a similar pre- 
tense in Hillsborough and Cheshire counties.  Although the 
local magistrates contained the disorders, the governor 
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-»■:■.'" •  r\.i : r.r .1 : :-.  : :•• ? .  '.•'.■:.' -   r • :. : .".. ■ : ;'.* *.•■ '  - - 
1 «• M 1 1 y • •:•.?:,-.• • :..■ ; w.-: s  *  ; v.: :.-*•:.• i:. r :•.■• ; : 
;r.Til -it :••: w.is :<■ s t w IT,: I :\ Massa.'h .;;*■ t *. s :■»'/ .   "Th: 
vir-.v-.- it last," he Jc-l.trci, "has LM :■:!;: t he :n! «•*-?;> r.."" ' 
The in?'-.:sion of political ideals l r. the ~ir.ds of the 
po'iplc ;avo the nob nrw neanir.-; and new vi jor.  With the ory 
•"or "liberty", the mob <irew in size and strength a:; a more 
widespread connunity shared a common anevance.  The intro- 
duction of a "cause" did not make the nob more vehement.  In 
many cases, mob gatherings were planned and orderly, without 
undue physical violence or damage to property.  However, 
the people's ideal against tyranny rendered nob action more 
stubborn and protracted than in previous decades.  Where 
mob action once served immediate goals, the movement against 
British oppression brought the people into the streets for 
reasons of long-term satisfaction. 
Prior to 1770 "special interest" mobs arose out of a 
particular local concern and subsided when the people at- 
1 r\ 
New Hampshire Gazette, October 23, 1774; John Went- 
worth to Lord Dartmouth, November 15, 1774, Provincial 
Papers, VII: 417; Stephen Nentworth was a distant relative 
of the governor; John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, November 
11, 1774, Ibid, VII: 417; Wentworth to Thornton and Went- 
worth to Morris, November 16, 1774, Wentworth Letter Book 
no. 3, p. 2,15, quoted in Daniell, Republicanism, p. 82-83. 
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i r« i- rii.t' r*.)v<-d ,i :,ur,st " t y rar.r.y" had r. • <T.d \;:th;*.t s.itis- 
',i;-; ion fror. ti'i.- rwther ,-;:.: r.rry.  Th<.' nrd. i*t<-r 1 "" : a i s ■) 
ha..I :;;-i'ti:i,' joals and tariets in r.i.nd, b'.t t iir a t M l .nr*-n? 
'>:'" its ideals was not within its immediate ry.ins.  Piotin.j 
over a f undarnenta I grievance alwut mjxTial po 1 l cy night 
dcnonstrato defiance, but it did not alter the fact of sub- 
ordiantion. 
The fact that a n>ob could exist and thrive in a commu- 
nity was a liberty in itself.  Yet, it was a liberty that a 
supportinq populace mTght quickly invert and use aqainst 
other inhabitants.  The nob that acted to suppress loyalists 
acted to the negation of their ideal.  To support and defend 
a cause of liberty over a long period of time, the mob re- 
quired the public disgrace of non-assenting citizens.  The 
liberty for some to speak their minds and take to the 
streets in defense of their beliefs did not exist, in times 
of crisis, for eveyone.  As Governor Wentworth said of his 
enemies, "I have often thought that vindictive men consider 
themselves as vulnerable." 
Just as the make-up of the mob was diverse in social 
and economic character, the Loyalist opposition was demo- 
graphically heterogeneous.  Ilary Beth Norton, in The Loyal- 
ist Critique of the Revolution, showed that the "Tories" 
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.'s > r.ir>>.} for its .: \>r. t • •r.j< o r.ir y r.<- :.it ivc •.•■.•:;• >t .it 1 >r.  •..<•:<■ ar. 
>r.ii:;ary .• r ■■ > ss - s- •<-1 i ■: ■::      '    *].<■   pop^Ia.-e ani rv.t l;rir<-,! r 
* * i < • arist'K:r.i>";'.  I r.   that sensr, rv,J .ir, ;cr a M i r. s • 1 ■.y.iiists 
was not a funct fin of .'lass hatrt'>!, aitho...;h certain ir-.di- 
vulu.ils r.i>jht have used it to that eff«-ct . 
The loyalists wore ncn cauaht in the dhUcrtic of tw 
sy.st.ens, one centuries olci, trie other fresh and formative. 
Where the nob was part of an historical novenent ,  the loy- 
alists were adversaries of the trend.  Where the nob rushed 
to support "natural law" the loyalists stood by the British. 
Constitution.  What the mob held as an ideal, the loyalists 
declared as political anathema.  AS one loyalist stressed in 
the Gazette in the early days of the conflict, 
"We shall have fine times indeed when every 
shoe-maker and plouqh-jogger fits up for a 
statesman and pretends to find fault, not 
only with the ministry, but even with the 
acts of Parliament.  Who made the populace 
judges of what is Constitutional?" 
Boycotting a particular business was one method of 
dealing with loyalists, but mob violence brought more immed- 
iate satisfaction and made a greater impact on the communi- 
ty.  In New Hampshire mobs forced many suspected Tories to 
siqn recantations or oaths to defend the continental cause 
of Liberty.  The mobs extracted the oaths from the sorry 
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sus; -ect s ;pon tf.riMts ■■■''    t.ir an '. fc.ui.crs .ir.i! '.he i.-str.-- 
M.ir, <->' 'heir ;,:.•:><• rr y .  I:-. i\r !:ur.i,  . r. .'">(•;, r er\i <• r r " , '."74, 
three h.:.ndred p.c:i a.sstr.Llfi! m th«- town arul ch'ist- a oorr.it- 
tee to brir.: the alleged Tory .'oshua Atherton to the local 
■ ■ourt house to si>;n a declaration.  The severely o,; tn;ini.<c re-! 
suspect, signed an oath of supjxirt and r--ad it to the corr.it- 
tee and attending patriots, who accepted it.  The nob then 
retired for drinks at the public house of .''r. Hildreth (paid 
•for by Athorton) and dispersed at midnight without doinq any 
"outraqeous act". 
By 1774 local committees of safety handled the investi- 
gations of suspect Tory activites.  Prior to that time, the 
community dealt  with fears and rumors largely through  the 
influence of the mob.  As the mob sought to protect the 
"people's liberties" against a designing British ministry, 
it grew in size and significance.  As the need and impor- 
tance of the mob increased within the community, local 
magistrates became less capable of upholding royal authori- 
ty.  The governor realized that popular torrents could not 
"safely be checked" without "irresistable power".  "Yet," he 
declared, "it sometimes changes its course and overwhelms 
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•!"'■<  ;a.rv.i l;.,i' oj)c:i:i the si a^'S.,,"" 
A I.»!•■;«• part of the * . ry .» :.i : :.•; t T-->n<-s W,IS <•<>:.:.<•,-T <-.i 
with the ,-ii mist;;1 fear  ' a British "plot".  ;■..-» is •-•' 
Tory Mthrrm is or o: lar ;c riant ites of provisions ■>r airvs 
in Tory hands o! ton bro;;;ht out mob anacr.  In rortsn<v;t!. 
in i'ocor.lxT 1774 runors of the arrival of British troops 
fron Boston set off the lamest riot in New Hanpsh l re' s 
history,. 
• )n December 13, Paul Revere traveled to Portsmouth wit; 
a letter from William Cooper of Boston addressed to the 
wealthy Merchant and popular provincial leader, Samuel 
Cutts.  The letter informed Cutts of the recent royal order 
in council prohibiting the importation.  of arms and ammuni- 
tion from Britain into the colonies.  With the letters came 
the rumors that two reqiments from Boston were on their way 
to Portsmouth to take possession of the fort and ammunition 
Cutts convened the Portsmouth Committee of Ways and 
Means and read the letter.  The next day, several committee 
members and Sons of Libertv beat a drum in the town center 
John Wentworth to Thomas Waldron, November 26, 17 74, 
Belknap Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society Collec- 
tions, III: 66: Mary Beth Norton, "The Loyalist Critique of 
the Revolution", Revolutionary Mentality, p. 128; Gazette, 
May 11, 17 7 0; Diary of Matthew Patten of Bedford, :iow 
Hampshire, 1754-1788 (Concord, 1903) , as quoted in Upton, 
Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 120; John Wentworth to 
Thomas Waldron, November 26, 1774, Belknap Papers, MHS 
Collections, III: 66. 
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Mary .      Tw •   :r.;:ui! 
lov.il    V..r>;r     W-rieral   Atkinson   hurried   t-<   t ?.<•   town   -«• ?-. t <• r    ,ir-.,! 
i« 4»>i   th«-   i'lot    Act.,    but    th<-   nob    l ;:v>red   hir.      :.<• !   !- 
Captian Tfior.js Pickering and :'..vor .'ohr. Lar.-jdon, • hf rioter:! 
sot out for tho fort.  Aloru; the way one hundred ar.d fifty 
forewarned citizens from Tve and Newcastle Kunci! t he Ports- 
mouth qroup. 
On the previous evenina, the governor had sent wore! t-> 
Captain Cochran at Fort William and Mary to keep "strict 
watch'' throughout the night.  As much as the Captain tried 
to prepare a defense, he had only five men at his disposal. 
He therefore resorted to pointing his ijuns at the places 
where he expected the rioters to enter.  At three o'clock 
on the 14th, three hundred and fifty men beset the fort on 
all sides.  The captain told the rioters not to enter "on 
their peril" and proceeded to fire snail arms into the mob. 
Before the guns could be reloaded the mob stormed from all 
quarters and secured the guards.  The rioters broke into 
the powder stores, took all but one barrel, and loaded it 
into small boats.  After the mob hauled down the British 
colors to three loud "huzzas", they released the captain and 
his me n. 
Early the next morning, Continental Congress delegate 
iMajor John Sullivan arrived in Portsmouth leading a group of 
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r»".\   '.  r >r,   :;ur!:.ir.  At the s,ir.<' • irr, '.:.<■    :.>•:<■ r:v >r :;«-r.t vnrd 
t.) the TIW.1 t !'.a t ther<- w<-r<- rv. tr-^p:; .irnvir. ; * r- r Iv-st <>:*.. 
!!•• .ii:;n asked that the r*>! rct.;rn the :>owdor whi^h w •.; 1 : 
briri j then sent' ropru'vc.  The nob loaders said they would 
disperse, but they did not.  At noon Ma;or Henerai Theodore 
Atkinson connanded Captain John Dennett of the mhtia's 
first Regiment "without delay" to enlist thirty men fron 
several companies to guard the fort.  Atkinson wanted the 
manes of the enlisted men immediately so that he miqht post 
them as regulars at the qarrison. 
At six o'clock on the 15th, Captain Dennett and Captain 
James Stoodley replied that they had paraded the streets, 
beat the drums and proclaimed the need for men, but not one 
person appeared by their sides to enlist. 
That same night, the entire mob, led by John Sullivan, 
returned to the fort and took sixteen cannons, sixty muskets 
and most of the remaining stores.  The mob then took the 
cannon back to Portsmouth, where Nathaniel Folsom (New Hamp- 
shire's other delegate to the Continental Congress) and  a 
party from Exeter stood guard until they could move the arms 
into the country on the 16th.  During the evening, part of 
the mob loaded the booty onto small craft and floated two 
hundred and twenty powder barrels up the river fifteen miles 
to Exeter. 
The governor immediately told General Gage of the 
-150- 
lru.'fci i 1 ty of any atter.p*. by '.is r ..%'<■ r rir-w-:-. r ' .:<•:.:<■ .»r., i 
detain r he ,irr..s and deo1 a r<- i his need ? >r :-;--.• "-;r. r • r. ; sJ.i;s 
•>f war" in iMrt.sno.t!; harbor. Wentworth fr«-<-ly a ir.it red t.v*.«- 
power of the people and fear*".' for the safety of the r-.;sV'.":! 
house treasures. The governor also confessed that the prin- 
ciple persons involved in the mob were known to !ur, nany of 
whom were of the "best propoerty and note in the province". 
I 
As an immediate cause of the riot, Wentworth blamed the pub- 
lishinq of tiie Kinq's Order in Council concernmq arms im- 
portation and the Secretary of State's letter sent from 
Rhode Island, which created fear and anqer amonqst the peo- 
ple . 
On December 16 Portsmouth remained crowded with people 
who refused to disperse.  The governor feared they night 
try to completely dismantle the fort or worse.  Although the 
rioters had abstained from private or personal injury, he 
could not tell how long that would last.  On the 17th, 
several committee members and Sons of Liberty played the 
drum and fife in the town, avowing their intention to take 
the fort.  The next day, while the governor and council were 
in their chambers, Major Sullivan and two to three hundred 
men from Durham and adjacent towns drew up to the chamber 
and asked if any ships or troops were expected to arrive in 
the province.  The governor replied that  he had not sent 
for any. 
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1 ,i* <■ t)'.,!' I'vr.ir. : ' •; ; i .-; a i. • ,ir.' '.!-.(•: r.,» r c':.   t ■ > the * ■ • r t . 
".." i r ;•. that.  j.;irk ,is:;a..lt , '.hey ?'>.>•. the riT.,u:',in; sr.il 1 .Mrs, 
A:\<1   brought the- bark to the >'ity.  Al thou ;h the ^i ve rrv-r 
heard runors of another sever, hundred rrw:i marching towards 
P.)rt:;nout::, he still hoped that the nob intended to disperse 
peacefully.  The next day, in spite of what the governor had 
told riajor Sullivan, the warship Canceaux, under Lieutenant 
,'lowat, arrived in Portsmouth harbor by order of Admiral 
Graves and General Gage; on the 19th, the Scarborough, under 
Captain Barkloy, set anchor outside the city.  The governor 
knew that the ships secured the safety of the fort, but 
nevertheless feared for his own safety.  He had been inform- 
ed of a plan to seize him in reprisal if Gage jailed any 
12 Boston or Portsmouth leaders. 
Wentworth attempted to take whatever punitive measures 
12 John Wentworth to General Gage, December 14, 1774, 
Provincial Papers, Vjl: 420; Captain Cochran to John Went- 
worth, December 14, 1774, Ibid, VII: 420; Major General 
Theodore Atkinson to Captain John Dennett, December 15, 
1774, Ibid, VII: 421; Captian Dennett to John Wentworth, 
December 15, 1774, Ibid, VII: 4 21; John Wentworth to 
General Gage, December 16, 1774; Ibid, VII: 422; John Went- 
worth to New York gentlemen, December 16 and 17, 1774, Ibid, 
VII: 423; John Wentworth to Dartmouth, December 20, 1774, 
and John Wentworth to Erving, January 5, 1774, Wentworth 
Letter Book no. 3, p. 33, 59, quoted in Daniell, Republican- 
ism, p. 84; New Hampshire Gazette, December 31, 17 74; John 
Wentwortli to Lord Dartmouth, January 14, 1775, Wentworth 
Letter Book no. 3, p. 53, quoted in Scott, "Tory Associa- 
tors", p. 509. 
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1 .• ,\» 1 r.t ns'r.i'r;; * - l r.; : i s : r. '«.:-. ■»:,  * - 
:i>:uirr:i.  Three weeks lati-r, havm ; received little res;*■-r.se 
•ho wvcrr.i >r asked i'.onro.il .'.a^e for two re umT.ts : r 5 '-rtri- 
nouth.  Wontworth realised that, the people dii rv t s ;j >j.^ ■ r t 
the magistrates; The re f or> •, the magistrates ooul .: not do 
their duty.  The governor rockonot] that if ;i:iyrnr was -ailed 
for the riot either a mob would immediately rescue the 
prisoner or a party would break down the jail.  Experience 
had taught the governor that he could not count on the r.ili- 
tia.  He hoped that troops from Boston would help him con- 
vict the leaders of the riot.  Gage sent men north to survey 
Portsmouth for barracks, but wisely decided against commis- 
sioning  troops. 
The governor's next move was to dismiss the leaders of 
the riot from their royal commissions as soon as he had 
found proper replacements.  Major John Langdon, Major Sul- 
livan, Colonel Nathaniel Folsom and Colonel Josiah Bartlett 
were dismissed from the militia and from their posts as 
justices of the peace.  Sullivan convinced fellow officers 
to resign and organized weekly military drills in Durham to 
prepare a defense if needed.  The governor also issued writs 
for a new assembly, hoping to restore the normal powers of 
government and reinstate his position as leader. 
-153- 
. .< ■  ; r. r had noticed • ha t 1 <• .\ i i •• u 
tr.UM-v! .". i s ~a ;i:.: : a* 1 r. t :•.<■ i r 
}• i 
:! < • "<•*»: ,1 •; w« • . . 
that !; I s iwr, s uppor t <• rs vc'.:id fall prey to r*.; vi. le.-.i-.',  I: 
,',inu.irv 1"" 7 r> fifty-nine iurtsnuuti, rrsulrr.ts, r«i l:-. 1 y r*>r.J-err- 
of the council and the Wen two r t h "clan", vowed pro t e;> t i ->r. 
for each other's person and property f ror. nobs and violence. 
The main purpose of the "Tory Assoc la tor s" was the r.utv.al 
protection of the governor and the maintenance of the laws 
of the land.  Although the associators were arnved, the 
governor admitted the inadequacy of their power; neverthe- 
less, he applauded their resolution. 
The associators' fears were not unfounded.  Many Ports- 
mouth citizens saw the need to maintain order and protect 
the governor.  Although the Portsmouth Committee of Ways 
and Means would not apologize for its part in the Fort 
William and Mary riot, it organized nightly patrols to dis- 
courage disorder on the outskirts of the captial.  In the 
Hillsborough and Cheshire counties, mobs continued to pre- 
vent court proceedings and drove loyal officials from their 
homes.  Many Portsmouth citizens saw the seriousness of 
events.  If Gage had sent the requested troops and if Par- 
liament had closed the Piscataqua port after the riot, the 
economic and political condition of the province would have 
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tak<>:i .1 ;ravr ♦. ^rr. : > r t lu- w;rsr. ' 
B<-hi:v.d  t.".e ,1 :iMt 10:1 o:  1 " 74 - 1 7 " ">    lay r r< >'A< >r. l .* as well 
,ir. |M! it rcjl >;r li'v-'int-fs .  The s t a jr.at i< >r.   of ; mncrci' I r. 
j'nrtsr»).it); and Boston crf,it.i.'<i the "iri'iitrst scmt'S of d i s - 
tress", as one Boston mTchant corjicntcd,  The implications 
of a slow economy brought dissatisfaction with in[x:irial 
authority.  .".any of Portsmouth's wealthy merchants, such as 
the Boyds and the Lanqdons, were not connected with the 
governor and could afford to make a bit of noise.  The 
Portsmouth Committee of Ways nad Means alerted the provin- 
cial congress that the laxity of trade "increased the number 
of people who, for want of employment, do too readily fall 
into disorders".  The committee knew that when dissatisfied 
men assembled, it was difficult to persuade a mob to dis- 
perse before it "exceeded the bounds of reason". 
The committee's main concern was order in Portsmouth. 
However, the order they sought was not in support of the 
established government.  Rather, the call to order was part 
of a plan of resistance, an increasingly necessary part as 
popular leaders realized.  As committee chairman Hunking 
Governor's Proclamation^ Provincial Papers, VII: 423- 
424; John V.'entwroth to Lord Dartmouth, March 10, 1775, Went- 
worth Letter Book no. 3, p. 82, quoted in Upton, Revolution- 
ary iiew Hampshire, p. 24; New Hampshire Gazette, March 10, 
1775; Provincial Papers, VlT! 371; Scott "Tory Associators", 
p. 507-510; Darnell, Republicanism, p. 86,83. 
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..it   * j^.ii     .. i • * .».*j  i t *«   » i* .*i t •*.!.. *( •. 
-' '!,(■ ;«',irc a:;d :■■>>! >rder  ■' r ? -.«- T wr. was • h<- ■,:-. Ly rw-a :'.-■; 
of si'(-.,rsry f r the r'Xiv".;! i -r. of the ."ont i r.«• r-.» a 1 -."on ;r«o; s<vs ' 
resolves.  Chairrvm Wrntworth reques ted that the local ;T.T.- 
viross requlate all bodies of armed men in future movement;; 
because of the number of alarninq "false c\na\   idle reports" 
circulating about the community.  The committee chairman 
feared that unnecessary conqreqations and false alarms ruqht 
allow the people to be caught off guard for the real "fatal 
blow" to their "qrand cause". 
By 1775 the tendency for citizens to look to local com- 
mittees and the congress for political guidance and not to 
the established government was part of the trend that gave 
substance and significance to the mob.  As Pauline Maier 
pointed out, resistance organizations were extra-legal, ir- 
regular and acceptable as temporary agencies.  They func- 
tioned to deal with immediate but transitory problems in a 
way that established government institutions could not. 
The organizations were part of the ideal of involving the 
"body of the people". 
The definition of resistance organizations might apply 
to the mob as well.  The popular mood was as much tied up 
with the deliberations of those organizations as it was with 
the mob.  Also, the continental and provincial congresses 
were as much a thorn in the governor's side as was a rioting 
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s r t• i: \ ::.\'    ' :.<• no a S . r < ■ • I  : 
'.':.<•   .-o:i :i ••:;:io;; w.-ro •.»«;>■:-. as -aft'-rs  .■ f   ■ !•«•d i an -o" ar.S ::   '. 
aftoj- "'.'^r.siilcratc oxar.i r.a t i or." .  Tr.o :'iv<'rr,T wishod :.o 
could iociar'- tho nootirvjs of tho oo:;;ressos riotous assor- 
blios amor.able to law.  I.iko tho nob, tho delojatos v«-ro 
ready to "sacrifice the^ir reason and their consit-*>nts to 
their fears and popularity".  Because of the extrerx- nat.ro 
of their behavior, the qovernor felt that there could !>e no 
restitution; every moderate nan was silenced.  The qovernor 
concluded that peace had by "unwise men been driven out. 
14 
They shut the door against its return". 
The increasing decentralization of power in the pro- 
vince led the governor to renew his faith in the legislature 
as a means of restoring constitutional authority.  When 
Wentworth had issued the writs for an election in Tebruary 
1775, he added three small Connecticut Valley towns to the 
list.  Those towns had leaders loyal to the governor.  He 
had also timed the elections to coincide with the expected 
arrival of Gage's regiment.  However, the governor's hopes 
of restoring the old Wentworth relationship with the house 
14 John Eliot of Boston to Jeremy Belknap, November 8, 
1774, Belknap Papers, MHS Collections, VI: 61; Committee at 
Portsmouth to New Hampshire Congress at Exeter, June 2, 
1775, Provincial Papers, VII: 502; Haier, "Popular Upris- 
ing", p~.   10 7; John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, December 2, 
1774, Provincial Papers, VII: 419; John Wentworth to 
Thomas Waldron, January 27, 1775, Ibid, VII: 442. 
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Nathaniel !*<iisor., two |«j;;,;iar I'-ahrs ■■>! th«- !-rt ri':*. 
Ti'.usr niT. and their patriot L^niU'ilnris totaled one thirl >..f 
the rvprest-ntatl ve s . 
The qovornor postponed the assembly until .''.ay, hopmq 
to arrest the riot leaders by that time.  Unfortunately, 
the public was losing faith in the qovernor.  Since he had 
issued election precepts to towns with a smaller population 
than others not represented, the people thouqht the qovernor 
attempted to deprive them of their leqislative riqhts.  Cer- 
tainly he looked for a   more balanced and cooperative body 
of representatives.  Wentworth severely regretted his in- 
ability to reward "good men" who might accept unprofitable 
employment for the good of the public and the established 
government. 
To the governor's dismay the assembly convened against 
the background of the Second Continental Congress and the 
fighting at Lexinton and Concord.  The governor pleaded with 
the assembly to consider measures that would restore public 
tranquility and an "affectionate reconciliation" with the 
mother country.  However, the assembly was more interested 
in hearing petitions regardinq the representatives elected 
in an "unconstitutional manner".  The assembly requested an 
adjournment to consult their constituents about "weighty 
matters".  In June the delegates refused to seat the new 
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~<-r.i-<TS iror ; iynnuth, I.yrse and  >>:?ord.  The tit-11* ;ate.s 
•lairifvS t :.•••/ wrrr "entirely at a loss" to know what rx-as- 
ures to take for a "~'.H.:h JfSirod" reconciliation. 
Two w«>eks after the assenb 1 y ' s adjour nrw n t l n May , 
outrage over the action of the warship Scarborough plunged 
the province into turmoil.  Rioting broke out in protest 
over the seizure by Captain Barkley of a Portsmouth fishing 
sloop.  The enforcement of the New England Restraining Act 
was in the hands of the Royal Navy and customs service.  In 
Portsmouth, the captain of the Scarborough established a 
blockade of the harbor to check vessels for compliance with 
the Acts of Trade.  He also seized incoming provision ships 
to send to Gage in Boston. 
On May 29, 1775, thirty to forty men from the Scarbor- 
ough boarded two provision vesselsj bound for Portsmouth. 
The next day, five hundred alarmed inhabitants of the city 
and surrounding towns went down to the battery at Jerry's 
Point with arms.  The men took eight cannons and brought 
them up to the town.  In the meantime, warship Canceaux 
set sail with the two provision vessels for Boston.  The 
next day, more armed men from the country stormed into 
Portsmouth alarmed at the "uncommon exertion" of arbitrary 
Provincial Papers, VII: 370-371; Ibid, IX: 714; John 
V/entworth to Assembly, May 5, 1775, Ibid, VII: 376: Ibid, 
VII: 373-380. 
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The Pfirtsnnuth i'ornit tec ni    Safety st-r.t .1 rnonorial to 
tlir kivcrrvr and Council.  Fearing violence at the hands of 
the larjf nob, the governor went on board the Scarborough 
and   tried to obtain the release of the two vessels.  The 
governor approached the Captain and told him that the pro- 
vision belonqed to the inhabitants.  The Captain replied 
that Admiral Graves and General Gaqe had ordered him to 
seize all provision vessels for the troops and navy at Bos- 
ton.  The Captine also informed the Governor that he must 
take all vessels with a cargo of salt and molasses,  as 
those commodities were species of provision. 
The Portsmouth assembly and committee members had two 
main concerns over the seizure.  First, they feared the con- 
sequences of such measures occurring at a critical juncture 
in time.  The Portsmouth committee had informed the Exeter 
congress that the Captain had threatened to fire on the town 
if he heard of "any preparation of rafts being used to annoy 
him".  Second, the trade blockade posed a particular hard- 
ship on the coastal town.  As the governor realized, the 
previously moderate merchant classes were becoming more hos- 
tile to royal authority, particularly when used in Captain 
Barkley's manner.  Since the provision vessels had left the 
harbor and the governor could do no more, the mob left the 
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,-:ty 5 ;: • >•   .i l ss.it is : led. 
The rneetirv; <■>'.    t!;r a ss-Ti; 1 y posed further -A i i '.  i c ■; 1 t i e s 
' T the .;(V,T ri'ior .  The assembly i* < • f M s t • i to scat the newly 
eh'i't,od Loloncl "cr.ton, a loyal supjx)rtor or the ■ ;<•■■ ve rnor, 
w'r.o had spent a number of davs aboard the Scarborough.  Fen- 
ton had made himself very unpopular when he denounced Ma;or 
Sullivan and the fort rioters for their foolish conduct. 
Fenton declared he would do his duty as a justice of the 
peace in executmq the laws and would never retract.  The 
antl-imperial populace resolved that Fenton was "not a 
friend to his country", and the Exeter Congress tried him 
as a Tory.  The other two newly elected representatives 
loyal to the governor, Israel Morey and Jacob Greene, men 
unpopular for a too favorable land granting scheme, refused 
to sit of their own accord. 
On June 15, 1775, Representative Colonel Fenton moved 
that the assembly accept Lord North's conciliatory proposal 
which had passed the House of Commons on February 27. The 
proposal provided that if a colony voted an adequate budget 
for its government, all Parliamentary taxes, except acts of 
trade, would be repealed as applied.  The revenue from the 
Memorial of Portsmouth citizens, May 30, 1773, Pro- 
vincial Papers, VII: 376; Hunking Wentworth to Matthew 
Thornton, President of Exeter Congress, May 30, 1775, Ibid, 
VII: 376; Hunking Wentworth to Provincial Congress at 
Exeter, June 2, 1775, Ibid, VII: 502. 
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rwrnbi-rs cult lvali' a "quii't and pt'.u-«.' t \; 1 d i s;>o.s i t 1 -p. " ar*;r.-?s? 
t hi* 1 r cons t l t u. • n t s . 
Ponton left the rcprcsontativcs chanl>er and went *.'■>   the 
governor's homo for the eveninq.  After dinner, a crowd of 
armed men beset the governor's house demanding to arrest 
Fenton.  When the colonel refused to cone out, the nob 
brouqht a cannon in front of the house and threatened to 
fire through the front door as they beat upon it with clubs. 
Fenton felt obliged to surrender.  The mob escorted him to 
Ilxeter where he was kept in confinement.  That same niqht, 
Wentworth, his wife Francie, and their five month old son 
moved to Fort William and Mary without arms or ammunition. 
They hoped the guns of the Scarborough would provide enough 
- *- ■ 17 protection. 
In the governor's mind, the incident demonstrated the 
"spirit of outrage" and general ferment that agitated the 
Proceedings of Assembly, Provincial Tapers, VII: 3 71; 
John Wentworth to General Gage, December 16, 1774 , Ibid, 
VII: 422; Fenton's land grants, Ibid, IX: 330; John Went- 
worth to Assembly, Ibid, VII: 372; Assembly Proceedings, 
Ibid, VII: 374-375; John Wentworth to Assembly, Ibid, VII: 
378-380; John Wentworth to General Gage, June 15, 1775,     « 
Ibid, VII: 381. 
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}>■■<;.'■: I .»>.-«• and ;ov>- r rirvnt a i 1 ke .  Ti'.cojorc Atkins,.:; tried t •■- 
keep ..;, the apjH-ara.'icc of the r'-yal  r>'.'e r.'inver.t after the 
governor':; fli:ht, but he had no effective authority.  The 
;ovc rriur issued orders to the assembly through Atkinson as 
he waited for troops.  The assembly still refused new mem- 
bers, rioting the qovernor's "cruel and arbitrary stretch of 
prerogative" in issuinq writs without the concurrence of the 
legislature.  The governor became convinced that the House 
was not in the disposition to proceed with his government 
y form. 
The aovernor maintained himself at the fort with the 
help of the Scarborough, which received its provision from 
Portsmouth.  When the Scarborough arbitrarily seized a fish- 
ing sloop and touched off a riot in the city, the Committee 
of Ways and .Means decided its communication with the ship 
was "inconsistent with the peace and good order of the 
"town".  Cutting off the ship's supplies meant that the 
Scarborough, and the governor, would have to anchor else- 
where . 
The first week in August Captain Barkley seized a fish- 
ing sloop he suspected had been fishing on the Grand Banks 
in violation of the Restraining Act.  The seizure renewed 
the city's outrage over the warship's presence in their har- 
bor.  When an impressed seaman escaped from the ship that 
same day, the Captain concluded that the townsmen were 
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.is .i !.J:;M:<' ! ir the return <■'    the .icscrtrr .   r, A.;;;:;*. '. 
the >'.;xswliir, arv.l !/"),)t;r'''W cure ash >re t->r provisid!-..  The 
r*-n were : ircii upon by .1 reser.ttul nob which, oapt ur e..i the 
coxswa1n. 
The Portsmouth Committee of Ways and Means convinced 
the no I.) to release the coxswain and drew up a petition to 
boycott the man of war.  From that tine, no boats were to 
pass or repass fron the ship on the outlyinq town of New- 
castle without permission fron the committee selectmen. 
At first, the Scarborough stopped all shipping coning in or 
out of the harbor.  However, as its provisions ran low, the 
captain resigned himself to the situation.  On August 23, 
the Scarborough, having released the local fisherman, left 
18 for Boston with the governor and his family on board. 
With the warship gone an unruly mob, disowned by the 
local committee, charged to the fort and demolished the 
structure.  On the whole, an outbreak of violence was not 
the city's response to the downfall of the government.  Pub- 
lic opinion against imperial authority strengthened and per- 
petuated itself as the towns looked to their local leaders 
18 Assembly Proceedings, Provincial Papers, VII: 384- 
385; Ibid, VII: 387-390; Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, 
p. 31. 
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and ,'i)r-".itti'cs for political ;u idanoe. At that ; ;nc t \;r<', 
v.- jnsf rv.it. r.'i'ii lacked the .strength to lead as radical sen- 
tment rose to the point of crisis. Kith no functions of 
the established royal government operating effectively in 
the province, royalists had no chance of controllinq neutral 
elements. By 1776, a unanimous popular minci renamed the 
only leqitmate-source of political authority. 
The one hundred years of New Hampshire's history as a 
province witnessed the development of the area, politically 
and economically to a point where it had outgrown its de- 
pendence on the imperial system.  Changes within the fabric 
of society left colonial interests and requirements mis- 
matched with those of the mother country.  When Britain 
needed most to benefit from the colonial relationship, New 
Hampshire found the actions of the government "arbitrary" 
and disagreeable.  In the minds of the inhabitants, a small 
degree of autonomy at the local level was better suited to 
the interests of the average citizen than a very centralized 
royal establishment with feeble or interfering officials. 
Rioting and the mob were a part of the historical de- 
velopment of the provicne into a fluid, self-sufficient 
society.  To properly understand the place of purposeful 
mob violence in that trasition, it is necessary to consider 
where rioting fit into the scheme of reform.  In what way 
did rioting contribute to the social and political awareness 
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••' i * : r. ; ,   r«-r •• 1 y a:: .m <■ y.j : >•:; s :• :\   •■ >'    : r ■: t e:; t ,  :.»-.•■■  r :•• r 
t '; j»-;M l -  ipini'T.;  it arouHed r.eu»ral <• 1 <T.«T. t :; .ir.J re ;.; i r ed, 
'  >r   the most part, se 1 :' -d<-1e rr mat i ■-.-:-. and a sincerity of 
purpose.  Tor that reason, riot in.;, carried cat m the in- 
terest of a particular locality, strengthened the resolve 
f the inhabitants.  To be successful and accomplish its 
ens, riotin.; required the support of the community. 
Civil discontent that developed into mob violence 
pointed out unwise or voerbearinq colonial policy.  It re- 
vealed the tensions in society created by growth and expan- 
sion.  Riotinq also highlighted those areas where British 
and American views on law and order were seriously incom- 
patible, particularly where the profit from provincial de- 
velopment was concerned.  Certainly mob violence created 
greater impact where verbal protests proved little safeguard 
for local interests. 
As a means of self-defense, rioting was purposeful in 
and of itself.  The New Hampshire inhabitants were a people 
interested in social and economic security.  A society 
undergoing change tends toward upheaval.  To protect and 
defend their economy and property, the inhabitants required 
a means of defense that normal governmental channels could 
not handle.  Mob violence for the sake of community welfare 
was necessary when no legal means was available to protect 
-166- 
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* , ^>:id«T.n »..".«■ :-«>!, whi-r. it a--t«-J i-,r '::•■ :<.>.\ >! .» ;,.»rtic\;- 
i .i r i'omun 1t y . 
iUoUr..| was not a vehicle of chanje; public vioii'ncc 
did riot cause immediate reform.  The subordination oi   the 
colonists to an imperial government was a fact.  haws ^rA 
social prejudice were a fact, and mob violence could not 
alter that.  In the early years of the province, riotinq had 
an immediate purpose, ie. to protect one's mill or money or 
to save the life of a local deserter.  When the riot was 
successful and the purpose had been accomplished, the satis- 
fied mob fitted immediately and comfortably back into 
society.  At that point, there was very little that the es- 
tablished qovernment could do to bring the rioters to legal 
justice.  Local magistrates could not violate community in- 
terests . 
With the introduction of long-term ideals and broader 
issues into the public mind, the mob became subtly redefin- 
\ 
\ 
ed.  Rioting continued to be an indication of the values 
and priorities of a society that required unanimity at a 
critical juncture in its history.  Rioting was not a tool of 
the "Grand Cause", but it did strengthen and perpetuate 
society's resolve to attain the ideal. 
The difference in the mob after 1765 was that it could 
not easily attain satisfaction; without short-term goals, 
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sysier :<•;.::«•: a uirr :si -r. -■•! r->-. 
n.i :isiry.  K 11 :: the decision ! r x n,i-•; «■ r-.cic:.^-.• , i-y.cc ..? i r. ; 
the -;onoral will of the public r«'*i;ired or-.lor arid saffy. 
By 1776, tho need to defend local interests was not a print 
concern of society.  Nevertheless, throughout New Hamp- 
shire's provincial history riotmq remained an ingredient 
necessary for its society to maintain liberty and freedom. 
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